# NOTE:

#### I suck and don’t have any of Carly’s 1NRs. I will upload them when I find them.

# ROUND 3 v OU BM

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### 1) Interpretation: The ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive advocacy

#### 2) Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School, ‘4

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

**The colon introduces** the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. **A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"¶ Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.**

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC.

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3) Vote Negative:

#### Limits

#### They’re necessary to give discussions direction and closure

**Tonn 05**

(Mari Boor, Professor of Communication – University of Maryland, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public”, *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Fall)

Second, whereas Schudson focuses largely on ways a conversational model for democracy may mute an individual's voice in crafting a resolution on a given question at a given time, I draw upon insights of Dana L. Cloud and others to consider ways in which a therapeutic, conversational approach to public problems can stymie productive, collective action in two respects.17 First, because conversation has no clearly defined goal, a public conversation may engender inertia as participants become mired in repeated airings of personal experiences without a mechanism to lend such expressions direction and closure. As Freeman aptly notes, although "[u]nstructured groups may be very effective in getting [people] to talk about their lives[,] they aren't very good for getting things done. Unless their mode of operation changes, groups flounder at the point where people tire of 'just talking.'"18 Second, because the therapeutic bent of much public conversation locates social ills and remedies within individuals or dynamics of interpersonal relationships, public conversations and dialogues risk becoming substitutes for policy formation necessary to correct structural dimensions of social problems. In mimicking the emphasis on the individual in therapy, Cloud warns, the therapeutic rhetoric of "healing, consolation, and adaptation or adjustment" tends to "encourage citizens to perceive political issues, conflicts, and inequities as personal failures subject to personal amelioration."19

#### Limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Stasis

#### Effective deliberation requires predictable points of stasis – its key to overcome politically debilitating self-obsession

Roberts-Miller 03

(Patricia Roberts-Miller is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt’s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into **solipsistic and unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all **imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience**, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that **it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical**. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who **abdicate their human capacities** and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with **disastrous consequences**, **both for other people and eventually for themselves**" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a **people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews**. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their **constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible**. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a **totalitarian system**, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; **there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies**. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the **playful and competitive space of agonism**; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the **assumption of competition,** and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are **not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments**, **of one's thought**. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to **articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response**. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that **one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it**. The situation is agonistic **not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict**, but because **conflict is a necessary consequence of difference**. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to **engage in mass murder** **because he was able not to think about it,** especially **not from the perspective of the victims**, and he was able to **exempt himself from personal responsibility** by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the **central mystery of the holocaust**—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, **fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy**, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: **denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive**. To put it another way, **theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies**. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "**critical thinking**, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, **necessarily public discourse**: critical thinking is possible "**only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection**" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; **participants are interlocutors** and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must **be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.** Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). **The paradoxical nature of agonism** (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still **values conflict, disagreement, and equality** among interlocutors, but it **has the goal of reaching agreement,** as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it **is how one tests the validity of one's thought**. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does **not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth**; **it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered.** Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one **simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions**, **rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think.** The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are **important positive political consequences of agonism.** Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how **the system could be actively moral**. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the **evil of conformity**—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state **makes possible extraordinary evil** carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill **undermines the political force of conformity**, so it is **a force against the bureaucratizing of evil.** If people think for themselves, **they will resist dogma**; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, **they will resist totalitarianism**. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the **best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere**. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### C) State action

#### Scientific and instrumental argumentation and research is key to motivate legislative fence-sitters – turns the aff

Brown 11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### D) Switch Side

#### Its key to effective deliberation over environmental issues

Mitchell 10

(Gordon R., Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh; Spring, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 – Kurr)

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate [End Page 106] debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work."56 Here, an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of "switch-side public [End Page 107] debate"57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other," and further, that humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 [End Page 108] Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation. The intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUS) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUS across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative. This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community's effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: [End Page 109] Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

#### E) Roleplaying is key

#### That allows us to influence state policy AND is key to agency

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features: their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the unique combination of simulation with role-playing. The unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied. This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. ‘No other technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures they want to explore’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. The game element: the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, policy development simulations—as forms of interactive or participatory modelling— are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action (‘the five Cs’). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the synopsis below

### 1NC

#### YOU OUGHT TO REFUSE THE ANTHRPOCENTRISM EMBEDDED IN HEIDEGGER’S ANALYTIC OF DASEIN.

#### THEIR CRITICAL, PARTIAL ACCEPTANCE OF HEIDEGGER IS INSUFFICIENT AND ONLY STRENGTHENS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HUMAN AND NONHUMANS, PUSHING POPULATIONS TOWARDS GENOCIDE - KILLING BEINGS WITH INAUTHENTIC VIEWS OF DEATH IS ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THEY DO NOT DIE – ONLY PERISH.

Calarco 2k3

[matthew, PHD Suny-Binghamton, "on the borders of language and death: derrida and the question of the animal", angelaki]

Now it might seem that by attempting to disrupt the strict binaries that separate the authentic from the inauthentic, properly dying from perishing and demise, and Dasein from animals and other living beings, that Derrida is attempting to collapse all experiences of death into an indifferent sameness. He is cognizant of this risk, and immediately adds that the “common characteristic” he is speaking about “does not mean homogeneity, but rather the impossibility of an absolutely pure and rigorously uncrossable limit . . .” (A 75/PF 336). The point for Derrida here is not to erase the sharp distinctions between the various modes of death and dying but to open them up to contamination and multiplication. In other words, he does not want to obfuscate the many differences between the kinds of living/dying that characterize human beings and animals; rather he is pointing out that the drawing of single or essential limits is itself what obscures important differences both between humans and animals as well as among humans themselves and animals themselves. There is not one difference that separates “The Human” from “The Animal” with respect to death any more than there is a single experience of death common to all animals as such or all humans as such. Such would be the conclusion reached by way of the “logic” of différance, which insists on multiplication and complication where essentialist gestures have homogenized, reduced, or screened out important differences. Derrida intimates the consequences of this differ*a*ntial thinking for Heidegger’s existential analytic when he writes: If, in its very principle, the rigor of this distinction [i.e., *eigentlich sterben* and *verenden*] were compromised, weakened, or parasited on both sides of what it is supposed to dissociate . . . , then . . . the entire project of the analysis of *Dasein*, in its essential conceptuality, would be, if not discredited, granted another status than the one generally attributed to it. (A 31-2/PF 321) But beyond this attempt to point out the necessity for a rethinking of the existential analytic, Derrida’s intervention into the thematics of the possible/proper in Heidegger’s discourse on death can also be read as opening onto a quite radical and original critique of anthropocentrism. In contrast to thinkers such as Agamben, Levinas, and Blanchot, Derrida clearly recognizes that something must be said about the anthropocentrism of a discourse that so quickly dismisses any relation between animals and their death(s) and/or language(s). The underlying argument here is that it is not sufficient to argue (against Heidegger) for the impossibility of a proper death for Dasein only to effectively leave in place (with Heidegger) the classically anthropocentric, hierarchical, and analytical distinctions between human Dasein and the animal. Derrida addresses this concern in the concluding lines of the paragraph we have been reading: Against, or without, Heidegger, one could point to a thousand signs that show that animals also die. Although the innumerable structural differences that separate one “species” from another should make us vigilant about any discourse on animality or bestiality in general, one can say that animals have a very significant relation to death, to murder and to war (hence to borders), to mourning and to hospitality, and so forth, even if they have neither a relation to death nor to the “name” of death as such, nor, by the same token, to the other as such, to the purity as such of the alterity of the other as such. But neither does man, that is precisely the point! . . . Who will guarantee that the name, that the ability to name death (like that of naming the other, and it is the same) does not participate as much in the dissimulation of the “as such” of death as in its revelation, and that language is not precisely the origin of the nontruth of death, and of the other? (A 75-6/PF 336) Derrida closes the paragraph with a question mark, as is typically the case in his work when such immensely complex relations are at stake. What we are left with at the end of his analysis, then, is a rather open-ended conclusion: the lingering forms of anthropocentrism and humanism that underpin Heidegger’s analysis of death should be called into question, and this entails the necessity not only for a more nuanced account of the various relations human beings have to death and dying, but also for careful analyses of how animals (and not “The Animal”) also die.

#### AND, this species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### Alternative: the judge should vote negative to REJECT THE 1AC’S human SURVIVAL ethic.

#### this rejection enables an understanding of the SPECIES-BEING. that SOLVES THE ETHICAL EXCEPTIONALISM OF THEIR SURVIVAL POLITICS.

HUDSON 2K4

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### Case

#### We’ll impact turn their intervention argument - it is necessary to prevent global extinction – it’s too late for the aff

Levy 99

Dr Neil Levy 1999. Fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University. “Discourses of the Environment” p. 215

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our uses of resources, we are nevertheless unable to simply leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions. More over, there is another reason why our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is no us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result form a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternative which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalist, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province for Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their won conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the fate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided.

#### The “standing reserve” is inevitable because technological thought won’t go away

Leach 3

date page modified (Neil, Professor at the University of Southern California, “Forget Heidegger”, August 15, <http://www.china-designer.com/magazine/leach/txt1.htm>)

Adorno's further example of the car reveals how the **technological has come to colonise our everyday lives not as standing reserve, but as something to which symbolic intention is always already being 'attached'**. The point here is that we have to understand that our engagement with technology involves a moment of 'proprioception'. **Technology may come to operate as a form of 'prosthesis' to the human body that is appropriated such that it becomes part of the motility of the body**. In driving a car we come to navigate the road through that car. As such, the car as an item of technology is not divorced - alienated - from the body. Indeed it becomes a form of extension to that body. What I am arguing here is not some simplistic manifesto for cyborgs, claiming that human beings can become part human and part machine. Rather I am trying to tease out the logic of mimesis itself. For according to this logic, **human beings have absorbed technology at an unconscious level, such that they have come to operate through technology**, as though by way of some tele-kinesis.¶ Not only this, but **technology may actually influence the way that human beings think. It may itself affect our consciousness**. Let us take the example of the computer. For, if as Walter Benjamin once argued, the factory worker in the modernist age comes to absorb the jolting, jarring repetitive action of the machine, such that those movements are appropriated into the worker's own behaviour, so too people today have absorbed the thinking and fluid circuitry behind the computer screen. **New conditions breed new ways of thinking**. As Douglas Rushkoff observes, a new computer generation is emerging. The computer kids of today come to behave like their computers. They identify with them, play with them, and mimic their operations. Analogical reasoning is out. Non-linear, multiple-layered thinking is in - Deleuzian surfing. Fractals, rhizomes and clones, fluidity and flux - these are the buzz words of this new generation. In such a context, those who argue against the use of the computer in the contemporary design studio are failing to address the concrete ontological reality of life today, and are doing no service to the students, for whom knowledge of computer has become a 'given' within the contemporary office. It may be that the still prevalent **antipathy towards digital technology is merely a form of 'denial'**. As in the case of homophobics, who often deny their latent homosexuality, critics of technology may be repressing a secret fascination with technology. An individual 'in denial' may be fascinated by some personal psychic obsession, but, not wishing to acknowledge it, will project that obsession on to some external object, and then criticise it. But **whether this antipathy towards digital technology is a form of repressed fascination or not, it is clearly out of place in what has become a highly digitalised world**.¶ This is not to say that the computer should be accepted unproblematically within the studio. Indeed the lessons of those design schools that have accepted the computer wholesale would seem to indicate that the concerns expressed in The Anaesthetics of Architecture about the potential aestheticisation and hence anaesthetisation of social issues are borne out only too clearly in such contexts. Rather it is a call for a self-critical, theoretically informed engagement with such realms. Theory may be unable in itself to combat the potential problems of aestheticisation. Yet it may provide the first crucial step. **Once a problem has been exposed, one is no longer trapped by that problem.**¶ **The consequences are all too obvious. Not only have we accepted technology as an essential part of our everyday life, such that the distinction once posed between techné and technology seems no longer valid, but our whole existence has become conditioned by technology**. In this new digital age, as Sarah Chaplin argues, we have adopted a form of cybervisuality. An important factor, then, is our interface with that technology. For **technology may take many forms**. Here the question of design becomes crucial. The message of mimesis is not that human beings will adapt to anything, so that design is unimportant, but precisely the opposite. Design becomes an important mechanism for making people feel at one with their world. This relates not simply to whether a piece of technology is itself aesthetically pleasing - as is the case, say, with the iMac computer - , but in the context of digital technology it relates also to the user interface - to software programming and its compatibility with human modes of operation. **Far from engendering alienation, well designed technology has the capacity to overcome alienation**.¶ There was a time when Heideggerian thought made a substantial and noteworthy contribution to architectural culture in challenging the spirit of positivism that was once so pervasive. But now **Heideggerian thinking must not** itself **go unchallenged, in that it threatens to install itself as a set of fixed values out of tune with the fluidity and flux of contemporary society**. And while some would criticise postmodern thought for being relativistic in accommodating plurality and difference, and questioning the ground on which any particular statement is made, the true relativism lies surely in a tradition that forecloses even the possibility of even asking these questions, by doggedly adhering to an out of date set of values, and by failing to engage substantively with any critical discourse.¶ In an increasingly digital world, it is time, it would seem, to adopt a more flexible and tolerant attitude towards digital technology. It is time to break free from the shackles of the past. **It is time**, perhaps, **to forget Heidegger**.

#### Prior focus on ontology causes paralysis – having “good enough knowledge” is a sufficient condition for action

Kratochwil 8

Kratochwil, professor of international relations – European University Institute, ‘8

(Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213)

The lesson seems clear. **Even at the danger of “fuzzy boundaries”, when we deal with “practice**” ( just as with the “pragmatic turn”), **we would be well advised to rely on the use of the term rather than on its reference** (pointing to some property of the object under study), **in order to draw the bounds of sense and understand the meaning of the concept. My argument for the fruitful character of a pragmatic approach in IR,** therefore, **does not depend on a comprehensive mapping of the varieties of research in this area, nor on an arbitrary appropriation or exegesis of any specific and self-absorbed theoretical orientation**. For this reason, in what follows, I will not provide a rigidly specified definition, nor will I refer exclusively to some prepackaged theoretical approach. Instead, **I will sketch out the reasons for which a prag- matic orientation in social analysis seems to hold particular promise**. These reasons pertain both to the more general area of knowledge appropriate for praxis and to the more specific types of investigation in the field. The follow- ing ten points are – without a claim to completeness – intended to engender some critical reflection on both areas.¶ Firstly, **a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects** **or “things” (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology**), **but with “acting**” (prattein), **thereby preventing some false starts**. Since, **as historical beings placed in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information.** Pre- cisely **because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear ex ante, because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions**, **and the multiple possibilities** are rife with incentives for (dis)information. **This puts a premium on** quick **diagnostic** and cognitive **shortcuts informing actors** about the relevant features of the situ- ation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. **Instead of** relying on **certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction** and controlled experiments, **we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail**, rather than to generality, **matter**. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic.¶ These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and use- fulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position.¶ Secondly, **since acting in the social world often involves acting “for” some- one, special responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem**. Since we owe special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, **we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case**. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, **we cannot refuse to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient know- ledge**, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, **there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act**. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sci- ences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

## 2NC

### 2NC Overview

####  “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

### 2NC Limits

#### Echo Chamber DA - This rejection of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. This impoverishes their project even if it is right

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. **Activists** also **must engage in deliberation** among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, **our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth** ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with

### 2NC Stasis

#### 3) Epistemology— lack of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. That prevents any knowledge gaining and turns their education claims

Talisse 5—Professor of Philosophy @Vandy

Robert, *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reﬂect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justiﬁcations for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justiﬁcation is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reﬂection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86 Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.) 17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be conﬁdent that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

### A2 Predictability Bad

#### Predictability maintains meaningful politics and empathy even if their DA is correct

Massaro, Prof Law – Florida, ’89

(Toni M, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099)

Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice. 52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal [\*2111] decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and experience. 53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations.¶ My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. 54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" -- to name only a few legal concepts -- hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas.¶ Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles. 55¶ As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -- including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization [\*2112] of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, 56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal.¶ Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant. 57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific -- more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations. 58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers -- in this example, women -- and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings.¶ A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity -- "law for law's sake" -- because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other [\*2113] party to follow them. 59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships. 60

### 2NC Simulation Good

#### Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

### Standing Reserve/Tech Thought

#### The alt is violent, causes passivity, and makes exploitation worse

Graham ‘99

(Phil, Graduate School of Management, University of Queensland, Heidegger’s Hippies: A dissenting voice on the “problem of the subject” in cyberspace, Identities in Action! 1999, <http://www.philgraham.net/HH_conf.pdf>)

Societies should get worried when Wagner’s music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not far away. Existentialists create problems about what is, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a name for this world? A solution to all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997). Armed with a volume of Nietzsche**,** some considerable oratory skills, several Wagner records, and an existentialist University Rector in the form of Martin Heidegger, Hitler managed some truly astoundingfeats of strategic identity engineering (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, Heidegger pronounced the end of thought, history, ideology, and civilisation: ‘No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being**.** The Fuhrer himself, and he alone, is the present and future reality for Germany’ (in Bullock 1991: 345). Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics: Hitler’s ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1997). The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche’s European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. Hitler took control of the means of propaganda: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past. Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk (e.g. Giddens4, 1991, Chapt. 2). Giddens’s claims that ‘humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction’, and that ‘subjective death’ and ‘biological death’ are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). History is, in fact, the simple and straightforward answer to the “problem of the subject”. “The problem” is also a handy device for confusing, entertaining, and selling trash to the masses. By emphasising the problem of the ‘ontological self’ (Giddens 1991: 49), informationalism and ‘consumerism’ confines the navel-gazing, ‘narcissistic’ masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, ~~raping~~ [ruining] the environment**;** swindling each other and whole nations**;** and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security**.** Slavery is once again on the increase (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998). There is no “problem of the subject”, just as there is no “global society”; there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies. Each person’s identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique and objective history of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity**.** This is their condition. People are not theoretical entities; they are people. As such, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value. No amount of theory or propaganda will make it go away. The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society and **hypercapitalism** as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth, indeed, as the path to an inevitable, international democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The “problem” of subjective death threatens to give way, once again, to unprecedented mass slaughter. The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent “now”, a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which “subjective death” and ontology are the least of all worries.

### Ontology Focus Bad

#### It causes academic regression and can’t explain things

Owen 2

(David, professor of social and political philosophy and deputy director of the Centre for Philosophy and Value at the University of Southampton, “Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2002 31: 653)

The first danger with **the philosophical turn** is that it **has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former**. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, **while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind**.¶ The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that **because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR**. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, **from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’**.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘**whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’**.6 Moreover, **this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity**.

The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and **prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right**. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so **a potentially vicious circle arises**.

### Space

#### Space exploration results from our viewing of space as an infinite standing reserve, the supreme manifestation of the danger of technology.

Soccio in 09 (Douglas J., Professor of Philosophy @ Shasta University Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy Seventh Edition The Age of Technology: Danger p.515, 2009) JM

We measure—“order”—the cosmos itself, looking to outer space for new sources of energy to add to the ever-expanding standing-reserve. When nature as a whole is threatened by technology, we employ technology to count and record (“order”) endangered species via wireless transmitters. We scientifically analyze soil and air samples, track storms via satellite, and obsessively tweak additives and supplements to enhance our food supply. We seek out new superdrugs to kill off superbugs created by older drugs crafted to kill off older bugs. Yet in these very attempts to control the world and to come to technically “correct” understandings of the world, “the truth will withdraw,” Heidegger warns. Correct, calculative, objective understanding of particulars, though not sufficient for grasping the truth of existence, is potently useful, seductive, and distracting and induces complacency. This, says Heidegger, is “the supreme danger” of technology, a danger rooted in our overall indifference to every- thing that is not part of the standing-reserve. So long as we are chiefly inter- ested in things as means, as instruments, as standing-reserve, we inevitably come to a point where we take ourselves for standing-reserve. Then, ironically and monstrously, . . . precisely as the one so threatened, [man] exalts himself to the posture of the lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself. . . . In truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence.

#### Solves extinction

Schulze-Makuch and Davies 2010 (Dirk Schulze-Makuch, Ph.D., School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Washington State University and Paul Davies, Ph.D., Beyond Center, Arizona State University, “To Boldly Go: A One-Way Human Mission to Mars”, <http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars108.html>)

There are several reasons that motivate the establishment of a permanent Mars colony. We are a vulnerable species living in a part of the galaxy where cosmic events such as major asteroid and comet impacts and supernova explosions pose a significant threat to life on Earth, especially to human life. There are also more immediate threats to our culture, if not our survival as a species. These include global pandemics, nuclear or biological warfare, runaway global warming, sudden ecological collapse and supervolcanoes (Rees 2004). Thus, the colonization of other worlds is a must if the human species is to survive for the long term. The first potential colonization targets would be asteroids, the Moon and Mars. The Moon is the closest object and does provide some shelter (e.g., lava tube caves), but in all other respects falls short compared to the variety of resources available on Mars. The latter is true for asteroids as well. Mars is by far the most promising for sustained colonization and development, because it is similar in many respects to Earth and, crucially, possesses a moderate surface gravity, an atmosphere, abundant water and carbon dioxide, together with a range of essential minerals. Mars is our second closest planetary neighbor (after Venus) and a trip to Mars at the most favorable launch option takes about six months with current chemical rocket technology.

#### Venturing into space reconstructs our connection with the earth, forcing us to become more environmentally aware.

O’NEILL 08, Ian: Ph.D in solar physics

[“The Human Brain in Space: Euphoria and the "Overview Effect" Experienced by Astronauts,” http://www.universetoday.com/2008/05/22/the-human-brain-in-space-euphoria-and-the-overview-effect-experienced-by-astronauts/]

Could be the best example yet of being "spaced out"? When in space, astronauts have repeatedly reported inexplicable euphoria, a "cosmic connection" or an increased sensitivity to their place in the Universe. The experience sounds like the ultimate high, or the ultimate enlightening; it would appear that without trying, astronauts are able to attain a similar mental state as meditating Buddhist monks. So what is happening when the human body is in space? Does zero-gravity create new connections in the brain? Or is it a natural human response to the vastness of space and realizing just how small we are in comparison? What ever the reason, it looks like even when astronauts are back on solid ground, they have changed profoundly… On March 6th, 1969, Rusty Schweikart experienced a feeling that the whole universe was profoundly connected. At the time, he was on a postponed space walk outside his Apollo 9 Lunar Module, carrying out tests for the forthcoming Moon landings. Already having suffered from space sickness (hence delaying the EVA) he felt a euphoric sensation: "When you go around the Earth in an hour and a half, you begin to recognize that your identity is with that whole thing. That makes a change… it comes through to you so powerfully that you're the sensing element for Man." - Russell "Rusty" Schweikart. Two years later, Apollo 14 astronaut, Edgar Mitchell (joint record holder with Alan Shepard for longest ever Moon walk of 9 hours and 17 minutes) reported experiencing an "Overview Effect". He described the sensation gave him a profound sense of connectedness, with a feeling of bliss and timelessness. He was overwhelmed by the experience. He became profoundly aware that each and every atom in the Universe was connected in some way, and on seeing Earth from space he had an understanding that all the humans, animals and systems were a part of the same thing, a synergistic whole. It was an interconnected euphoria. Schweikart and Mitchell's experiences are not isolated anomalies, many other astronauts since the 1970's have reported this Overview Effect. Andy Newberg, a neuroscientist/physician with experience in space medicine, hopes to find out whether this is an actual psychological phenomenon. Perhaps there is a medical reason for an actual change in an astronaut's brain function when in space. What's more, he's noticed a psychological change in the men and women that have come back from space: "You can often tell when youâ€™re with someone who has flown in space, its palpable." - Andy Newberg Newberg has scanned many brains to try to understand how humans reach this euphoric state on Earth. The religious communities, transcendental mediators and others around the world are able to experience similar states and have been the focus of interest to neuroscientists. In some cases, the meditation leads some people to view the whole cosmos as an interconnected quantum web, where consciousness is not separate, but a part of the Universe. Now Newberg hopes to monitor the brain of one of the first space tourists so a better grasp of the brain function of a human in zero-G can be understood. Edgar Mitchell has said that his personal event has changed his life, revealing a Universe that had remained hidden until he experienced the Overview Effect on that Apollo 14 mission in 1971. Whether this effect is a physical change in the brain, or a deeper, yet to be discovered event, Newberg hopes to find some answers.

## 1NR

### A2: Perm

#### - PERM LINKS MORE: HOLDING OUT FOR REFORM IS WORSE BECAUSE IT DISAVOWS THE UNETHICAL VIOLENCE IN THEIR POLITICAL PARADIGM. ONLY THE ALT. SOLVES.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

The banality of action hits against a central problem of social-political action within late modernity. In one sense, the ethical demand to respond to historical and present environmental destruction opens onto a difficulty within the relationship between moral intention and autonomy. While an individual might be autonomous in respect of moral conscience, their fundamental interconnection with and inter- dependence upon social, political and economic orders strips them of the power to make and act upon truly autonomous decisions. From this perspective it is not only the modern humanist figures such as Hawking who perpetuate present violence and present dreams of colonial speciesist violence in the future. It is also those who might reject this violence but whose lives and actions are caught up in a certain complicity for this violence. From a variety of political standpoints, it would seem that the issue of modern, autonomous action runs into difficulties of systematic and institutional complicity.¶ Certainly both individuals and groups are expected to give up a degree of autonomy in a modern liberal-democratic context. In this instance, giving up autonomy (in the sense of autonomy as sovereignty) is typically done in exchange for the hope or promise of at some point having some degree of control or influence (i.e. via the electoral system) over government policy. The price of this hope or promise, however, is continued complicity in government-sanctioned social, political and economic actions that temporarily (or in the worst case, eternally) lie beyond the individual’s choice and control. The answer to the questions of whether such complicity might ever be institutionally overcome, and the problems of human violence against non-human species and ongoing environmental destruction effectively dealt with, often depends upon whether one believes that the liberal hope or promise is, either valid and worthwhile, or false and a sham. [8]

#### THE AFFIRMATIVE'S ADHERENCE TO HEIDEGGER'S NOTION OF THE RELATIVE PRIMACY OF THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE - OF DA-SEIN AS AN ANALYTIC TOOL - LOCKS US INTO AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE MEAT-EATING, MALE SUBJECT AND FORECLOSES ETHICS. the permutation fails.

Steiner 2K5 [gary, anthropocentrism and its discontents, 218]

Heidegger fails, in Derrida's estimation, to acknowlege such a sense of responsibility because his thesis about the world-poverty of the animal is irretrievably "anthropo-telological." Heidegger's thesis confers an absolute superiority on humans over all other beings, and subtly incorporates the Stoic prejudice that all nonhuman beings exist for the sake of humanity. Heidegger's anthropocentrism regarding animals is a "carno-phallogocentrism," that is, it asserts the primacy of meat-eating, male linguistic beings in the cosmic scheme of things, thereby effectively excluding all other beings from the bond of ethical responsibility.

#### And the perm uniquely links more.

Tyler 2k5

[tom, like water in water, journal for cultural research, vol 9, no 3, july]

Glendinning puts it best when he suggests that the problem is not so much, as¶ Derrida claims, that we cannot find a place for the animal within the basic¶ concepts of Heidegger’s analytic, as the fact of the “unexamined privilege¶ conferred on the human being” by those concepts (Glendinning 1996, p. 78). The¶ distinctive co-dependence of thinking, word and hand sets humanity apart.¶ Heidegger’s objection to traditional humanism is, in part, that it does not sufficiently¶ emphasize the unique and privileged relationship that “homo humanus”¶ has to Being: “the highest determinations of the essence of man in humanism still¶ do not realize the proper dignity of man” (Heidegger 1993, pp. 233–234, 245).¶ Only once we recognize the special role of Man as guardian over the truth of¶ Being is he restored to his proper place. This done, Heidegger is prepared to¶ contemplate the possibility of reclaiming the term humanism (Heidegger 1993,¶ pp. 245, 247–248). The humanistic (or hyperhumanistic) phenomenology from¶ which Heidegger starts has thus already precluded the possibility of his recognizing¶ or discovering a human–animal continuity, a human–animal Mitsein (beingwith)¶ perhaps, and thus condemns him to an anthropocentrism in which human¶ being is foremost.18

### Link

#### HEIDEGGER’S ANALYSIS OF BEINGS CELEBRATES HUAMSN AT THE EXPENSE OF ANIMALS BY PROMOTING THE distinctioN and PRESUMING AN essential knowledge OR DISTINCTION.

McFarlane 2k9

[craig, book review: Calarco’s Zoographies: Metaphysical Anthropocentrism – Heidegger, <http://inhumanities.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/calarcos-zoographies-metaphysical-anthropocentrism-heidegger/>]

Also of great significance, is that Heidegger resists an attempt to organize beings along a hierarchy: just because humans are world-forming, this does not imply that they have an ontological priority to animals which are world-poor or even to rocks which are worldless. Consequently, there are no grounds upon which to rank beings in terms of differences in degree. The result, however, is that beings end up being ranked in terms of differences in kind. This result follows from Heidegger’s refusal to explain animals in terms of humans and humans in terms of animals. Ultimately, “the question concerning whether such a distinction between human beings and animals can or even should be drawn is never raised for serious discussion.” The result of Heidegger’s analysis of beings in relation to the world is that he has recourse to two dogmatic theses: “the human beings and animals can be clearly and cleanly distinguished in their essence; and that such a distinction between human beings and animals even needs to be drawn.”…¶ Fourth Analysis: metaphysical humanism and metaphysical anthropocentrism – the final section turns to a consideration of the connection between humanism and anthropocentrism, a question which Heidegger raises in his essay, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” where he notes that the “beginning of metaphysics in the thought of Plato is at the same time the beginning of ‘humanism.’” Here, Heidegger notes the connection between human subjectivity and anthropocentrism under the heading of humanism, which differs from the later account in the “Letter on ‘Humanism.’” At issue is whether humans should be thought of as one of the living beings among many others (which Heidegger continues to identify with biologism) or should humans be thought of in exceptional terms? In fancier terms, what is at issue is whether the being of humans belongs to animalitas or humanitas? Here we return to the question of language: where does language arrive from? Simply put (and not how Calarco explains it, by the way), language does not appear in animals, but it does appear in humans, thus language must arise from something specific to humans. Consequently, it cannot be said that language, that which is specific to humans, arises out of animalitas, but only humanitas. (One thinks of Chosmky’s “universal grammar” as an essential difference between humans and animals.) While Heidegger’s analysis here is moderately novel, Calarco notes that Heidegger has not said anything fundamentally new about the distinction between humans and animals (language is a standard dividing line), thus despite his efforts, Heidegger remains trapped within the tradition of humanism. In this sense, Heidegger also remains trapped within an anthropocentric vision of the world.

### AT: not our Heidegger

#### THEIR WILLINGNESS TO THINK, TO DWELL ON A CRITIQUE OF HUMANISM MERELY MASKS THE SUBTLE TRACES OF ANTHROPOCENTRISM IN HEIDEGGER’S THOUGHT.

Calarco 2k3

[matthew, PHD Suny-Binghamton, "on the borders of language and death: derrida and the question of the animal", angelaki]

My purpose for this schematic recall of Agamben’s argument is twofold. First, Agamben’s critical remarks on Heidegger’s thinking of death as a possibility proper to man present in an abbreviated form one of the main strands of the argument that Derrida develops in *Aporias*, an argument that I shall examine in more detail in the following pages. On this issue, Derrida’s work converges not only with that of Agamben but also with other prominent critical readers of Heidegger such as Blanchot and Levinas.[[3]](http://www.faculty.sbc.edu/mcalarco/Calarco%20Essay%2C%20On%20the%20Borders%2C%20Angelaki.htm#_edn3) Second, by pointing out this convergence among key post-Heideggerian thinkers, we will be able to gain a clearer perspective on Derrida’s divergence from this tradition. The split becomes especially apparent when we begin to think through the status of “the animal” in Heidegger’s writings as well as in contemporary politics/ethics. For Agamben, Levinas, and Blanchot, as for much of contemporary post-Heideggerian or “Continental” thought, the question of the animal has been a non-question. Thus, even as the task of thinking through the conditions of an affirmative, post-metaphysical, post-humanist conception of community remains a central theme, there has been very little attention devoted to the implications that such notions of community might have for contemporary animal ethics and politics. Continental thought, it seems, has remained content with continuing and deepening Heidegger’s critique of metaphysical humanism, while leaving his subtle anthropocentrism and binary distinctions between man and animal intact. In the analysis of Derrida’s *Aporias* to which we now turn, I shall attempt to show how Derrida offers a critical challenge to this anthropocentric tendency in Continental thought and what the implications of this challenge might be for contemporary reflections on finitude, language, and relation.

### AT Alt No Solve

#### and, abandonment of the humanist paradigm of survival means rejecting their efforts towards harm minimization. complicity with genocidal violence is inevitable in any world of the aff or the perm. only the alternative’s dialectical anti-humanism can solve.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

How might such a standpoint of dialectical, utopian anti-humanism reconfigure a notion of action which does not simply repeat in another way the modern humanist infliction of violence, as exemplified by the plan of Hawking, or fall prey to institutional and systemic complicity in speciesist violence? While this question goes beyond what it is possible to outline in this paper, we contend that the thought experiment of global suicide helps to locate this question – the question of modern action itself – as residing at the heart of the modern environmental problem. In a sense perhaps the only way to understand what is at stake in ethical action which responds to the natural environment is to come to terms with the logical consequences of ethical action itself. The point operates then not as the end, but as the starting point of a standpoint which attempts to reconfigure our notions of action, life-value, and harm. For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of non- participation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion – the global suicide of humanity – as a free-willed and ‘final solution’.

# ROUND 6 v UMKC ??

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### Interpretation – Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced. Aff only reduces a regulation on production.

Anell 89 Chairman, WTO panel "To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68) http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### On is exclusive

Graham 16 (Arthur Butler, "Brief for Appellants – Wilson v. Dorflinger %26 Sons", Court of Appeals – State of New York, Reg. 108, Fol. 387, 1916, p. 11-12)

The Standard Dictionary defines the word "on" as follows: "In or into such a position with reference to something, as a vehicle, a table, or a stage, as to be in contact with and supported by it; in a position, state or condition of adherence; as, he got on before the wagon had fully stopped." In Webster's International Dictionary, we find as follows: "on--The general signification of 'on' is situation, motion or condition with respect to contact with, the surface or upper part of a thing, and supported by it; placed or lying in contact with the surface; as, the book lies on the table, which stands on the floor of a house on an island." It is submitted that an elevator is not operated on streets or on highways, as a car, truck or wagon is operated, and that by the use of the word "on" the Legislature intended to include only those appliances therein enumerated, namely, cars, trucks, and wagons. An elevator is not operated on anything, but is operated in or inside a shaft, and is controlled by guides, which deprive the operator of the power to change the course of the lift from right to left. Clearly the Legislature intended to include in Group 41, only those cars, trucks and wagons whose direction and guidance are controlled by the operator, in whatever direction he may deem advisable.

#### Production refers to primary energy extraction for a specific list of sources

Energici 12 (provides business intelligence and decision support services to companies and investors active in the wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and bioenergy industries. Specializes in providing robust research, analysis and intelligence coverage of trends and developments) February “PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION (MONTHLY)” http://www.energici.com/energy-profiles/by-country/europe-m-z/sweden/49-countries/north-america/usa/usa-geothermal/449-primary-energy-production

Definition : Primary Energy Production is the amount of energy converted from a primary energy source in its natural state, such as coal, gas, wind etc. that has not been subjected to any conversion or transformation process. The U.S. Energy Information Administration includes the following in U.S. primary energy production: coal production, waste coal supplied, and coal refuse recovery; crude oil and lease condensate production; natural gas plant liquids production; dry natural gas—excluding supplemental gaseous fuels—production; nuclear electricity net generation\*, conventional hydroelectricity\* (not hydro pumped storage), geothermal electricity\*, solar thermal and photovoltaic electricity\*, wind electricity\*, wood and wood-derived fuels consumption; biomass waste consumption and biofuels feedstock.

#### Voting issue –

#### 1. Including regulations is a limits disaster.

Doub 76 Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy Annual Review of Energy Vol. 1: 715-725 (Volume publication date November 1976) DOI: 10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, 1757 N Street NW, Washington, DC 20036 Mr. Doub is a principal in the law firm of Doub and Muntzing, which he formed in 1977. Previously he was a partner in the law firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae. He was a member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1971 - 1974. He served as a member of the Executive Advisory Committee to the Federal Power Commission in 1968 - 1971 and was appointed by the President of the United States to the President's Air Quality Advisory Board in 1970. He is a member of the American Bar Association, Maryland State Bar Association, and Federal Bar Association. He is immediate past Chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the World Energy Conference and a member of the Atomic Industrial Forum. He currently serves as a member of the nuclear export policy committees of both the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Energy Council. Mr. Doub graduated from Washington and Jefferson College (B.A., 1953) and the University of Maryland School of Law in 1956. He is married, has two children, and resides in Potomac, Md. He was born September 3, 1931, in Cumberland, Md. http://0-www.annualreviews.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435

FERS began with the recognition that federal energy policy must result from concerted efforts in all areas dealing with energy, not the least of which was the manner in which energy is regulated by the federal government. Energy selfsufficiency is improbable, if not impossible, without sensible regulatory processes, and effective regulation is necessary for public confidence. Thus, the President directed that "a comprehensive study be undertaken, in full consultation with Congress, to determine the best way to organize all energy-related regulatory activities of the government." An interagency task force was formed to study this question. With 19 different federal departments and agencies contributing, the task force spent seven months deciphering the present organizational makeup of the federal energy regulatory system, studying the need for organizational improvement, and evaluating alternatives. More than 40 agencies were found to be involved with making regulatory decisions on energy. Although only a few deal exclusively with energy, most of the 40 could significantly affect the availability and/or cost of energy. For example, in the field of gas transmission, there are five federal agencies that must act on siting and land-use issues, seven on emission and effluent issues, five on public safety issues, and one on worker health and safety issues-all before an onshore gas pipeline can be built. The complexity of energy regulation is also illustrated by the case of Standard Oil Company (Indiana), which reportedly must file about 1000 reports a year with 35 different federal agencies. Unfortunately, this example is the rule rather than the exception.

#### 2. Precision – A distinction between regulation and restrictions is key.

Sinha 6 http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/ Supreme Court of India Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries on 7 November, 2006 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: S Sinha, Mark, E Katju CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 4695 of 2006 PETITIONER: Union of India & Ors. RESPONDENT: M/s. Asian Food Industries DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17008 of 2006] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4696 OF 2006 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17558 of 2006] S.B. SINHA, J :

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus: "It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

### Implementation Advantages 1NC

#### Interpretation- the aff cannot claim advantages not tied to the implementation of the plan

#### Key to predictable limits- infinite number of benefits the aff could claim to their speech act our discourse- impossible to get offense against.

#### Key to education- can’t clash with portions off the aff that aren’t predicated off of affirming the resolution- clash is key to two way education

#### Voting issue for fairness and education

### 1NC CP

#### Text: The United States Congress should eliminate the restriction to have environmental impact statements for the construction of nuclear power plants that they would be reistant to terrorist attacks.

#### Cp solves

Briggs 11

Seton Hall Circuit Review

Volume 8

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Article 7

6-11-2012

Managing The Line Between Nuclear Power And

Nuclear Terror: Considering The Threat Of

Terrorism As An Environmental Impact

Alexander T. Briggs

Barring intervention by the Supreme Court, Congress has the ability ¶ to closely consider the public interest and implement a variety of ¶ mechanisms to address this issue. First, a limited revival of “worst case” ¶ analysis could provide a vehicle for a terrorism review. Second, ¶ Congress could free the NRC of this burden by entrusting terrorism ¶ analysis exclusively to Homeland Security. Third, Congress could ¶ require the agencies or Homeland Security to publish a Homeland ¶ Security Impact Statement. Finally, Congress could broaden the scope of ¶ the NRC’s defensive capabilities and jurisdiction, and expressly charge it ¶ with the duty to evaluate the threat of terrorism. Until either Congress or ¶ the Supreme Court acts, the NRC will continue to enforce its statutory ¶ duty as per its discretion in a manner best serving the nation, while the ¶ Ninth Circuit exposes its energy industry to ambiguous and unattainable ¶ disclosure demands, and its citizens to unnecessary threats.

### 1NC Kobiel DA

#### Supreme Court will limit the ATS in the controversial Kobiel case now.

Daniel Fisher 8/31/12, Forbes Staff, http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/08/31/supreme-court-mulls-affirmative-action-class-actions-in-fall-docket/

FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum Argument date: Oct. 1 Question: Can foreign plaintiffs sue in U.S. court over actions that occurred in another country? This is the second trip to the Supreme Court for Kiobel, a lawsuit by Nigerians who accuse their country’s military of torturing and killing residents, allegedly in the service of Anglo-Dutch Shell Oil. The court heard arguments in February, only to kick the case back with a crucial question: Does the Alien Tort Statute allow such lawsuits at all? The 1789 law was barely used until the 1980s, when enterprising lawyers dusted it off to sue corporations over human-rights abuses in foreign countries. It says foreigners can sue in U.S. courts over torts and violations of international law. Critics say the law was intended to allow ambassadors of foreign countries to sue over acts committed against them in the U.S., not torts committed by other countries on their own soil. The last time the Supreme Court looked at the ATS, in the 2004 decision Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaina, the court said the claims must involve specific violations of international law on a par with piracy and attacks on ambassadors. In the February arguments over Kiobel, a skeptical Chief Justice John Roberts seemed ready to go further: “If there is no other country where this suit could have been brought, regardless of what American domestic law provides,” he asked, “isn’t it a legitimate concern that allowing the suit itself contravenes international law?” Kiobel’s supporters include plaintiff lawyers, human-rights activists and unions, who say the ATS is a powerful tool for forcing corporations accountable for abuses committed by foreign police and troops on their behalf. The U.S. government initially supported the Nigerian plaintiffs, then switched its position, saying the claims in Kiobel would be better handled by a Nigerian court. Meir Feder, an appellate specialist with Jones Day in New York, said it’s likely the court will agree with the Obama administration on that. “I am pretty skeptical the court is going to say that it’s generally OK” for foreign plaintiffs to bring their disputes to U.S. courts, he said. “They’re very likely to limit it some way.”

#### Judicial capital is finite – plan spills-over.

Grosskopf & Mondak, ’98 (Poli Sci Profs -- Pitt & FSU, Political Research Quarterly, Sept, Vol. 51, No. 3)

The existence of a strong link between basic values and diffuse support does not necessarily preclude a role for specific decisions, particularly when we seek to understand how support comes to change over time (e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1992: 658-6 1). We believe that any claim that the Supreme Court is fully immune to backlash against controversial decisions **can be rejected on a prima facie level**. First, consider the extreme case. Were the Supreme Court to make its occasional blockbusters—Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, Texas v. Johnson, etc. —the norm by routinely ruling on the thorniest social questions, we see it as implausible that such actions would bring no cumulative impact on how people view the Court. Second, the Supreme Court’s typical mode of operation suggests that justices themselves view institutional support **as an expendable political capital** (Choper 1980). That is, the **Court recognizes its own political limitations**, and thus justices **pick their spots carefully** when approaching potentially controversial cases. From this perspective, the apparent dominance of democratic values as a determinant of institutional support (e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1992) means not that the Court is insulated from backlash, but that strategic justices **tread cautiously** so as to keep backlash to a minimum. Consequently, how and where we examine whether public response to Supreme Court decisions affects institutional support may shape what answer we find.

#### Controversial decisions expend judicial capital and prevent future controversial decision.

Peretti, ’99 (Associate Political Science Professor – Santa Clara, In Defense of a Political Court, pp. 152-3)

To the degree that a justice cares deeply about her policy goals, she will be quite **attentive to the degree of support and opposition** among interest groups and political leaders for those goals. She will be aware of the resources (e.g. commitment, wealth, legitimacy) that the relevant interest groups possess who bear the burden of both carrying forward the appropriate litigation necessary for policy success and for pressuring the other branches for full and effective implementation. Only the policy-motivated justice will care about the willingness of other government officials to comply with the Court's decisions to carry them out effectively. And only the policy-motivated justice will care about avoiding the application of political sanctions against the Court **that might foreclose all future policy options**. The school desegregation cases illustrate these points quite nicely. The Court could not pursue the goals of racial integration and racial equality until there was an organized and highly regarded interest group such as the National Associate for the Advancement of Colored People willing and able to help. The Court further was required to protect that group from political attack, as it did in NAACP v. Alabama and NAACP v. Button. Avoidance of other decisions that might harm its desegregation efforts was also deemed necessary. Thus the Court had legal doctrine available to void antimiscegenation statutes, but refused to do son two occasions. (Murphy notes that one justice was said to remark upon leaving the conference discussion, "**One bombshell at a time is enough**.") The Court softened the blow by adopting its "deliberate speed" implementation formula. Even so, the Court still needed the active cooperation of a broad range of significant progress in racial integration in the southern schools did not in fact occur until Congress and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare decided to act. The Court further had to consider whether the political opposition that it knew would ensue would be sufficient to result in sanctions against the Court, such as withdrawal of jurisdiction or impeachment.

#### Destroys the global economy.

US Engage 03 July 14 http://www.usaengage.org/press\_releases/2003/20030724%20iie%20ats%20study.html

The proliferation of class action lawsuits filed under the 1789 U.S. Alien Tort Provision (ATP) could **seriously damage** the world economy by **threatening economic growth and development**, especially in developing countries, according to a study released today by the Institute for International Economics (IIE) and endorsed by USA\*Engage. “This IIE study is a highly thoughtful and well-documented analysis of the damaging consequences these ATP suits could have, not only on the U.S. economy, but also on the economies of many developing nations,” said Bill Reinsch, president of the National Foreign Trade Council and Co-Chairman of USA\*Engage. Reinsch added that “this statute is being used to sue multinational corporations for the actions of foreign governments over which they have no control. By increasing the uncertainty of doing business in developing countries, the suits discourage much needed foreign direct investment there, slowing down their growth and setting back their progress toward becoming free market democracies.” The study, Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, projects that more than $300 billion in global trade and investment could be lost as a result of current and potential lawsuits. In light of the benefits of overseas investment to the U.S. economy, the suits can cause damage here at home by endangering hundreds **of thousands of American jobs, as well as over two million jobs in the developing world.**

#### Nuclear war.

Mead 9 (Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy – Council on Foreign Relations, The New Republic, 2-4)

For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

### Reactors 1NC

#### Obama will win but it’s close

AP 10/29

“A week before Election Day, Obama has an edge in fight for 270 electoral votes needed to win,” 2012, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-week-before-election-day-obama-has-an-edge-in-fight-for-270-electoral-votes-needed-to-win/2012/10/29/c8f7f2e2-21aa-11e2-92f8-7f9c4daf276a_story.html>

AMES, Iowa — President Barack Obama is poised to eke out a victory in the race for the 270 electoral votes needed to win re-election, having beaten back Republican Mitt Romney’s attempts to convert momentum from the debates into support in all-important Ohio, according to an Associated Press analysis a week before Election Day.¶ While the Democratic incumbent has the upper hand in the electoral vote hunt, Romney has pulled even, or is slightly ahead, in polling in a few pivotal states, including Florida and Virginia. The Republican challenger also appears to have the advantage in North Carolina, the most conservative of the hotly contested nine states that will determine the winner.¶ While in a tight race with Obama for the popular vote, Romney continues to have fewer state-by-state paths than Obama to reach 270. Without Ohio’s 18 electoral votes, Romney would need last-minute victories in nearly all the remaining up-for-grabs states and manage to pick off key states now leaning Obama’s way, such as Iowa or Wisconsin.¶ To be sure, anything can happen in the coming days to influence the Nov. 6 election.¶ The AP analysis isn’t intended to predict the outcome. Rather, it’s meant to provide a snapshot of a race that has been stubbornly close in the small number of competitive states all year. The analysis is based on public polls and internal campaign surveys as well as spending on television advertising, candidate visits, get-out-the-vote organizations and interviews with dozens of Republican and Democratic strategists in Washington and in the most contested states.¶ The analysis shows that Obama probably would win with at least 271 electoral votes from 21 states, including Ohio, Wisconsin and Iowa, and the District of Columbia. Romney seems on track for 206 from 23 states, including North Carolina. Obama won that state in 2008 and campaigned aggressively there this year. But Obama’s team acknowledges it is the most difficult state for him to win, and he’s paid less attention to it recently.

#### New reactors are massively unpopular.

De Rugy 12

Veronique de Rugy, senior research fellow @ the MercatusCenter @ George Mason University, 7-2012, No to Nukes, Reason, p. reason.com/archives/2012/06/25/no-to-nukes, accessed 9-7-2012

When Barack Obama was just a baby, nuclear energy was touted as the technology that would finally provide pollution-free, limitless electricity for all. In its famous 1962 Port Huron Statement, the left-wing Students for a Democratic Society gushed about how “our monster cities…might now be humanized” thanks to nuclear power. Like so many predictions about the future, that one rather dramatically missed the mark. ¶ Surprising as it may seem, the United States still generates around 20 percent of its electricity from nuclear power plants. This despite the fact that no new facilities have been built since the notorious Three Mile Island accident of 1979, which released small amounts of radioactive gases and iodine into the environment after a partial meltdown at a nuclear power plant in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. Public opinion has remained steadfast against the technology ever since. In February The Economist reported that 64 percent of Americans opposed building new reactors. Disputes over waste disposal have never been resolved, and the Fukushima reactor meltdown in March 2011 cast further doubt on the idea that nuclear power will ever be a long-term clean-energy solution in the United States. ¶ All of this has not stopped the Obama administration from betting on nukes. Even though the president prefers talking up more fashionable (and less economically viable) technologies such as wind and solar, in February his Nuclear Regulatory Commission quietly approved construction of what would be the first two new nuclear reactors in two generations. In 2010 Secretary of Energy Steven Chu touted the White House’s commitment to “restarting the American nuclear industry and creating thousands of new jobs and export opportunities in the process.” ¶ But jump-starting nuclear power is not just bad politics. It’s awful economics. ¶ The nuclear energy industry in the United States is powered by corporate welfare on plutonium. What is in theory a wonderful technology is in practice an economic white elephant. The data accumulated during the last 30 years suggest strongly that nuclear plants will never be able to cover their operating costs, let alone recoup the billions it costs to build them.¶ A 2009 Massachusetts Institute of Technology study led by physicist Ernest J. Moniz and engineer Mujid S. Kazimi showed that nuclear energy costs 14 percent more than gas and 30 percent more than coal. And that’s after taking into account a baked-in taxpayer subsidy that artificially lowers nuclear plants’ operating costs.¶ A 2010 study by the U.S. Energy Information Administration projected that nuclear power will remain more expensive to produce than other conventional sources of electricity in 2016 (see chart). Based on this analysis, nuclear power is also more expensive than wind power, although cheaper than solar and clean coal.¶ While the nuclear industry in the United States has seen continued improvement in operating performance over time, it remains uncompetitive with coal and natural gas on price. This cost differential is primarily driven by high capital costs and long construction times, often more than 10 years. ¶ According to the Congressional Budget Office, nuclear power plants, on average, wind up costing three times more to build than original estimates suggest. Inflation, especially in the more nuclear-powered 1970s, played some role in the problem of ballooning costs. But when a project takes more than a decade to complete, labor and capital costs can grow in unexpected ways as well.

**Approval Rating is key, lines up perfectly with reelection**Silver ’11

Nate directs five thirty eight and is a statistician, “Approval Ratings and Reelection Odds,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/approval-ratings-and-re-election-odds/>

Earlier this month, we posted the simple version of a finding, based on the historical record, that is worth keeping in mind when you read articles about how Barack Obama’s presidency has (or has not been) been revitalized: It’s just too soon for his approval ratings to tell us very much about his re-election prospects for 2012. This is an overdue follow-up to that article — what you might think of as the slightly-more-complicated version. While **it’s true that approval ratings aren’t of much use now, it’s also the case that, by the time we get close to the election, they will have become a very reliable predictor of Mr. Obama’s chances of winning another term**. Based on Gallup polling, here is what I estimate that the incumbent president’s approval rating was on Election Day in almost every election since 1940. (There is no data for 1944 because Gallup went on wartime hiatus.) There are a few tricks I had to employ to derive these numbers; I’d ask you to take them on faith for a few moments, and then we’ll explain everything later on. **At first glance, the relationship seems nearly perfect: every incumbent with an approval rating of 49 percent or higher won re-election, while every candidate with a rating of 48 percent or lower lost.** In practice, things probably don’t work quite that crisply. For example, Harry Truman, whom we estimate had a 50 percent approval rating on Election Day 1948, won by 4.5 points, and 114 electoral votes, over Thomas E. Dewey, which suggests that he had some margin to spare. And candidate quality clearly makes a difference. Although Robert Dole is sometimes considered a weak Republican nominee, Bill Clinton beat him in 1996 by just 8.5 points, despite Mr. Clinton’s 55 percent approval rating. By contrast, in 1972, Richard Nixon, with an approval rating only a couple of points higher (57 percent), trounced a very weak Democratic nominee, George McGovern, by more than 23 points. Still, the approval rating at which an incumbent candidate goes from being an underdog to a favorite for re-election is somewhere in the high 40s. The reason the threshold is probably slightly below 50 percent rather than right at 50 percent is that in any approval survey, some people (typically 5 to 10 percent) say they are undecided about the president’s performance. For instance, at this writing, Barack Obama’s Gallup approval rating is 49 percent but his disapproval rating is just 42 percent, a net margin of +7. If those were the figures on Election Day, he would be a favorite to win unless nearly everybody who was undecided about his performance cast their ballots against him, something that is possible in theory but usually doesn’t occur in practice. Now, then, how did we come up with these numbers? As I said, it’s not quite so straightforward. Gallup has approval ratings data going back to 1937. The problem is that, until fairly recently, they had a habit of stopping their approval ratings polling several months before a presidential election. For instance, in 1956, their last poll of Dwight Eisenhower’s public approval was in early August; they did not survey him again until late November, after he had already defeated Adlai Stevenson. However, we can extrapolate what Mr. Eisenhower’s rating would have been on Election Day 1956 by drawing a smoothed regression line — known in the business as a Loess curve — using the data points before and after that date. The one hitch is that incumbent presidents, whether they win, lose, or don’t run at all, almost always receive a “bounce” in their approval rating after the election, as people either rally around a winner or feel sympathy for the lame duck. The average magnitude of this post-election bounce is 4 points. So, before I fitted the curves, I subtracted 4 points from approval rating polls conducted after Election Day. By applying this process of bounce-adjustment and curve-fitting, we are able to estimate an incumbent president’s Gallup approval rating on Election Day itself or on any day before it, as shown in this nifty-looking graphic: I haven’t labeled the curves by the candidate’s name in the chart, because that which create too much clutter. But I have distinguished those who eventually won re-election (blue lines) from those who lost (red). A couple of cases are worth attention. The red line that you see briefly extending above 80 percent is for George H.W. Bush. His approval ratings, which were already pretty good, shot up following the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when American-led forces drove Iraqi troops back from their occupation of Kuwait. Politically, that made Mr. Bush look like an extremely formidable candidate for re-election: Saturday Night Live ran a sketch later that year entitled “Campaign ’92: The Race To Avoid Being The Guy Who Loses To Bush,” with Democratic candidates at a debate all trying to lose so they would not have to run against him. But Mr. Bush’s approval ratings fell precipitously throughout late 1991 and early 1992, and were below 40 percent by Election Day. If Mr. Bush is the precedent that challengers will cite when their campaign seems to be flailing, the opposite example is the original Comeback Kid, Harry Truman. He’s the blue line that you still see down around 40 percent approval with just five months to go before the election of 1948. It’s hard to know exactly where Mr. Truman’s approval numbers were on Election Day. When Gallup surveyed in late June, he had just 39 percent approval; in January, 1949, after he had beaten Thomas E. Dewey, he was up to 69 percent; and then he reverted back to 50 percent just a couple months later. Our Loess curve estimates that Mr. Truman’s approval rating was probably around 50 percent on Election Day, but this is just a guess. What’s clear is that Mr. Truman was at some point an extremely unpopular president, and he nevertheless — to the great surprise of the Chicago Daily Tribune — defeated Mr. Dewey. Another thing to take from the graphic is how the red and blue lines gradually untangle themselves as the relationship between approval ratings and re-election becomes stronger over time. We can see this a bit more clearly by taking the average approval rating for the 8 winning candidates and the 3 losing ones and tracking them over the two years leading up to the election: I would resist the idea that there is any one magical date when approval ratings go from meaningless to meaningful as predictors of re-election. In the chart, the first time the winners and the losers begin to separate themselves is about 19 months before the election — which would correspond roughly to March of the prior year — but the split would have come a bit earlier if not for Mr. Bush’s Gulf War bounce. There’s also increasing differentiation in the period roughly 10 to 5 months before the election, corresponding with primary season. Still, for the most part, the separation occurs gradually. I’ve also tried to play around with various sorts of logistic regression models that attempt to predict a president’s chances at re-election based solely on his Gallup approval rating and the number of days until the election. Don’t take this terribly seriously — it’s hard to do anything very rigorous based on so few data points (just 11 presidents in the sample), and I can imagine better model designs than the one that I’ve used. But it does yield some ballpark estimates of what this data implies. For example, a year in advance of the election, the model figures that a president with a 60 percent approval rating is about 90 percent likely to win re-election, whereas a 40 percent rating translates into a win probability of a bit below 40 percent. So by that point the differences have become fairly meaningful: What does this mean for Barack Obama? Right now, we’re still in the period where the most useful number for estimating his re-election chances is not his approval rating but rather the historical track record of incumbent presidents. As I wrote on Wednesday, since the Civil War, 73 percent of incumbent presidents who sought another term won, as have 70 percent since World War II. Plugging Mr. Obama’s current numbers into the regression model that I described above yields a 65 percent likelihood of re-election — but again, this is a really rough guess, based mostly on the high historical batting average for incumbents rather than anything to do with Mr. Obama himself. What we can say is important is the range in which Mr. Obama’s approval ratings have been varying in recent months: between about 45 and about 50 percent. **If Mr. Obama’s approval rating is at the top of that range, 50 percent, on Nov. 6, 2012 — about where it is now — the model figures that his chances of winning re-election will be greater than 80 percent. But if his approval rating is at the bottom of the range instead, at 45 percent, his chances for a second term will be only about one in three,** and he’ll have to hope that the Republican nominee is a weak one. Much will change between now and then, of course. But Mr. Obama would probably win an election held next Tuesday — and that would not have been true a couple of months ago.

**Romney win means war with Iran**

**Blumenthal '12** (award-winning journalist and bestselling author whose articles and video documentaries have appeared in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Daily Beast, The Nation, The Guardian, The Independent Film Channel, The Huffington Post, Salon.com, Al Jazeera English and many other publications. He is a writing fellow for the Nation Institute. His book, Republican Gomorrah: Inside The Movement That Shattered The Party, is a New York Times and Los Angeles Times bestseller) Max 3.8.12 http://maxblumenthal.com/2012/03/romneys-man-on-iran/

According to the former SAIS student, Karlin was a favorite of Eliot **Cohen, an ultra-hawkish professor of strategic studies at SAIS**, which is regarded in American foreign policy circles as **a training ground for the neoconservative movement.** Through Cohen’s connections among the neocons occupying key civilian posts in Bush’s Defense Department, the former student claims Cohen was able to arrange an attractive sinecure for Karlin. Besides Karlin, the ex-SAIS student told me Cohen **has promoted the career ambitions of many former pupils,** including Kelly Magsamen, who worked under Cohen in the Bush administration and now oversees the Iran portfolio in the Obama administration’s State Department. **Today, Cohen is** among Republican presidential front-runner Mitt **Romney’s top campaign advisers. He is the primary author of Romney’s foreign policy white paper, which** attacks Obama for “currying favor with [America’s] enemies” and “ostentatiously shunning Jerusalem.” The paper **urges a policy of regime change in Iran including possible coordination with Israel on military strikes** to prevent the Iranian regime from developing a nuclear weapon**.** It is an aggressive Republican election season document presenting a concoction of post-9/11 unilateralism and unvarnished neo-imperialism as the antidote to a sitting president Cohen accused of “unilateral disarmament in the diplomatic and moral sphere.” More importantly, **it suggests that a Romney administration’s foreign policy might look remarkably similar to** – and perhaps more extreme than – **that of the Bush administration**. Cohen rose through the ranks of the Republican foreign policy elite as a protégé of Paul Wolfowitz.Stephen Walt, a professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s School of Government who has been on the receiving end of aggressive attacks by Cohen, called Cohen “a classic neoconservative.” Walt said, “He is constantly fretting about alleged U.S. vulnerabilities, consistently supportive of increased defense spending, and generally inclined to favor U.S. intervention in other countries. Second, like virtually all neoconservatives, he is also deeply attached to Israel, as well as to the United States. I do not question his patriotism, but I think he tends to see U.S. and Israeli interests as more-or-less identical and doesn’t see a trade-off between support for one and support for the other.” Cohen rose through the ranks of the Republican foreign policy elite as a protégé of Paul Wolfowitz, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense who is credited with playing a central role in the push for invading Iraq. In 1990, Wolfowitz secured a position for Cohen working beside him on the policy planning staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Three years later, when Wolfowitz was appointed dean of SAIS, he began using his influence to propel Cohen’s career. According to a former State Department official who graduated from SAIS, it was through the beneficence of Wolfowitz that Cohen earned an endowed teaching position at SAIS as the Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies. In 1997, Wolfowitz and Cohen joined forces to form the Project for a New American Century, a neoconservative umbrella group that served as the key non-governmental vehicle for promoting the case for invading Iraq after 9/11. In the immediate wake of al-Qaeda’s attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., Cohen took to the media to map out the next phase of a grand global military venture that he coined, “World War IV.” Describing Iraq as “the big prize,” **Cohen urged a unilateral invasion of Iraq** that would advance the ambitions of the now-discredited political charlatan Ahmed Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress. Like so many of his neoconservative peers, Cohen claimed Saddam Hussein’s regime maintained “a connection with the 9/11 terrorists.” With the war deteriorating into a chaotic bloodbath and as his own son was called up for duty, Cohen criticized the Bush administration for “happy talk and denials of error.” However, he refused to admit fault for his role in selling Americans on the invasion. Despite mildly dissenting from the White House line, Cohen continued his ascent, replacing Philip Zelikow as counselor to then-Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in 2007. According to the former State Department official, Rice had almost no role in Cohen’s appointment. Instead, Cohen was recommended for the position by Vice President Dick Cheney and his daughter Liz. Cheney’s daughter headed the Iran Syrian Operations Group, a newly created, neoconservative-inspired initiative burrowed within the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. At the time of Cohen’s appointment, Rice was attempting to open diplomatic lines to Iran, North Korea, and Syria – a move Cohen and the Cheneys fiercely opposed. A few months after Bush left office, the former State Department official said Cohen and Wolfowitz rewarded their neoconservative fellow traveler Eric Edelman – a former Defense Department official during the later Bush years – with a visiting scholarship at SAIS. In private, Johns Hopkins alumni expressed outrage at the installment of Edelman, a career diplomat with no academic background, accusing the neoconservatives of exploiting SAIS to create a system of political patronage. **Cohen advised that the “US actively seek the overthrow of the Islamic Republic…through every instrument of U.S. power**, soft more than hard.”Cohen’s extensive web of foreign policy and military connections forms a seamless line to Tel Aviv. There, on the top floor of one of the office buildings known as “HaKirya,” is the office of one of Cohen’s former pupils, Aviv Kochavi. Kochavi is now the director of Israeli military intelligence, making him one of the most quietly influential figures in the country. In 2006, Kochavi, who also holds a philosophy degree, boasted to the Israeli architect and anti-occupation activist Eyal Weizmann about how he and his troops crushed Palestinian resistance cells in Nablus through the use of “inverse geometry” and “micro-tactical actions” inspired by the theories of post-structuralist philosophers like Deleuze and Guattari. On February 2, Kochavi appeared at the annual Herzliya Conference to issue grave warnings about the rapid progress of Iran’s nuclear program, suggesting that sanctions and diplomacy have failed, and that more aggressive action might be required. Despite Cohen’s deep Israeli ties, he has proven extremely sensitive to critiques of the connection. When Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, the latter a professor of International Relations at the University of Chicago, published their widely debated paper on the Israel lobby in 2006, Cohen authored one of the first attempts to discredit their thesis about a loose coalition of individuals and organizations creating political pressure to move US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. In an op-ed in the Washington Post, Cohen accused the authors of “kooky academic work” and “obsessive and irrationally hostile beliefs about Jews.” “Cohen’s rather hysterical reaction to our work was both typical and easy to explain,” Walt remarked. “Given that he and other neoconservatives had played a key role in convincing George Bush to invade Iraq in 2003, he was understandably upset when we pointed this out and provided extensive documentation of their role in the run-up to this disastrous war. He could not refute our logic or our evidence, however, so he chose to misrepresent our views and smear us falsely as anti-Semites and conspiracy theorists.” With the last battalions of US troops preparing to redeploy from Iraq to other conflict zones, **Cohen is homing in on Iran.** In a September 2009 editorial for the Wall Street Journal, he dismissed diplomacy and sanctions as feasible means of curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “Pressure, be it gentle or severe, will not erase that nuclear program,” **he wrote. “The choices are now what they ever were: an American or an Israeli strike, which would probably cause a substantial war,** or living in a world with Iranian nuclear weapons, which may also result in war, perhaps nuclear, over a longer period of time.” While not ruling out the necessity of an American strike on Iranian facilities, Cohen advised that the “US actively seek the overthrow of the Islamic Republic…through every instrument of U.S. power, soft more than hard.” **As** tensions between Israel and Iran rise to unprecedented levels, and **Israel’s leadership beseeches the US to join a military strike on Iran, Cohen’s visions of regime change seem closer to realization than ever before.** For him and the neoconservative policy elite, **a Romney victory in November might deliver the next “big prize.”**

**Extinction**

**Hirsch 6'** (Jorge Hirsch, a professor of physics at the University of California San Diego. He is one of the originators of the physicists' petition on nuclear weapons policies started at the UCSD, 1/3/2006, America's nuclear ticking bomb, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060103/news\_mz1e3hirsch.html)

If only conventional bombs are used in an unprovoked U.S. or Israeli aerial attack against Iran's facilities, **Iran is likely to retaliate with missiles against coalition forces in Iraq and against Israel,** as well as possibly a ground invasion of southern Iraq, that the 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq would not be able to withstand. **Iranian missiles could potentially contain chemical warheads, and it certainly would be impossible to rule out such possibility.** Iran has signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (in 1993 and 1997 respectively), however it is still likely to have supplies, as determined by the U.S. State Department in August 2005. **Early use by the United States of low-yield nuclear bombs with better bunker-busting ability than conventional bombs targeting Iranian nuclear, chemical and missile installations would be consistent with the new U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine and could be argued to be necessary to protect the lives of 150,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq and of Israeli citizens.** It would also send a clear message to Iran that any response would be answered by a far more devastating nuclear attack, thus potentially saving both American and Iranian lives. However, **the nuclear threshold is a line of no return. Once the United States uses a nuclear weapon against a nonnuclear adversary, the 182 countries that are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty will rightly feel at risk, and many of them will rush to develop their own nuclear deterrent while they can.** A new world with many more nuclear countries, and **a high risk of any regional conflict exploding into all-out nuclear war, will be the consequence**. The scientific community (which created nuclear weapons) is alarmed over the new U.S. nuclear weapons policies. A petition to reverse these policies launched by physicists at the University of California San Diego has gathered over 1,500 physicists' signatures including eight Nobel laureates and many prominent members of the U.S. scientific establishment (http://physics.ucsd.edu/petition/). Scientists object strongly to the concept of WMD, that lumps together nuclear weapons with other "weapons of mass destruction" and blurs the sharp line that separates immensely more destructive nuclear weapons from all other weapons. **An escalating nuclear war could lead to the destruction of civilization.** There is no fundamental difference between small nuclear bombs and large ones, nor between nuclear bombs targeting underground installations versus those targeting cities or armies.

### Case

#### Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else

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Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

Violence is inevitable but escalation isn’t. Knowing our friends and enemies allows wars to be controlled – attempting to erase dichotomies homogenizes the Other

Rasch 3 (Cultural Critique 54 (2003) 137-41, William Rasch is the Henry H. H. Remak Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, Human Rights as Geopolitics  Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form of American Supremacy).NAR

In the past, we/they, neighbor/foreigner, friend/enemy polarities were inside/outside distinctions that produced a plurality of worlds, separated by physical and cultural borders. When these worlds collided, it was not always a pretty picture, but it was often possible to maintain the integrity of the we/they distinction, even to regulate it by distinguishing between domestic and foreign affairs. If "they" differed, "we" did not always feel ourselves obliged to make "them" into miniature versions of "us," to Christianize them, to civilize them, to make of them good liberals. Things have changed. With a single-power global hegemony that is guided by a universalist ideology, all relations have become, or threaten to become, domestic. The inner/outer distinction has been transformed into a morally and legally determined acceptable/unacceptable one, and the power exists (or is thought to exist), both spiritually and physically, to eliminate the unacceptable once and for all and make believers of everyone. The new imperative states: the other shall be included. Delivered as a promise, it can only be received, by some, as an ominous threat. In his The Conquest of America, Tzvetan Todorov approaches our relationship to the "other" by way of three interlocking distinctions, namely, self/other, same/different, and equal/unequal. A simple superposition of all three distinctions makes of the other someone who is different and therefore unequal. The problem we have been discussing, however, comes to light when we make of the other someone who is equal because he is essentially the same. This form of the universalist ideology is assimilationist. It denies the other by embracing him. Of the famous sixteenth-century defender of the Indians, Bartolomé de Las Casas, Todorov writes, [his] declaration of the equality of men is made in the name of a specific religion, Christianity.... Hence, there is a potential danger of seeing not only the Indians' human nature asserted but also their Christian "nature." "The natural laws and rules and rights of men," Las Casas said; but who decides what is natural with regard to laws and rights? Is it not specifically the Christian religion? Since Christianity is universalist, it implies an essential non-difference on the part of all men. We see the danger of the identification in this text of Saint John Chrysostrom, quoted and defended at Valladolid: "Just as there is no natural difference in the creation of man, so there is no difference in the call to salvation of all men, barbarous or wise, since God's grace can correct the minds of barbarians, so that they have a reasonable understanding."12 Once again we see that the term "human" is not descriptive, but evaluative. To be truly human, one needs to be corrected. Regarding the relationship of difference and equality, Todorov concludes, "If it is [End Page 139] incontestable that the prejudice of superiority is an obstacle in the road to knowledge, we must also admit that the prejudice of equality is a still greater one, for it consists in identifying the other purely and simply with one's own 'ego ideal' (or with oneself)" (1984, 165). Such identification is not only the essence of Christianity, but also of the doctrine of human rights preached by enthusiasts like Habermas and Rawls. And such identification means that the other is stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal of what it means to be human. And yet, despite—indeed, because of—the all-encompassing embrace, the detested other is never allowed to leave the stage altogether. Even as we seem on the verge of actualizing Kant's dream, as Habermas puts it, of "a cosmopolitan order" that unites all peoples and abolishes war under the auspices of "the states of the First World" who "can afford to harmonize their national interests to a certain extent with the norms that define the halfhearted cosmopolitan aspirations of the UN" (1998, 165, 184), it is still fascinating to see how the barbarians make their functionally necessary presence felt. John Rawls, in his The Law of Peoples (1999), conveniently divides the world into well-ordered peoples and those who are not well ordered. Among the former are the "reasonable liberal peoples" and the "decent hierarchical peoples" (4). Opposed to them are the "outlaw states" and other "burdened" peoples who are not worthy of respect. Liberal peoples, who, by virtue of their history, possess superior institutions, culture, and moral character (23-25), have not only the right to deny non-well-ordered peoples respect, but the duty to extend what Vitoria called "brotherly correction" and Habermas "gentle compulsion" (Habermas 1997, 133). 13 That is, Rawls believes that the "refusal to tolerate" those states deemed to be outlaw states "is a consequence of liberalism and decency." Why? Because outlaw states violate human rights. What are human rights? "What I call human rights," Rawls states, "are ... a proper subset of the rights possessed by citizens in a liberal constitutional democratic regime, or of the rights of the members of a decent hierarchical society" (Rawls 1999, 81). Because of their violation of these liberal rights, nonliberal, nondecent societies do not even have the right "to protest their condemnation by the world society" (38), and decent peoples have the right, if necessary, to wage just wars against them. Thus, liberal societies are not merely contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization; they become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Those found wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world. Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty.

#### A. Turn- “Tragic Framing”- The idea of embracing the Death Drive says that Desire maps all of our political choices- it sets up a prefigured political option

**Critchley**, very trendy postmodernist, **1999** p. 110-111

(Simon, “Comedy and Finitude..” in Constellations)

Moving from the German to the French context, I would like to focus on how **this tragic paradigm is continued in Lacanian psychoanalysis**, at least in Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959–60).10 I think it is justified to say that, for Lacan, **Antigone becomes the tragic heroine of psychoanalysis: she who does not give way on her desire, she who follows the law of desire**, which is what Hegel would call “the law of heaven,” and follows that law all the way to her death.11 We might say that **Lacan is the psychoanalytic extension of the German philosophy of the tragic, and that he extends the tragic paradigm through his choice of Antigone as the heroine of psychoanalysis, as she who embodies the ethical imperative of psychoanalysis:** ne pas ceder sur votre désir. If I am right in my suggestion that there is a tragic paradigm in Lacanian psychoanalysis, and I will try and make good on this claim below, then the critical question that follows for me is very simple: **what about the comic? Is there not an Oedpius complex in post-Kantian philosophy, or an Antigone complex** – at the least a Sophocles complex – that has the consequence of subordinating the comic to the tragic and hence marginalizing the phenomena of jokes, humor, and laughter? But **what is at stake in this question**? The following, I think: returning to my opening sentence, **if the post-Kantian settlement in philosophy has the consequence that questions concerning the ultimate meaning and value of human life pass from the category of the religious to that of the aesthetic – which initiates the philosophy of the tragic – then what is presupposed in this passage is the recognition of the essential finitude of the human being**. That is, the question of the meaning and value of human life becomes a matter of what sense can be made from the fact of finitude. Given the collapse of the possibility – at least for “we moderns” – of traditional religious belief, **it is a question of what forms of aesthetic production and creation might begin to fill the void left by the historical self-consciousness of the death of God.**12 The critical hypothesis that I would like to explore is that the **tragic paradigm** in post-Kantian philosophy outlined above **provides a way for thinking through the question of finitude, a thinking through which, moreover, disfigures finitude by making the human being heroic.** This is a large claim and I can only hope to begin to substantiate it within the limitations of this essay. Furthermore, I would not want to advance this claim against all the authors mentioned above: Kierkegaard stands as an obvious exception, not to mention the complexity of the treatment of the tragic in Hölderlin and its critical or, better, zeitdiagnostisch employment in Hegel and in the tradition inspired by him, for example in Simmel. My modest ambition here is to begin to develop this critical hypothesis by using the example of Lacan’s Ethics seminar.

#### B. The “tragic framing” of your immolation and psychoanalysis obscures the sphere of ethics- we define ethics only in relation to desire, not suffering

**Critchley**, very trendy postmodernist, **1999** p. 114-116

(Simon, “Comedy and Finitude..” in Constellations)

Let me now try and specify this all too huge a topic by turning to Lacan’s The Ethics of Psychoanalysis and in particular to the final séance of Seminar VII, “The paradoxes of ethics ou as-tu agi en conformité avec ton désir.” **Lacan defines an ethics as a judgment on an action** (is an action good or bad?). Now, if there is an ethics of psychoanalysis, then it is only to the extent that it provides a measure (an Aristotelian metron) for our action, a measure that would be able to guide judgment, some sort of criterion. It is clear that **for Lacan this measure is desire**, unconscious sexual desire in the Freudian sense. The imperative implied by this ethical measure – although I am simplifying the logic of Lacan’s text at this point – is ne pas ceder sur votre désir. I think this explains Lacan’s anti-Hegelian closing comment in Seminar VII, that “The laws of heaven in question are the laws of desire” (325/375), namely that **the laws of heaven for psychoanalysis, which provide a measure for ethical judgment, are the laws of desire**. Looking back over the course of the seminar, Lacan says that he asked his auditors to enter into a thought experiment by adopting the standpoint of the Last Judgment, namely to ask oneself the question, **“Have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you?**” (362/314) That is to say, **the question of ethics is raised as a matter of the relation of action to unconscious desire. It is therefore a question of what form or forms of action would be appropriate to desire. Which forms of action would be ethical? Of course, the rather circular answer to this question has already been given insofar as the only form of action that is ethical is the following: not to act in such a way that you give way on your desire.** Now it would be something of an understatement to say that the precise normative consequences of this imperative are not exactly clear, although Alain Badiou has made some significant advances in this direction, as I discuss elsewhere. 20 In order to explain the relation between action and desire**, Lacan has recourse to tragedy; namely, that tragic action might be an index for ethical action that would conform to one’s desire**. The ethics of psychoanalysis entails a relation to “the reality of the human condition” (351/303). This can be expressed with what Lacan calls “the tragic sense of life.” Such a tragic sense of life has, for Lacan, nothing to do with what he calls “speculation about prescriptions for, or the regulation of, what I have called the service of goods” (362/314). The notion of “service of goods” is the position that Lacan also describes as that of “traditional ethics” (362/314), and is represented – dubiously, I think – by the person of Creon.21 With these precisions in mind, I can now turn to the passage I want to discuss. I quote at length, **It is in the tragic dimension that actions are inscribed and we are called to take our bearing with regard to values**. Moreover, this is also the case with the comic dimension and when I began to speak to you about the formations of the unconscious, it was, as you know, the comic that I had in mind. Let us say as a first approximation that the relation of action to **the desire which inhabits it in the tragic dimension functions in the sense of a triumph of death**. I taught you to rectify the latter as triumph of being-towards-death (triomphe de l’être-pour-la-mort), that is formulated in Oedipus’s me phunai, where this me figures, **the negation that is identical to the entrance of the subject supported by the signifier. This is the fundamental character of all tragic action. In the comic dimension**, as a first approximation, **it is less a question of triumph as of a futile and derisory play of vision**. However little I have up to now tried to approach the comic with you [my emphasis], you have been able to see there too the relation of action to desire, and of the fundamental failure of the former to catch up with the latter. The comic dimension is created by the presence at its center of a hidden signifier, but which, in the Old Comedy, is there in person – the phallus. Who cares if it is subsequently whisked away? One must simply remember that what satisfies us in comedy, what makes us laugh, what makes us appreciate it in its full human dimension, not excluding the unconscious, is not so much the triumph of life as its flight, the fact that life slides away, steals away, flees, escapes all those barriers that oppose it, and precisely those that are most essential, those that are constituted by the agency of the signifier. The phallus is nothing other than a signifier, the signifier of this flight. Life goes by, triumphs all the same, whatever happens. When the comic hero trips up and falls in the soup, the little fellow still survives. The pathetic side of this dimension is, you see, exactly the opposite, the counterpart of tragedy. They are not incompatible, since the tragi-comic exists. That is where the experience of human action resides, and it is because we know better than those who have gone before how to recognize the nature of desire that is at the heart of this experience, that an ethical revision is possible, that an ethical judgment is possible, that represents this question with its value of the Last Judgment – have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you? (361–62/313–14) This is an extremely suggestive passage that would merit much commentary, but let me just attempt some provisional remarks both with and against the grain of the text. **To understand the relation between action and desire, Lacan has recourse to tragedy**. Now, Lacan goes on to make the extremely Heideggerian claim that the relation between action and **desire in the space of tragedy functions in the direction of being a triumph of being-towards-death**, une triomphe de l’être-pourla- mort, which is simply the French rendering of Sein-zum-Tode. This reading of tragedy finds confirmation in an earlier series of allusions to Oedipus, where the words me phunai are interpreted in terms that recall Nietzsche’s use of the wisdom of Silenus in The Birth of Tragedy, namely “plutot, ne pas être” (306/353) – the best thing is not to be born, the second best is to die soon. Thus, Lacan’s thesis here would seem to be that **tragedy provides an exemplary model of ethical action in conformity with one’s desire**, insofar as desire is bound up in a relation to death. Thus, the appropriate ethical comportment in the face of death is being towards- death, where we act in such a way that we do not give way on our desire. Thus, one way of understanding the ethics of psychoanalysis is in terms of the aspiration to a Schellingian-Heideggerian correspondence between free ethical action and fateful deathly desire, that the subject should pursue the Freiheit-zum- Tode that is the core of tragic experience and the tragic-heroic paradigm for thinking finitude. This line of thought is also connected to what Lacan says at the beginning of the penultimate séance about helplessness (Hilflosigkeit, 351/303–4), where helplessness describes our fundamental relation to finitude. But helplessness is not described, as it was for Freud in the Entwurf, as the signal of anxiety. Interestingly, Lacan says that such a relation to finitude is “not so much Abwarten as Erwartung,” that is, not so much the helplessness of waiting, but rather the passive openness of expectation or anticipation, something perhaps much closer to Heideggerian Gelassenheit. Thus, tragic experience is one of “absolute disarray” (361/304), where **the tragic hero** – Lear as much as Oedipus – finds himself “alone and betrayed” (353/305), **cast out from the polis to become upsipolis, the uncanniest one who, in breaking with all familiarity, makes history**. **For Lacan, in this tragic ruination of the hero, a certain catharsis of desire is achieved. Tragic action achieves a purification of desire in relation to its object, namely death**.

#### Psychoanalytic social theory annihilates politics—the premise of their link is so broad that it prevents all social action and explains away every historical event

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The postmodernists' problem is that they cannot live with disappointment. All the tragedies of the political project of emancipation - the evils of Stalinism in particular - are seen as the inevitable product of men and women trying to create a better society. But, rather than engage in a critical assessment of how, for instance, radical political movements go wrong, they discard the emancipatory project and impulse itself. The postmodernists, as Sivanandan puts it, blame modernity for having failed them: `the intellectuals and academics have fled into discourse and deconstruction and representation - as though to interpret the world is more important than to change it, as though changing the interpretation is all we could do in a changing world'.58

To justify their flight from a politics holding out the prospect of radical change through self-activity, the disappointed intellectuals find abundant intellectual alibis for themselves in the very work they champion, including, in Cohen's case, psychoanalysis. What Marshall Berman says of Foucault seems true also of psychoanalysis; that it offers `a world-historical alibi' for the passivity and helplessness felt by many in the 1970s, and that it has nothing but contempt for those naive enough to imagine that it might be possible for modern human- kind to be free. At every turn for such theorists, as Berman argues, whether in sexuality, politics, even our imagination, we are nothing but prisoners:

there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage far more airtight than anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break . . . There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; how- ever, once we grasp the futility of it all, at least we can relax.59

Cohen's political defeatism and his conviction in the explanatory power of his new faith of psychoanalysis lead him to be contemptuous and dismissive of any attempt at political solidarity or collective action. For him, `communities' are always `imagined', which, in his view, means based on fantasy, while different forms of working-class organisation, from the craft fraternity to the revolutionary group, are dismissed as `fantasies of self-sufficient combination'.60 In this scenario, the idea that people might come together, think together, analyse together and act together as rational beings is impossible. The idea of a genuine community of equals becomes a pure fantasy, a `symbolic retrieval' of something that never existed in the first place: `Community is a magical device for conjuring something apparently solidary out of the thin air of modern times, a mechanism of re-enchantment.' As for history, it is always false, since `We are always dealing with invented traditions.'61 Now, this is not only non- sense, but dangerous nonsense at that. Is history `always false'? Did the Judeocide happen or did it not? And did not some people even try to resist it? Did slavery exist or did it not, and did not people resist that too and, ultimately, bring it to an end? And are communities always `imagined'? Or, as Sivanandan states, are they beaten out on the smithy of a people's collective struggle?

Furthermore, all attempts to legislate against ideology are bound to fail because they have to adopt `technologies of surveillance and control identical to those used by the state'. Note here the Foucauldian language to set up the notion that all `surveillance' is bad. But is it? No society can function without surveillance of some kind. The point, surely, is that there should be a public conversation about such moves and that those responsible for implementing them be at all times accountable. To equate, as Cohen does, a council poster about `Stamping out racism' with Orwell's horrendous prophecy in 1984 of a boot stamping on a human face is ludicrous and insulting. (Orwell's image was intensely personal and destructive; the other is about the need to challenge not individuals, but a collective evil.) Cohen reveals himself to be deeply ambivalent about punitive action against racists, as though punishment or other firm action against them (or anyone else transgressing agreed social or legal norms) precluded `understanding' or even help through psychotherapy.

It is indeed a strange kind of `anti-racism' that portrays active racists as the `victims', those who are in need of `help'. But this is where Cohen's argument ends up.

In their move from politics to the academy and the world of `discourse', the postmodernists may have simply exchanged one grand narrative, historical materialism, for another, psychoanalysis.62 For psychoanalysis is a grand narrative, par excellence. It is a theory that seeks to account for the world and which recognises few limits on its explanatory potential. And the claimed radicalism of psycho- analysis, in the hands of the postmodernists at least, is not a radicalism at all but a prescription for a politics of quietism, fatalism and defeat. Those wanting to change the world, not just to interpret it, need to look elsewhere.

#### Even if they win superior explanatory power, psychoanalytic imaginings are useless in advancing political change

Adam Rosen-Carole 10, Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Bard College, 2010, “Menu Cards in Time of Famine: On Psychoanalysis and Politics,” Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. LXXIX, No. 1, p. 205-207

On the other hand, though in these ways and many others, psychoanalysis seems to promote the sorts of subjective dispositions and habits requisite for a thriving democracy, and though in a variety of ways psychoanalysis contributes to personal emancipation— say, by releasing individuals from self-defeating, damaging, or petrified forms action and reaction, object attachment, and the like—in light of the very uniqueness of what it has to offer, one cannot but wonder: to what extent, if at all, can the habits and dispositions—broadly, the forms of life—cultivated by psychoanalytic practice survive, let alone flourish, under modern social and political conditions? If the emancipatory inclinations and democratic virtues that psychoanalytic practice promotes are systematically crushed or at least regularly unsupported by the world in which they would be realized, then isn’t psychoanalysis implicitly making promises it cannot redeem? Might not massive social and political transformations be the condition for the efficacious practice of psychoanalysis? And so, under current conditions, can we avoid experiencing the forms of life nascently cultivated by psychoanalytic practice as something of a tease, or even a source of deep frustration?

(2) Concerning psychoanalysis as a politically inclined theoretical enterprise, the worry is whether political diagnoses and proposals that proceed on the basis of psychoanalytic insights and forms of attention partake of a fantasy of interpretive efficacy (all the world’s a couch, you might say), wherein our profound alienation from the conditions for robust political agency are registered and repudiated?

Consider, for example, Freud and Bullitt’s (1967) assessment of the psychosexual determinants of Woodrow Wilson’s political aspirations and impediments, or Reich’s (1972) suggestion that Marxism should appeal to psychoanalysis in order to illuminate and redress neurotic phenomena that generate disturbances in working capacity, especially as this concerns religion and bourgeois sexual ideology. Also relevant are Freud’s, Žižek’s (1993, 2004), Derrida’s (2002) and others’ insistence that we draw the juridical and political consequences of the hypothesis of an irreducible death drive, as well as Marcuse’s (1970) proposal that we attend to the weakening of Eros and the growth of aggression that results from the coercive enforcement of the reality principle upon the sociopolitically weakened ego, and especially to the channeling of this aggression into hatred of enemies. Reich (1972) and Fromm (1932) suggest that psychoanalysis be employed to explore the motivations to political irrationality, especially that singular irrationality of joining the national-socialist movement, while Irigaray (1985) diagnoses the desire for the Same, the One, the Phallus as a desire for a sociosymbolic order that assures masculine dominance.

Žižek (2004) contends that only a psychoanalytic exposition of the disavowed beliefs and suppositions of the United States political elite can get at the fundamental determinants of the Iraq War. Rose (1993) argues that it was the paranoiac paradox of sensing both that there is every reason to be frightened and that everything is under control that allowed Thatcher “to make this paradox the basis of political identity so that subjects could take pleasure in violence as force and legitimacy while always locating ‘real’ violence somewhere else—illegitimate violence and illicitness increasingly made subject to the law” (p. 64). Stavrakakis (1999) advocates that we recognize and traverse the residues of utopian fantasy in our contemporary political imagination.1

Might not the psychoanalytic interpretation of powerful figures (Bush, Bin Laden, or whomever), collective subjects (nations, ethnic groups, and so forth), or urgent “political” situations register an anxiety regarding political impotence or “castration” that is pacified and modified by the fantasmatic frame wherein the psychoanalytically inclined political theorist situates him- or herself as diagnosing or interpretively intervening in the lives of political figures, collective political subjects, or complex political situations with the idealized efficacy of a successful clinical intervention? If so, then the question is: are the contributions of psychoanalytically inclined political theory anything more than tantalizing menu cards for meals it cannot deliver**?**

As I said, the worry is twofold. These are two folds of a related problem, which is this: might the very seductiveness of psychoanalytic theory and practice—specifically, the seductiveness of its political promise—register the lasting eclipse of the political and the objectivity of the social, respectively? In other words, might not everything that makes psychoanalytic theory and practice so politically attractive indicate precisely the necessity of wide-ranging social/institutional transformations that far exceed the powers of psychoanalysis?

And so, might not the politically salient transformations of subjectivity to which psychoanalysis can contribute overburden subjectivity as the site of political transformation, blinding us to the necessity of largescale institutional reforms? Indeed, might not massive institutional transformations be necessary conditions for the efficacy of psychoanalytic practice, both personally and politically? Further, might not the so-called interventions and proposals of psychoanalytically inclined political theory similarly sidestep the question of the institutional transformations necessary for their realization, and so conspire with our blindness to the enormous institutional impediments to a progressive political future?

#### This is a solvency takeout and a case turn. The act of imagination they call for overstates the political value of psychoanalysis and is a neurotic projection of personal alienation

Adam Rosen-Carole 10, Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Bard College, 2010, “Menu Cards in Time of Famine: On Psychoanalysis and Politics,” Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. LXXIX, No. 1, p. 226-229

The second approach to the problem has to do with psychoanalytic contributions to political theory that avoid Freud’s methodological individualism, but nevertheless run into the same problem. An expanding trend in social criticism involves a tendency to discuss the death or aggressive drives, fantasy formations, traumas, projective identifications, defensive repudiations, and other such “psychic phenomena” of collective subjects as if such subjects were ontologically discrete and determinate. Take the following passage from Žižek (1993) as symptomatic of the trend I have in mind:

In Eastern Europe, the West seeks for its own lost origins, its own lost original experience of “democratic invention.” In other words, Eastern Europe functions for the West as its Ego-Ideal (Ich-Ideal): the point from which [the] West sees itself in a likable, idealized form, as worthy of love. The real object of fascination for the West is thus the gaze, namely the supposedly naive gaze by means of which Eastern Europe stares back at the West, fascinated by its democracy. [p. 201, italics in original]

Also, we might think here of the innumerable discussions of “America’s death drive” as propelling the recent invasions in the Middle East, or of the ways in which the motivation for the Persian Gulf Wars of the 1990s was a collective attempt “to kick the Vietnam War Syndrome”— that is, to solidify a national sense of power and prominence in the recognitive regard of the international community—or of the psychoanalytic speculations concerning the psychodynamics of various nations involved in the Cold War (here, of course, I have in mind Segal’s [1997] work), or of the collective racist fantasies and paranoiac traits that organize various nation-states’s domestic and foreign policies.7

Here are some further examples from Žižek, who, as a result of his popularity, might be said to function as a barometer of incipient trends:

• What is therefore at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession of the national Thing. We always impute to the “other” [ethnic group, race, nation, etc.] an excessive enjoyment: he wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our way of life) and/or he has access to some secret, perverse enjoyment. [1993, pp. 202-203]

• Beneath the derision for the new Eastern European post- Communist states, it is easy to discern the contours of the wounded narcissism of the European “great nations.” [2004, p. 27, italics added]

• There is in fact something of a neurotic symptom in the Middle Eastern conflict—everyone recognizes the way to get rid of the obstacle, yet nonetheless, no one wants to remove it, as if there is some kind of pathological libidinal profit gained by persisting in the deadlock. [2004, p. 39, italics added]

• If there was ever a passionate attachment to the lost object, a refusal to come to terms with its loss, it is the Jewish attachment to their land and Jerusalem . . . . When the Jews lost their land and elevated it into the mythical lost object, “Jerusalem” became much more than a piece of land . . . . It becomes the stand-in for . . . all that we miss in our earthly lives. [2004, p. 41]

Rather than explore collective subjects through analyses of their individual members, this type of psychoanalytically inclined engagement with politics treats a collective subject (a nation, a region, an ethnic group, etc.) as if it were simply amenable to explanation, and perhaps even to intervention, in a manner identical to an individual psyche in a therapeutic context.

But if the transpositions of psychoanalytic concepts into political theory are epistemically questionable, as I believe they are,8 the question is: why are they so prevalent? Perhaps the psychoanalytic interpretation of collective subjects (nations, regions, etc.), or even the psychoanalytic interpretation of powerful political figures, registers a certain anxiety regarding political impotence and provokes a fantasy that, to an extent, pacifies and modifies—defends against—that anxiety. Perhaps such engagements, which are increasingly prevalent in these days of excruciating political alienation, operate within a fantasmatic frame wherein the anxiety of political exclusion and “castration”—that is, anxieties pertaining to a sense of oneself as politically inefficacious, a non-agent in most relevant senses—is both registered and mitigated by the fantasmatic satisfaction of imagining oneself interpretively intervening in the lives of political figures or collective political subjects with the efficacy of a clinically successful psychoanalytic interpretation.

To risk a hypothesis: as alienation from political efficacy increases and becomes more palpable, as our sense of ourselves as political agents diminishes, fantasies of interpretive intervention abound. Within such fantasy frames, one approaches a powerful political figure (or collective subject) as if s/he were “on the couch,” open and amenable to one’s interpretation. 9 One approaches such a powerful political figure or ethnic group or nation as if s/he (or it) desired one’s interpretations and acknowledged her/his suffering, at least implicitly, by her/his very involvement in the scene of analysis.

Or if such fantasies also provide for the satisfaction of sadistic desires provoked by political frustration and “castration” (a sense of oneself as politically voiceless, moot, uninvolved, irrelevant), as they very well might, then one’s place within the fantasy might be that of the all-powerful analyst, the sujet supposé savoir, the analyst presumptively in control of her-/himself and her/his emotions, etc. Here the analyst becomes the one who directs and organizes the analytic encounter, who commands psychoanalytic knowledge, who knows the analysand inside and out, to whom the analysand must speak, upon whom the analysand depends, who is in a position of having something to offer, whose advice—even if not directly heeded—cannot but make some sort of impact, and in the face of whom the analysand is quite vulnerable, who is thus powerful, in control . . . perhaps the very figure whom the psychoanalytically inclined interpreter fears.

Minimally, what I want to underscore here is that (1) a sense of political alienation may be registered and fantasmatically mitigated by treating political subjects, individual or collective, as if they were “on the couch”; and (2) expectations concerning the expository and therapeutic efficacy of psychoanalytic interpretations of political subjects may be conditioned by such a fantasy.

## 2NC

### CP

#### Policy implications of the cp should be evaluated first

Roger E. Solt 2004, Debate Coach at the University of Kentucky, 2004 (“Debate’s Culture of Narcissism,” Contemporary Argumentation & Debate, Volume 25, September, Available Online via Communication & Mass Media Complete, p. 45-46)

Beyond fashion and novelty, **there are** fairly good reasons why a focus on assumptions rather than on plans posed difficulties. In justifying its plan, the affirmative will typically advance scores of different arguments. And each of those arguments is linked to assumptions of a more or less fundamental nature. Thus, in a typical debate, each side relies on hundreds, if not thousands, of implicit assumptions. A few of these assumptions may be critical to the ultimate policy conclusion that the plan is a good idea, but many are not. Undermining one assumption may discredit one argument, but the affirmative's final conclusion seldom rests on a single argument. Also, assumptions can rarely be completely confirmed or discredited--they are not won or lost like chess pieces. Indeed, the things that we assume are those which it is most difficult, if not impossible, to convincingly establish. This is especially true of such basic ontological issues as the existence of an external world, of other minds, and of causal relationships. Because of this, in most cases, the affirmative can neither prove, nor the negative disprove, many of the assumptions at play in a given debate. Nor, in most cases, is this necessary to establish the desirability of the affirmative plan. The chance that an assumption may be true (i.e., causation may exist) will be enough to justify endorsing a certain course of action.

### Predicts

#### Prediction is possible and accurate even if not perfect-game theory and political modeling can account for complex social systems by aggregating expertism-forecasting can provide an accurate basis for scenario planning

de Mesquita 11 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is Silver Professor of Politics at New York University and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution B.A. from Queens, M.A. from Michigan, PhD from Michigan, "FOX-HEDGING OR KNOWING: ONE BIG WAY TO KNOW MANY THINGS" July 18 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/

Given what we know today and given the problems inherent in dealing with human interaction, what is a leading contender for making accurate, discriminating, useful predictions of complex human decisions? In good hedgehog mode I believe one top contender is applied game theory. Of course there are others but I am betting on game theory as the right place to invest effort. Why? Because game theory is the only method of which I am aware that explicitly compels us to address human adaptability. Gardner and Tetlock rightly note that people are “self-aware beings who see, think, talk, and attempt to predict each other’s behavior—and who are continually adapting to each other’s efforts to predict each other’s behavior, adding layer after layer of new calculations and new complexity.” This adaptation is what game theory jargon succinctly calls “endogenous choice.” Predicting human behavior means solving for endogenous choices while assessing uncertainty. It certainly isn’t easy but, as the example of bandwidth auctions helps clarify, game theorists are solving for human adaptability and uncertainty with some success. Indeed, I used game theoretic reasoning on May 5, 2010 to predict to a large investment group’s portfolio committee that Mubarak’s regime faced replacement, especially by the Muslim Brotherhood, in the coming year. That prediction did not rely on in-depth knowledge of Egyptian history and culture or on expert judgment but rather on a game theory model called selectorate theory and its implications for the concurrent occurrence of logically derived revolutionary triggers. Thus, while the desire for revolution had been present in Egypt (and elsewhere) for many years, logic suggested that the odds of success and the expected rewards for revolution were rising swiftly in 2010 in Egypt while the expected costs were not.

This is but one example that highlights what Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, who was quoted by Gardner and Tetlock, has said about game theory and prediction (referring, as it happens, to a specific model I developed for predicting policy decisions): “Bueno de Mesquita has demonstrated the power of using game theory and related assumptions of rational and self-seeking behavior in predicting the outcome of important political and legal processes.” Nice as his statement is for me personally, the broader point is that game theory in the hands of much better game theorists than I am has the potential to transform our ability to anticipate the consequences of alternative choices in many aspects of human interaction.

How can game theory be harnessed to achieve reliable prediction? Acting like a fox, I gather information from a wide variety of experts. They are asked only for specific current information (Who wants to influence a decision? What outcome do they currently advocate? How focused are they on the issue compared to other questions on their plate? How flexible are they about getting the outcome they advocate? And how much clout could they exert?). They are not asked to make judgments about what will happen. Then, acting as a hedgehog, I use that information as data with which to seed a dynamic applied game theory model. The model’s logic then produces not only specific predictions about the issues in question, but also a probability distribution around the predictions. The predictions are detailed and nuanced. They address not only what outcome is likely to arise, but also how each “player” will act, how they are likely to relate to other players over time, what they believe about each other, and much more. Methods like this are credited by the CIA, academic specialists and others, as being accurate about 90 percent of the time based on large-sample assessments. These methods have been subjected to peer review with predictions published well ahead of the outcome being known and with the issues forecast being important questions of their time with much controversy over how they were expected to be resolved. This is not so much a testament to any insight I may have had but rather to the virtue of combining the focus of the hedgehog with the breadth of the fox. When facts are harnessed by logic and evaluated through replicable tests of evidence, we progress toward better prediction.

### AT Root cause

#### The alternative locks in the war system – infinite number of non-falsifiable ‘root causes’ means only incentive theory solves

Moore ’04 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2.

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come. A useful framework in thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State, and War,12 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision for war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant. I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who may be disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposing to high risk behavior. We should keep before us, however, the possibility, indeed probability, that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders, and systematically applying other findings of cognitive psychology, as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence in context. A post-Gulf War edition of Gordon Craig and Alexander George's classic, Force and Statecraft,13 presents an important discussion of the inability of the pre-war coercive diplomacy effort to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without war.14 This discussion, by two of the recognized masters of deterrence theory, reminds us of the many important psychological and other factors operating at the individual level of analysis that may well have been crucial in that failure to get Hussein to withdraw without war. We should also remember that nondemocracies can have differences between leaders as to the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, we should also keep before us that major international war is predominantly and critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three, specifically an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk. Testing the Hypothesis Theory without truth is but costly entertainment. HYPOTHESES, OR PARADIGMS, are useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms.

In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is unlikely. No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war"; there are simply too many variables. We should insist, however, on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other constructs. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars; that is, in looking, for example, at the principal interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence?' And although it is by itself not going to prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in nonwar settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the synergy; that is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

#### Empirically denied – no root cause of war

Greg Cashman. 2000. Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

### Econ ok

#### Economics is not socially constructed and acting like it is collapses the economy

**Foss, 11** (Nicolai prof business/strategy @ Copenhagen U “[The Performative Effects of Social Constructionist](http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2011/02/04/the-performative-effects-of-social-constructionist-professors-in-bschools/)Professors in Business School” <http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2011/02/04/the-performative-effects-of-social-constructionist-professors-in-bschools/>)

Many European business schools praise disciplinary diversity. Some style themselves as “business universities,” rather than “traditional” business schools. Such schools may have a substantial contingent of faculty from the humanities, including historians, literary theorists, and philosophers, as well as sociologists and political scientists. The probability of such faculty subscribing tosocial constructionism is high. Typically, this perspective is taught to the students in courses on communication, whether intercultural or not, the theory of science, cross-cultural management, and so on. It is pretty much everywhere. Those in sociology who stress “reflexivity” and “performativity” tell us that our theorizing, as mediated through teaching, influences the objects of theorizing. What may be the performative effect of social constructionist professors? My hypothesis is that the students they teach will end up acting like Hayek’s “constructivist rationalists” on the level of society, that is, managers who believe everything in organizations is malleable, and may therefore do substantial damage to the organizations they manage. [The Wiki on social constructionism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_constructionism) provides a neat summary of [Ian Hacking’s celebrated critique of social constructionism](http://www.amazon.co.uk/Social-Construction-What-Ian-Hacking/dp/0674004124/ref%3Dsr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1296855718&sr=8-1): Ian Hacking, having examined a wide range of books and articles with titles of the form “The social construction of X” or “Constructing X”, argues that when something is said to be “socially constructed”, this is shorthand for at least the following two claims: (0) In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable. (1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. Hacking adds that the following claims are also often, though not always, implied by the use of the phrase “social construction”: (2) X is quite bad as it is. (3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically transformed. If this is foundational for you as a manager, you will likely have little respect for what has evolved inside an organization, because “it is not inevitable.” You will be unimpressed by efficiency arguments from economics and functionalist arguments from sociology that explain the presence of a given feature of an organization. Your urge is to change the organization erratically according to your whims, and nourish ongoing turmoil. Psychological/implicit contracts suffer. Negative implications for productivity and firm-level performance follow.

#### Economics is good – we should act on economic data even if it isn’t totally accurate

Farrands and Worth 2k5 (Christopher, lecturer in IR @ nottingham U and Owen, lecturer in IR @ limerick U “Critical theory in Global Political Economy: Critique? Knowledge? Emancipation?” Capital &• Class #85)

This paper has set out to analyse forms of critical theory that have been applied within the study of Global Political Economy, and to emphasise other avenues of influence along which critical study can go. All of which leads to the following question: has knowledge in the study of Global Political Economy moved on, and has it moved 'forward'? Does a continuous search for critique take us where we want to go? If knowledge is only provisionally so, and if there is no foundational criterion for truth—or even for validity—then there is one possible path, sketched by the Frankfurt School and marked out by Habermas, which enables us to engage with a 'real world'. We could also take a different path, not discussed here: one that moves away from the principles discussed above, and moves more towards engaging with Foucauldian discourse analysis. From here we could, of course, just stay in the garden and play, as a version of post-modernism might encourage. Or we might, more seriously but not more purposively, conclude that we do not yet know enough, and perhaps cannot ever know enough, to found knowledge claims sufliciently firmly that they might constitute grounds for actions which cannot be imperial, oppressive or ineffective. But we have to admit to an assertion here. It seems to us that Global Political Economy does not allow us the luxury of inaction, even if we run the risk of mistake. GPE is still founded, as it always has been, on the questions that Cox raised: knowledge for somebody and for something in a given context. This imposes a responsibility that we cannot shrug off in play, or in a retreat to inward contemplation. It also returns to what we have argued are fundamental questions in critical theory: die attempt to bring together accounts of symbolic and material forms of power and domination; the impact of the interaction of the aesthetic and the political in ordering the economic imagination; and the problem of giving an account of consciousness, and of the sociology of knowledge. This places emphasis, in turn, on the need for refiexive thinking, and for reflexive imagination in research. And it underscores the need for practical and critical knowledge to be grounded in a common project: the two are not separate, nor are they possible if one is securely grounded and the other is tagged on as an afterthought. But it also calls to mind the provisional nature of any critical knowledge that we might claim: critical knowledge is fi-agile, and the conventions which encode it are always, and unavoidably, in danger of being taken away or co-opted back to an orthodoxy. We cannot doubt that critical-practical knowledge is possible, which is to say that we cannot allow ourselves to doubt, although the lived experience of writers such as Gramsci might help us to recognise the struggles involved. But the fact that it is—while possible—always difficult, always provisional, always fragile, is vital to understanding the ways in which we might approach it. Much that claims to be 'critical' is interesting; some of it is repetitive; but relatively little seems to appreciate the commitments involved in the claim to be critical. If we are to take and hold to the three-pronged virtues of critique, knowledge and emancipation, as the signs of a prerequisite for critical theory, then the building of 'schools' developed either to hold to one set construction of historicism (as is the case with the Coxian-inspired neo-Gramscian School), or to promote a certain form of problematic emancipation, needs to be critiqued within the tradition of critical theory. To be properly critical is to engage in a commitment to a certain mode of working, and one in which we cannot expect definite, permanent results. There is no continuous, unfolding telos; but the results that we obtain are significant, not just because they are all we can expect, but because they are sufficient for the grounding of a critical, elaborated radicalism.

#### Images of catastrophe cause an empathic shift to common humanity---creates the condition for empathetic relationships that eschew the politically anesthetizing form of politics their evidence criticizes---and, this is especially crucial in the context of policy debates and advocacy simulations

Recuber 11

Timothy Recuber is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the Graduate Center of the City. University of New York. He has taught at Hunter College in Manhattan "CONSUMING CATASTROPHE: AUTHENTICITY AND EMOTION IN MASS-MEDIATED DISASTER" gradworks.umi.com/3477831.pdf

Perhaps, then, what distant consumers express when they sit glued to the television watching a disaster replayed over and over, when they buy t-shirts or snow globes, when they mail teddy bears to a memorial, or when they tour a disaster site, is a deep, maybe subconscious, longing for those age-old forms of community and real human compassion that emerge in a place when disaster has struck. It is a longing in some ways so alien to the world we currently live in that it requires catastrophe to call it forth, even in our imaginations. Nevertheless, the actions of unadulterated goodwill that become commonplace in harrowing conditions represent the truly authentic form of humanity that all of us, to one degree or another, chase after in contemporary consumer culture every day. And while it is certainly a bit foolhardy to seek authentic humanity through disaster-related media and culture, the sheer strength of that desire has been evident in the public’s response to all the disasters, crises and catastrophes to hit the United States in the past decade. The millions of television viewers who cried on September 11, or during Hurricane Katrina and the Virginia Tech shootings, and the thousands upon thousands who volunteered their time, labor, money, and even their blood, as well as the countless others who created art, contributed to memorials, or adorned their cars or bodies with disaster-related paraphernalia— despite the fact that many knew no one who had been personally affected by any of these disasters—all attest to a desire for real human community and compassion that is woefully unfulfilled by American life under normal conditions today. In the end, the consumption of disaster doesn’t make us unable or unwilling to engage with disasters on a communal level, or towards progressive political ends—it makes us feel as if we already have, simply by consuming. It is ultimately less a form of political anesthesia than a simulation of politics, a Potemkin village of communal sentiment, that fills our longing for a more just and humane world with disparate acts of cathartic consumption. Still, the positive political potential underlying such consumption—the desire for real forms of connection and community—remains the most redeeming feature of disaster consumerism. Though that desire is frequently warped when various media lenses refract it, diffuse it, or reframe it to fit a political agenda, its overwhelming strength should nonetheless serve notice that people want a different world than the one in which we currently live, with a different way of understanding and responding to disasters. They want a world where risk is not leveraged for profit or political gain, but sensibly planned for with the needs of all socio-economic groups in mind. They want a world where preemptive strategies are used to anticipate the real threats posed by global climate change and global inequality, rather than to invent fears of ethnic others and justify unnecessary wars. They want a world where people can come together not simply as a market, but as a public, to exert real agency over the policies made in the name of their safety and security. And, when disaster does strike, they want a world where the goodwill and compassion shown by their neighbors, by strangers in their communities, and even by distant spectators and consumers, will be matched by their own government. Though this vision of the world is utopian, it is not unreasonable, and if contemporary American culture is ever to give us more than just an illusion of safety, or empathy, or authenticity, then it is this vision that we must advocate on a daily basis, not only when disaster strikes.

### AT Plan After Election

#### The plan happens before the election---Congress is holding pro forma sessions now

Cox 9/24

Ramsey is a writer for The Hill. “Congress to hold pro forma sessions until November,” 2012, <http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/251313-congress-to-hold-pro-forma-sessions-until-november>

Rather than being in recess for more than five weeks, both the Senate and the House decided to hold pro forma sessions until after the November elections.

#### Legislation can be passed then

Cover 12

Matt is a writer at CNS news. “Democrats Passed Payroll Tax Extension During ‘Pro Forma’ Session on Dec. 23,” 1/6, <http://cnsnews.com/news/>

(CNSNews.com) – Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) took to the Senate floor during a “pro forma” session on Dec. 23 to pass a two-month extension to the payroll tax. President Barack Obama, however, this week claimed that a pro forma session means the Senate is practically in recess, opening the door for him to make appointments whenever he deems the Senate is out of session.¶ In justifying the appointments made on Wednesday, Jan. 4, while the Senate was in pro forma session, Obama spokesman Dan Pfeiffer said that the Senate was “effectively” in recess because “no Senate business is conducted.”¶ “The Senate has effectively been in recess for weeks, and is expected to remain in recess for weeks,” Pfeiffer wrote on the White House Web site on Jan. 4. “In an overt attempt to prevent the President from exercising his authority during this period, Republican Senators insisted on using a gimmick called ‘pro forma’ sessions, which are sessions during which no Senate business is conducted.”¶ However, the Senate did conduct business during a pro forma session, with Majority Leader Reid leading the unanimous consent proceeding to pass the two-month payroll tax extension.

### Generic 2NC

#### New Nuclear Reactors are unpopular- Correctly Worded Questions prove

Mariotte ’12

Michael is Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the Polls Say,” <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say>

Public opinion on nuclear power matters. Should we build new reactors or not? If so, who should pay for them? Should we close existing reactors? Where should nuclear power rank among all the other possible sources of electricity generation? Where should we put our limited resources to attain the best possible energy future?¶ These are all fundamental questions, the answers to which could affect our future far more than, say, who will be the next Senator from Indiana. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, until recently—really the past two or three years—other than regularly-conducted, loudly-trumpeted and rarely relevant industry-sponsored polls, polling of public opinion on nuclear power (and a lot of other energy issues) was haphazard at best.¶ Gallup, for example, over the past 18 years as best as we can find out, has conducted only 10 polls (and most of these only asked a half-sample, putting their numbers into question) asking people their opinion on nuclear power. But beginning in 2009, Gallup has begun polling annually. Unfortunately, Gallup asks the exact same question, with the same wording, that the Nuclear Energy Institute’s (NEI) own well-tested polling does. And the NEI doesn’t ask questions that it doesn’t want the answers to. Even so, Gallup’s answers don’t quite match those NEI gets, and which are usually heavily promoted in the media by NEI.¶ To try to get a better sense of what the public really thinks about nuclear power (and since we can’t afford to conduct our own polling), we took a look at every poll we could find on the issue, and related energy issues, over the past two years, and in some cases further back. Yes, that includes GOP/Fox News favorite Rasmussen.¶ As DailyKos readers know, if not the general public, examining all the possible polls leads to a much greater confidence in conclusions than relying on a single poll. Thus, we have a fairly strong confidence that our conclusions are a good statement of where the American public is at on nuclear power and our energy future in the Spring of 2012.¶ Conclusion 1: The public does NOT want to pay for new nuclear power. It IS willing to pay for renewable energy.¶ This one is a slam dunk.¶ New nuclear reactors are simply too expensive for utilities to build with their own assets. Nor are banks willing to lend money for most nuclear projects; they’re considered too risky given the long history of cost overruns, defaults, cancellations and other problems. Thus, the only two means of financing a new reactor are to either get money from taxpayers, through direct federal loans or taxpayer-backed loan guarantees, or from ratepayers in a few, mostly Southern states, which allow utilities to collect money from ratepayers before reactors are built—a concept known either as “early cost recovery” or Construction Work in Progress (CWIP).¶ ORC International (which polls for CNN, among others) has asked a straightforward question for the past two years (March 2011 and February 2012) in polls commissioned by the Civil Society Institute: “Should U.S. Taxpayers Take on the Risk of Backing New Nuclear Reactors?” The answer? Basically identical both years: 73% opposed in 2011, 72% opposed in 2012.¶ Maybe using the work “risk” skews the poll, you think? So ORC also asked, “Do you favor or oppose shifting federal loan guarantees from nuclear energy to clean renewables?” The answer was basically the same: 74% said yes in 2011, 77% in 2012 with 47% “strongly” holding that opinion both years.¶ A third poll conducted by ORC for Civil Society Institute in March 2012 asked this question: ¶ “Utilities in some states are allowed to charge electricity ratepayers for “Construction Work in Progress” for new power plants. This means that ratepayers – instead of the companies – pay for construction of new nuclear reactors and other major power plants before any electricity ever reaches customers, thereby lowering the financial risks to shareholders. Knowing this, which of the following statements about “Construction Work in Progress” most closely reflects your view?”¶ The answer: fully 80% opposed CWIP.¶ Most pollsters have not asked similar questions; interestingly though, Rasmussen did in May 2012 for an undisclosed client. Their question: “The government is providing billions in loan guarantees to help the development of new nuclear plants. Would that money be better spent on the development of alternative new energy sources?” Unfortunately, Rasmussen did not publicize the results and hid them behind a paywall, which we were not inclined to pursue. But if anyone has access to that, we’d love to know what Rasmussen found.¶ Conclusion 2: Americans do not think nuclear power is “clean” energy, and still don’t want to pay for it.¶ Jumping back to ORC International, their March 2012 poll found this:¶ About two out of three Americans (66 percent) – including 58 percent of Republicans, 65 percent of Independents, and 75 percent of Democrats -- agree that the term “‘clean energy standard’ should not be used to describe any energy plan that involves nuclear energy, coal-fired power, and natural gas that comes from hydraulic fracturing, also known as ‘fracking.’”¶ and this:¶ About three out of four Americans (73 percent) agree that “federal spending on energy should focus on developing the energy sources of tomorrow, such as wind and solar, and not the energy sources of yesterday, such as nuclear power.” Fewer than one in four (22 percent) say that “federal spending on energy should focus on existing energy sources, such as nuclear, and not emerging energy sources, such as wind and solar.”¶ Meanwhile, the New York Times in May reported on a Harvard/Yale poll (also behind a paywall), conducted in 2011 but released in May 2012, that found that Americans are willing to pay an average of $162/year more for clean energy than they are paying now—an average 13% increase in electric bills. But when clean energy was defined as including nuclear power or natural gas, that support plummeted.¶ This is consistent with findings over the past decade, which have shown that nuclear power has typically ranked well below renewable energy sources, especially solar and wind, in public opinion, at times battling with coal for least-favorite U.S. energy source.¶ A March 2012 Gallup poll found that 69% of Americans support spending more government money on solar and wind power—with majorities among Democrats (84%) and Republicans (51%) alike. But support for “expanding the use of nuclear power” barely received a majority (52%) and then only due to Republican support: 64% of Republicans supported that idea, only 41% of Democrats.¶ Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters.¶ Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?”¶ This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way.¶ Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition.¶ Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima.¶ But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today.¶ Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question).¶ Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that:¶ “Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.”¶ But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?”¶ 29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.”¶ Conclusions¶ Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is divided on the issue. But Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since it crosses all party and political lines.¶ It is also clear that the American public does not see nuclear power as a “clean energy” source (nor, for that matter, “clean” coal or natural gas fracking). Congressional or state efforts to include these technologies in a “clean energy standard” or a clean energy bank concept are bound to fail.¶ Finally, for those of us who want to build a genuinely clean, nuclear-free and carbon-free energy future, there is this scintillating nugget: According to the April 2012 ORC International poll:¶ “More than eight out of 10 Americans (83 percent) – including 69 percent of Republicans, 84 percent of Independents, and 95 percent of Democrats -- agree with the following statement: ‘The time is now for a new, grassroots-driven politics to realize a renewable energy future. Congress is debating large public investments in energy and we need to take action to ensure that our taxpayer dollars support renewable energy-- one that protects public health, promotes energy independence and the economic well being of all Americans.”¶ The American people are ready for significant change in energy policy; it’s time we all stepped up our efforts to harness and help direct that sentiment to build the energy future we need and deserve.

### AT No Impact to Econ Decline

#### And, their defenses don’t apply – there’s strong historical data that economic interdependency solves war, but decline leads to escalatory global conflict

Royal 10

Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. **Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that** rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power **(see also Gilpin. 19SJ)** that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation **(Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively,** even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power **(Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that** 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. **However,** if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states**.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write.** The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. **Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore,** crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. **Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni** economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict **al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.**

### Economy Impact Extensions

#### -- Expanding the ATCA jacks the global economy and causes poverty.

Griswold, CATO Institute, 1—25 ’3 http://www.cato.org/dailys/01-25-03.html

The unjust wielding of the ATCA **threatens to damage** the U.S. economy and the often-underdeveloped economies of the host countries. If those cases move forward and ultimately result in damages, it could **put a chill on profitable** foreign investment, jeopardizing jobs and investment capital in the United States **while retarding development in poor countries**. Hundreds of millions of poor people around the world **will find it more difficult to escape poverty.**

# OCTOS v OU LS

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### 1) Interpretation: The ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive advocacy

#### 2) Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC.

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3) Vote Negative:

#### Limits

#### They’re necessary to give discussions direction and closure

**Tonn 05**

(Mari Boor, Professor of Communication – University of Maryland, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public”, *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Fall)

Second, whereas Schudson focuses largely on ways a conversational model for democracy may mute an individual's voice in crafting a resolution on a given question at a given time, I draw upon insights of Dana L. Cloud and others to consider ways in which a therapeutic, conversational approach to public problems can stymie productive, collective action in two respects.17 First, because conversation has no clearly defined goal, a public conversation may engender inertia as participants become mired in repeated airings of personal experiences without a mechanism to lend such expressions direction and closure. As Freeman aptly notes, although "[u]nstructured groups may be very effective in getting [people] to talk about their lives[,] they aren't very good for getting things done. Unless their mode of operation changes, groups flounder at the point where people tire of 'just talking.'"18 Second, because the therapeutic bent of much public conversation locates social ills and remedies within individuals or dynamics of interpersonal relationships, public conversations and dialogues risk becoming substitutes for policy formation necessary to correct structural dimensions of social problems. In mimicking the emphasis on the individual in therapy, Cloud warns, the therapeutic rhetoric of "healing, consolation, and adaptation or adjustment" tends to "encourage citizens to perceive political issues, conflicts, and inequities as personal failures subject to personal amelioration."19

#### Stasis

#### Effective deliberation requires predictable points of stasis – its key to overcome politically debilitating self-obsession

Roberts-Miller 03

(Patricia Roberts-Miller is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt’s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### C) State action

#### Scientific and instrumental argumentation and research is key to motivate legislative fence-sitters – turns the aff

Brown 11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### D) Switch Side

#### Its key to effective deliberation over environmental issues

Mitchell 10

(Gordon R., Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh; Spring, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 – Kurr)

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate [End Page 106] debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work."56 Here, an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of "switch-side public [End Page 107] debate"57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other," and further, that humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 [End Page 108] Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation. The intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUS) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUS across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative. This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community's effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: [End Page 109] Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

#### E) Roleplaying is key

#### That allows us to influence state policy AND is key to agency

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features: their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the unique combination of simulation with role-playing. The unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied. This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. ‘No other technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures they want to explore’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. The game element: the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, policy development simulations—as forms of interactive or participatory modelling— are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action (‘the five Cs’). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the synopsis below

### 1NC

#### A social justice and critical pedagogy methods normalize anthropocentric domination.

Bell and Russell 2K

(Anne C. by graduate students in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York Universi- ty and Constance L. a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Educa- tion, University of Toronto, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf

It would be an all-too-common mistake to construe the task at hand as one of interest only to environmentalists. We believe, rather, that disrupting the social scripts that structure and legitimize the human domination of nonhuman nature is fundamental not only to dealing with environmental issues, but also to examining and challenging oppressive social arrangements. The exploitation of nature is not separate from the exploitation of human groups. Ecofeminists and activists for environmental justice have shown that forms of domination are often intimately connected and mutually reinforcing (Bullard, 1993; Gaard, 1997; Lahar, 1993; Sturgeon, 1997). Thus, if critical educators wish to resist various oppressions, part of their project must entail calling into question, among other things, the instrumental exploitive gaze through which we humans distance ourselves from the rest of nature (Carlson, 1995). For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms. Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”? This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112). Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90) Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. **Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others**” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). **This** becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of **normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities** (see Britzman, 1995). The **primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned.** Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged.

#### AND, this species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### Alternative: the judge should vote negative to REJECT THE HUMAN/ANIMAL DIVIDE.

#### this rejection enables an understanding of the SPECIES-BEING. that SOLVES THE ETHICAL CONTRADICTION OF THEIR SPECIES-LEVEL RACISM.

HUDSON 2K4

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### 1NC

#### The story of Buffalo and Eagle Wing is uniquely from Blackfoot Indian Folklore

NLA 11

(Native Languages of the Americas website “Native Languages of the Americas:

Blackfoot (Siksika, Peigan, Piegan, Kainai, Blackfeet)” 2011 http://www.native-languages.org/blackfoot.htm,TSW)

Blackfoot Indian Folklore

Indian Why Stories:

 Online collection of Blackfoot and Chippewa-Cree legends from Montana.

Blackfeet Creation Tale:

 Blackfeet myths about the creation of the world.

Earth Diver Myths:

 Comparison of Blackfoot and Iroquois creation myths.

Old Man and Old Woman Woman Chooses Death The Origin of Death:

 Blackfoot legends about the creation of humans and the origin of death.

How The Old Man Made People:

 A different Blackfoot creation myth, with Nape and Coyote creating people together.

The Mistakes of Old-Man:

 Blackfoot myth about Naapi placing animals upon the earth.

Origin of the Worm Pipe: How the Worm Pipe Came to the Blackfoot:

 Blackfoot legends about the origin of the sacred Worm Pipe.

The Sacred Weed A Tobacco Legend:

 Blackfoot legends about nawak'osis, tobacco.

Origins of the Buffalo Dance:

 Blackfoot myths about the beginning of the Buffalo Dance.

The Theft from Sun The Fire-Leggings:

 Blackfoot stories about Napi trying to steal the Sun's pants.

Why the Birch Tree Wears the Slashes in its Bark:

 Blackfoot legend about Napi's fight with a birch tree.

Old Man and the Roasted Squirrels A Meal For Nata'yowa:

 Lynx steals food from Napi and suffers the consequences.

Blood Clot Boy Kut-o'-yis:

 Blackfoot saga of the hero Blood Clot Boy.

The Story of Poia Star Boy Scarface and the Sweatlodge:

 Blackfeet stories about the young hero Scarface.

The Piqued Buffalo Wife:

 The Blackfoot legend of the hero Calfboy.

The First Men and Women Marry:

 Blackfeet myth about how men and women first chose spouses.

Buffalo and Eagle Wing:

 Blackfoot Indian legend about a broken promise to the buffaloes.

Little Friend Coyote:

 Blackfoot story about a coyote who helped a Piegan widow escape from the Kutenais.

The Snake With Big Feet:

 Blackfeet legend about the origin of the Shoshone tribe.

The Falcon and the Duck:

 Blackfoot folktale about a boastful duck.

The Sacred Buffalo Stone The Buffalo Rock:

 Blackfoot legends about iniskim, the buffalo stone.

Beaver Medicine Two Brothers:

 Blackfeet legends about a boy deceived by his sister-in-law.

Adventures Of Bull Turns Round:

 Another Blackfeet story about a young hero and a deceitful sister-in-law.

Beaver Meat:

 Why not to anger the beavers.

Why Blackfeet Never Kill Mice:

 How Mouse helped man become ruler of the animals.

Legend of the Crazy Dog Society:

 Myth about the origins of one of the traditional Blackfoot warrior societies.

Chief Mountain:

 Legend about a Piegan chief's widow who went mad with grief.

How Muskrat Created The World:

 Legends about Muskrat from the Blackfoot, Ojibway, Mohawk, and Potawatomi tribes.

The Orphan Boy and the Elk Dogs:

 19th-century legend about how horses came to the Blackfeet

#### By only recognizing this group as “The Indian” throughout the rest of the 1AC – the affirmative recreates a Colombus binary that understands the group as a singular identity that which is distinct from the colonizers

Carson 06

(James Taylor, Queens University Kingston, Ontario, Canada; “American Historians and Indians,” The Historical Journal, 49: 921–933 – Kurr)

The people he met posed a particular challenge. He called them indios, a term that reflected his own erroneous assumption about where he was and who he was seeing. But the meanings he attached to the term as he navigated the island seas came to denote so much more than a people who inhabited the Indies. The edenic qualities Columbus attributed to the islands he surveyed suggested that he wondered whether or not the Fall or the Flood had ever happened there. If they had not, the ‘Indians’ were a people who had lived outside of time as he understood it. And if they were innocent, their poverty, simplicity, and, ultimately, degradation made them ideal candidates for redemption before the One True Faith in vassalage to the Crowns of Castile and Aragón. As he reported to his sovereigns, the ‘Indians’ were ‘fit to be ordered about and made to work, plant, and do everything else that may be needed, and build towns and be taught our customs’, and, lastly, ‘to go about clothed’.6

The place that Columbus brought into being, however, was neither blank nor empty, nor particularly new, for where he saw Muslim tents, medieval monsters, and the Garden of Eden, the people who lived there held altogether different conceptions of the land and of themselves. To limit the story of colonization to the narrative of the fall of the ‘Indian’ that so often follows from Columbus’s voyages predetermines the outcome of the story and leaves unchallenged European notions of what the land and its possession meant. While explorers charted spiritual, gendered, and commercial cartographies, their encounters with other people and places unsettled the stability and veracity of the maps and the ideas that guided them. Columbus, for one, saw a people who lacked all conventional accoutrements of civilization, as he knew it, such as towns, laws, clothing, and a work ethic. We do not know what deficiencies his hosts saw in him. Probably a lack of generosity, a suite of bad manners, too much hair, and an unwillingness to become a part of their world that galled them every bit as much as their alleged indolence appalled him. But in order to contest the Eden and the ‘Indians’ that the invaders imagined and the very real processes that created the colonies, we need to know, in a fundamental way, how the Columbian moment has transfixed our historical gaze in one way while distracting us from other possible readings of the American past.7

Columbus has cast a long shadow over the field of American history and scholars still take refuge in his shade. Beginning with his diario and continuing through early chronicles by scholars such as Gabriel de Oviedo, cosmographers like André Thevet, and naturalists such as Thomas Hariot, each imperial power developed its own language to describe the people they saw and sought to dispossess.8 Columbus coined indio while the French preferred sauvage. The early records of the English colony at Jamestown depicted ‘salvages’ who lived rude lives in the forest and ‘infidels’ who did the devil’s bidding. Scholars, of course, no longer write about savages or infidels, but among today’s national historiographies, scholars in the United States are almost alone in their use of the term ‘Indian’. Why?

Canadians now write of aboriginals, first peoples, and first nations while Latin American anthropologists and historians use various terms derived from indigene. It is important, then, to ponder the meaning of the word ‘Indian’ and the ways in which this foundational category, and its opposite ‘white’, have shaped the contours of United States historiography. Dichotomies are oppositions, anthropologist Neil Whitehead has written, ‘that seem to demand, and permit, an answer but in fact are only methods of categorizing the processes of human change and expression that we are trying to conceptualize’.9 As such, adversarial categories like ‘Indian’ and ‘white’ sustain a particular and exclusive view of the past and obscure other creative ways of posing and pondering questions about contact and colonization. We need a new historiographical language to wend our way out of the Columbian binary so that other possible pasts can rise to the horizon and lead us to new questions and new ways of thinking about our shared pasts.10

#### This notion of “The Indian” causes linguistic imperialism through homogenizing Indigenous peoples into a singular identity, which reproduces colonialism and racism and strips these groups of their individual sovereignty and culture that turns the aff.

#### Our alternative is to reject the affirmative’s singular notion of “Indian.”

Bird 95

(Dr. Michael Yellow Bird, a citizen of the Sahnish (Arikara) and Hidatsa First Nations, is Assistant Professor and Director of the Office for the Study of Indigenous Social and Cultural Justice in the School of Social Welfare, University of Kansas, “Indian, American Indian, and Native Americans: Counterfeit Identities,”

 <http://www.aistm.org/yellowbirdessay.htm>)

 ¶In our cultural renaissance there are certain concepts and movements which we should understand and give attention to. The first these in linguistic imperialism. A tortured People: The Politics of Colonization, by Howard Adams, 1995. In his recent article "The Colonialism of Names" (Winds of Change, Winter, 1997), Dr. Jack Forbes argued for throwing off the names of colonialism and insisted that Indigenous Peoples be treated as human beings worthy of respect. I totally agree with his thinking and suggest we begin by refusing to use "Indian," "American Indian," or "Native American" to identify the Indigenous Peoples of the United States. I believe these words are names of colonialism and reflect the linguistic imperialism that Howard Adams cautions us about in the above quote. Colonialism refers to when an alien people invade the territory inhabited by people of a different race and culture and establish political, social, spiritual, intellectual, and economic domination over that territory. Colonialism includes territorial and resource appropriate by the colonizer and loss of sovereignty by the colonized.¶ In my most recent writings, I consistently use the terms "Indigenous" and "First Nations" Peoples. For me, using these terms is an important part of my intellectual decolonization and liberation from linguistic imperialism. I prefer using Indigenous Peoples because it is an internationally accepted descriptor for peoples who are the descendants of the original inhabitants of the lands, and have suffered and survived a history of colonialism (for example, see the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, www.halcyon.com/FWDP/drft9329.html). I like the term because it is accurate and reflects who we really are. For instance, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 1981, defines indigenous "as having originated in...or living naturally in a particular region or environment" whereas, Indian is defined "as a native inhabitant of the subcontinent of India or of the East Indies." Adding American to the term Indian does little more than reflect the more recent colonization of Indigenous Peoples by the United States government. I also prefer First Nations because it suggests that such persons are the original peoples of the land and hold aboriginal title to the lands they occupy. The term also has a strong spiritual foundation because it comes from tribal elders in British Columbia who maintain the traditions of First Nations include a belief in a Creator who placed their Nations on the land to care for and control them.¶ The terms Indigenous and First Nations Peoples still generalize the identity of the more than 550 Indigenous groups in the lower forty-eight states and Alaska. However, I believe they are empowering "generalized" descriptors because they accurately describe the political, cultural, and geographical identities, and struggles of all aboriginal peoples in the United States. I no longer use "Indian," "American Indian," or "Native American" because I consider them to be oppressive, "counterfeit identities." A counterfeit identity is not only bogus and misleading, it subjugates and controls the identity of Indigenous Peoples. ¶ There are several additional problems with using the terms Indian, American Indian, and Native American. First, they are inaccurate and confusing labels. For example, Indigenous Peoples in the United States are not from India and, therefore, not Indians. They are the descendants of the First Nations of these lands. The term Native American is confusing because anyone born in the Americas can be referred to as a native American. Second, the terms threaten the sovereignty and nationhood of Indigenous Peoples and undermine our right to use our tribal affiliation as our preeminent national identity. The terms also subsume our original identity ("Indigenous Peoples," who are the first peoples of the land) and imply foreigners ("Indians"). Moreover, they are highly inaccurate for tribal groups who continue to resist European American "citizenship" and colonization. Third, they are historically entangled in American racist discourses that claim Europeans "discovered" a "new world" that needed to be "settled," "claimed," and "civilized." This myth-making has promoted the notion that the original inhabitants were unable to settle, claim, and civilize these lands because they were "nomadic " (unsettled) and "savage" (uncivilized) peoples. Fourth, the terms dehumanize and stigmatize Indigenous Peoples by using stereotypical "American Indian" images as emblems for selling products and mascots for sports teams. Indeed, educator Paulo Freire, who is most noted for the promotion of critical consciousness among the oppressed, suggests that through the process of dehumanization the consciousness of the oppressor transforms Indigenous identity into a commodity of its domination and disposal.¶ The continued use of Indian, American Indian, and Native American maintains counterfeit identities for Indigenous Peoples. As part of the decolonization of Indigenous scholarship and thinking, I suggest these terms must be discarded in favor of more empowering descriptors. To me, ceasing to call Indigenous Peoples Indians, American Indians, or Native Americans is more than an attempt at "political correctness," or a change in semantics. It is an act of intellectual liberation that corrects a distorting narrative of imperialist "discovery and progress" that has been maintained far too long by Europeans and European Americans.¶

## 2NC

### 2NC Overview

#### Topical version of the aff

#### TERA regulations deter investment and stifle Native control over energy development---reform is necessary to boost Native sovereignty and effective renewable energy production

Kronk 12

Assistant Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law (Elizabeth, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: The Unintended "Great Mischief for Indian Energy Development" and the Resulting Need for Reform, 29 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 811)

Many tribes are currently engaged in some form of energy development. n112 A long history of energy development and [\*843] natural resource extraction exists in Indian country. n113 Within the past decade, tribes have increasingly tested their ability to branch out from their historical practice of providing access to energy resources through leases to third parties by self-development and management of energy resources. Moreover, those outside of Indian country have increasingly expressed a need for and interest in energy development within Indian country. n114 The list of existing and proposed tribal energy projects extends from the proposed Navajo-owned wind farm project in Arizona n115 to the proposed coal-to-liquids and biomass-to-liquids Many Stars Project on the Crow Reservation in Montana. n116 As a result of their historical and modern experiences, tribes have a demonstrated record of energy development. Today, many tribes are able to accomplish such energy development in a sustainable manner, thereby reducing further environmental degradation. n117¶ Ultimately, energy development in Indian country is attractive to many tribes because of the potential benefits to the [\*844] tribal community, as well as the ability to help the entire nation meet its energy goals. n118 Yet, despite the potential benefits and the demonstrated ability to engage in energy development, not a single Indian tribe has yet taken advantage of the "streamlining" benefits available under the TERA provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, as discussed above. Tribal governments' lack of interest in the TERA provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 is perplexing. The ability of tribal governments to exercise their sovereignty in a meaningful and stable manner increases the likelihood of tribal economic development, n119 something that is crucial to tribal governments. Moreover, "TERAs offer the potential to significantly improve investor confidence and enhance the development of renewable energy projects on tribal lands." n120¶ IV. A THEORY: THREE FACTORS DISCOURAGE TRIBAL ADOPTION OF TERAS¶ Given the potential benefits to Indian country available to tribes through utilization of the TERA provisions, the fact that tribes have not taken advantage of this opportunity is perplexing. [\*845] The fact that tribes apparently requested streamlined procedures from the federal government, n121 but yet have failed to take advantage of the streamlined provisions of TERAs n122 compounds the oddness of this turn of events. According to the Department of the Interior, "several tribes have expressed interest in obtaining information about Tribal Energy Resource Agreements (TERAs) and the TERA regulatory process, but that as of [December 1, 2010], no tribes had submitted a request to the Department to enter into a TERA." n123 On May 7, 2012, a representative of the Bureau of Indian Affairs confirmed that "to date the Secretary has received no TERA applications and no TERAs have been approved." n124 Moreover, the stated purpose of Title V of the Energy Policy Act, which contains the TERA provisions, was to attract energy development to Indian country, n125 but it has failed to do so. As exemplified by the [\*846] legislative history detailed above, it appears that tribes may have declined to enter into TERAs because of concerns associated with the federally-mandated environmental review program and the potential impact of the waiver of federal government liability, n126 which in turn may have implications related to the federal trust relationship.¶ The waiver of federal liability is itself somewhat of a conundrum, as the Secretary is directed to "act in accordance with the trust responsibility" and "act in good faith and in the best interests of the Indian tribes." n127 The Act provides that nothing contained within it "shall absolve the United States from any responsibility to Indians or Indian tribes." n128 Yet, at the same time, the provisions state that "the United States shall not be liable to any party (including any Indian tribe) for any negotiated term of, or any loss resulting from the negotiated terms" of an agreement entered into under the tribe's TERA. n129 Although perhaps not directly contradictory, these provisions are not entirely consistent with one another, as demonstrated by many of the comments highlighted above. As was explained by President Joe Shirley, Jr. of the Navajo Nation, the general waiver provisions of TERA are inconsistent with the federal trust responsibility and "is an abdication of the federal trust responsibility that is patently unfair to tribes." n130¶ [\*847] Furthermore, under the existing TERA provisions, tribes are increasingly seeing the cost of energy development being shifted to themselves. n131 This issue dovetails into concerns associated with the federally mandated environmental review provision, which places additional regulatory burdens on tribes without providing financial resources.¶ Accordingly, given that the above aspects of the TERA likely serve as impediments to tribes entering into TERAs, reform is necessary to address these concerns. In considering potential revisions to the TERA provisions, one should keep in mind the perspectives of Senators Bingaman and Campbell discussed above. The options for reform may be reflective of the perspectives articulated by Senators Bingaman and Campbell, one of which represents a vision that encompasses a stronger role for the federal government in Indian country and the other which represents a vision that encompasses a stronger opportunity for tribes to express their sovereignty and self-determination. Both of these options are discussed below.¶ V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO SPUR TRIBAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT UNDER TERAS¶ Notably, the Obama Administration may be receptive to potential options to reform the TERA provisions. The current Administration has generally been open to hearing previous calls for reform from Indian country. n132 As explained in Section II of this paper, America needs to diversify its energy portfolio, and Indian country will likely play a role in increased domestic production of energy. However, as President Joe Shirley, Jr. explained, tribes are unlikely to "opt in" to the existing TERA [\*848] provisions, for the reasons articulated above. n133 Even Congress seems to recognize the necessity of reform. In 2009, Senator Bryon Dorgan (D-ND), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, and Senator John Barrasso (R-WY), Vice Chairman of the Committee, released a concept paper on energy development and efficiency within Indian country. n134 In recognizing the need for reform, the concept paper identified "outdated laws and cumbersome regulations for tribal energy development and programs" as one of the three areas where reform was necessary. n135 Ultimately, following the release of the concept paper and numerous follow-up hearings, legislation was proposed to amend the TERA provisions; however, none of this legislation was enacted. n136 As a result, reform is still very much needed. n137¶ [\*849] The discussion below offers two suggestions for reform. These options, though somewhat contradictory, would both improve upon the existing TERA regulations. Whether one proposal is found more persuasive than the other may turn "partly on how one conceptualizes the trust doctrine. It can be seen as a federal duty to protect tribes' right of self-governance and autonomy, or as a way to justify federal power and control over tribal affairs." n138 Senators Bingaman's and Campbell's comments on the then-pending TERA provisions exemplify this difference of viewpoint on the federal government's trust responsibility to federally-recognized tribes.¶ The first proposal approaches the federal trust responsibility from the perspective of promoting tribal sovereignty and self-determination: the TERA regulations maintain federal decision-making authority over energy development in Indian country, which is unnecessary and perhaps even detrimental to the overarching goal of tribal self-determination and energy development. Alternatively, the second proposal for reform adopts a "federal" or "paternalistic" perspective of the federal trust responsibility: the federal government maintains a significant role in energy development in Indian country and therefore should be liable for decisions made under TERA (presumably to protect the economic stability of tribal governments). In considering these proposals, one must be mindful of the fact that the role of the federal government in tribal decision-making is a hotly contested issued. n139 Moreover, these two options for reform are presented in recognition of the existing trade-offs between the tribal trust responsibility and full tribal sovereignty. As Professor Ezra Rosser explained, "the challenge for Indian scholars and leaders alike is recognizing that the future of tribal progress will involve a trade-off between self- [\*850] determination and the trust duties of the federal government." n140 Interestingly, the Navajo Nation made similar recommendations to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in comments submitted in 2003. n141¶ A. One Potential Avenue for Effective Reform: Empower Tribal Governments to Make Decisions Regarding Energy Development Without Intervention from the Federal Government¶ If Congress truly wishes the federal government to be free from liability with regard to certain types of energy development within Indian country, the TERA provision waiving federal government liability may remain. However, to maximize energy development within Indian country and truly promote tribal self-determination as is the stated goal of the Act, the federal government should remove some or all federal "conditions" on such development. n142 This is consistent with the viewpoint expressed by Senator Campbell and discussed above; if tribes are to be sovereign, they must have control over regulation within their territories and also bear the liability for tribal decision-making. n143 This means that federal mandates, such as the [\*851] mandates listed in the existing TERA provisions related to environmental review, should be removed. n144 Moreover, under the current provisions, "the government's significant involvement in the approval process could be interpreted as an infringement on tribal self-sufficiency and sovereignty." n145 As previously discussed, many tribes and tribal representatives expressed strong concerns about federally-mandated environmental review provisions that would potentially disrupt tribal governance and subject tribal governments to standards not applicable to the states. n146 Such reform would empower tribes to become the true decision-makers with regard to energy development under the TERA provisions. The proposed reform offers several benefits. First, tribes empowered as true decision-makers tend to perform better. n147 Acting as decision-makers allows tribes to exercise their sovereignty, which as discussed above is tied to the overall likelihood of tribal economic success. In order for a tribe to exercise its sovereignty as a "true" decision-maker, the federal government must play a lesser role in making decisions affecting [\*852] development within Indian country. n148 In fact, scholars have deduced that "federal control over economic decision-making is "the core problem in the standard approach to development and a primary hindrance to reservation prosperity'." n149¶ Tribes that have undertaken increased decision-making roles have a demonstrated record of success, as exemplified by tribal forest management under Public Law No. 638. Under P.L. 638, tribes may enter into contracts and self-governance compacts to assume administration of federal Indian programs, and may use the 638 program to gain significant control over natural resources development. For example, a statistical analysis of seventy-five forestry tribes showed that in the 1980s, forty-nine of the tribes used the 638 program to take some degree of management over their forest resources. The study concluded that "tribal control of forestry under P.L. 638 results in significantly better timber management." n150 When tribes took complete management over their forest resources under 638, output rose as much as forty percent with no increase in the number of workers, and the tribes received prices as much as six percent higher than they had when the forest resources were managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. n151 Empirical proof exists that, at least in the context of forest management (which is analogous to energy development given both involve the development of natural resources), tribes have demonstrated the ability to excel when allowed to exercise increased decision-making authority. As Professor Royster concludes, "tribal control of federal programs is thus better than federal control, but a clear second-best to tribal choices of what programs and development opportunities." n152 By eliminating the [\*853] requirement that tribes entering into a TERA come into compliance with a federally-mandated environmental review process, tribes would, therefore, have increased decision-making authority, which in turn increases practical sovereignty that has been shown to increase the likelihood of success of a project.¶ Furthermore, reduction of the federal government's role in energy development within Indian country correlates with the federal government's goal to promote tribal self-determination. n153 Although some tribes may not be in a position to take an increased role in decision-making within their territories, those that are in the position should be encouraged to take an increasingly active role, thereby empowering the appropriate tribes to be self-determinating. n154 The failure of the federal government to recognize that many tribes are capable of independent decision-making would see tribal nations "frozen in a perpetual state of tutelage." n155

### 2NC Limits Good

#### Echo Chamber DA - This rejection of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. This impoverishes their project even if it is right

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. **Activists** also **must engage in deliberation** among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, **our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth** ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with

#### I’ll finish the Steinberg and Freely evidence

Steinberg & Freeley 8

\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

### AT Debate is not fact checking

#### The need for policy focus is necessary- critical practice that refuses to advocate concrete political change offers no hope for those for those suffering from oppression

Ling 01

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**Without concrete action for change, postmodernism's `dissident voices' have remained bracketed, disconnected, not really real. In maintaining `a criti¬cal distance' or `position offshore' from which to `see the possibility of change'** (Shapiro, 1992: 49), **the postmodern critic brushed off too conveniently the immediate cries of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like but who have few means or strategies to deal with them. What hope do they have of overthrowing the shackles of sovereignty without a program of action?** After all, asked Mark Neufeld, `What is political without partisanship?' (Neufeld, 1994: 31). In **not answering these questions, postmodernists recycled, despite their avowals to the contrary, the same sovereign outcome as (neo)realism: that is, discourse divorced from prac¬tice, analysis from policy,** deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving. Dissident international relations could not accommodate an interactive, articulating, self-generative Other. Its exclusive focus on the Western Self en¬sured, instead, (neo)realism's sovereignty by relegating the Other to a familiar, subordinate identity: that is, as a mute, passive reflection of the West or utopian projection of the West's dissatisfaction with itself. Critique became romanti¬cized into a totalizing affair - especially for those who must bear the brunt of its repercussions. bell hooks asked, appropriately: `[s]hould we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the "subject" when they surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time?' (hooks, 1990: 28) **Without this recognition, postmodernists ended up marginalizing, silencing, and exiling precisely those who are `the greatest vic¬tims of the West's essentialist conceits** (the excolonials and neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth)' (Krishna, 1993: 405). Worse yet, added Roger Spegele, **dissidence as offshore observation has `freed us from the recognition that we have a moral obligation to do anything about it'** (Spegele, 1992: 174).

### 2NC Clash – No Advocacy

#### 3) Epistemology— lack of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. That prevents any knowledge gaining and turns their education claims

Talisse 5—Professor of Philosophy @Vandy

Robert, *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reﬂect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justiﬁcations for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justiﬁcation is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reﬂection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86 Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.) 17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be conﬁdent that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

### AT Framework is violent

#### Switch-side debate shapes us to become more tolerant, less violent, and it empowers us with agency to engage with others

O’Donnell et al ’10

(Timothy O’Donnell, University of Mary Washington, Neil Butt, Wayne State University StefanBauschard,Lakeland School District, New York Joseph Bellon, Georgia State University Warren Decker, George Mason University John Kastulas, Boston College William Keith, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee James Lyle, Clarion University Danielle Verney O’Gorman, U.S. Naval Academy Joseph Packer, University of Pittsburgh, “Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century”, “A Rationale for Intercollegiate Debate in the Twenty-first Century”, p.50-51)

In addition to cultivating educational skills, **participation in debate has long been recognized as having positive benefits in shaping the personality of students** (Mayer 1936). **Because debate requires students to debate both sides of controversies, they become more flexible arguers and more tolerant of opposing viewpoints** (Bellon 2000; Muir 1993). There is also evidence that **debaters are more socially tolerant and less likely to accept conventional social norms** (Rogers 2002, 2005). **This is a unique** **benefit to switch-side debating**. Rogers explains: “**as debaters become exposed to various resolutions and topics for debate, conduct research on both sides of usually controversial social subjects, organize and write briefs for both sides, and go through the process of arguing those positions, they have the opportunity to develop a wider view of differing social perceptions”** (2002, 13–14). **Research also shows that debaters are more inclined to become members of intercultural organizations and enroll in crosscultural classes** (Rogers 2005). These tendencies are improved and enhanced when debate programs engage in community outreach. Beth Breger observes that **these programs “encourage a dialogue” that not only results in “profound learning” but also “becomes the bridge across the chasms of difference**” (1998, 67). This finding is consistent with empirical research that has linked service learning with building citizenship (Morgan and Streb 2001). **Empirical research proves that debate involvement enhances beneficial argumentative skills, while reducing verbal aggression** (Colbert 1993, 1994). **Debate helps students deal with other types of aggression as well**. Reflecting on the Open Society Institute’s lengthy experience, Breger reports that “**debate teaches students to command attention with words, provides students with an alternate outlet for day-to-day conflicts, and gives them a tool with which they can combat physical aggression**” (1998, 66–67). As Melissa Wade explains, “**If one knows how to advocate on one’s own behalf in a way that will be acknowledged by the listener, one does not have to resort to violence to get the attention of decision-makers”** (1998, 63). **This contention has been confirmed by empirical research that documents a link between debate participation and a sharp decline in disciplinary referrals** (Winkler 2009). **The personal benefits of debate extend well beyond social attitudes and behavioral control. Participants often experience debate as a form of personal empowerment**. **This includes feelings of personal efficacy, educational engagement, and political agency**. Robert Branham explains that **debaters evaluate what they are told, and therefore come to see their own knowledge about the world as “earned” instead of passively received** from instructors or textbooks (1991, 20). Many authors (e.g., Freeley and Steinberg 2009) have noted that **debate experience gives students the confidence they need to interact with peers and authority figures**. **Debaters see themselves as citizens who can successfully engage complex questions of policy**. As Cori Dauber explains, **debate teaches students that “they ought not be intimidated by the rhetoric of expertise” surrounding policy issues. “They know that they are capable of making and defending informed choices about complex issues outside of their own area of interest because they do so on a daily basis”** (1989, 207). This sense of empowerment is not an abstraction. **Debaters gain the skills and the attitude they need to engage important issues in their lives and their communities**. Gordon **Mitchell** (1998, 53) **outlines the empowering potential of a variety of debate practices. He describes debate as a “political activity that has the potential to empower students and teachers to change the underlying conditions that cause inequities among schools and communities.”** Reflecting on their study of Latina involvement in debate, Casey Arbenz and Sylvia Beltran conclude, “debate can be a useful vehicle for providing empowerment and educational opportunities lacking in the public school system” (2001, 14).

### 2NC Simulation Good

#### Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

### 2NC State Action Good

#### The state can be redeemed!

Brubaker 4

Rogers Brubaker, Department of Sociology, UCLA, 2004, In the Name of the Nation: Reflectionson Nationalism and Patriotism, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, [www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf](http://www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf)

This, then, is the basic work done by the category ‘nation’ in the context of nationalist movements—movements to create a polity for a putative nation. In other contexts, the category ‘nation’ is used in a very different way. It is used not to challenge the existing territorial and political order, but to create a sense of national unity for a given polity. This is the sort of work that is often called nation-building, of which we have heard much of late. It is this sort of work that was evoked by the Italian statesman Massimo D’Azeglio, when he famously said, ‘we have made Italy, now we have to make Italians’. It is this sort of work that was (and still is) undertaken—with varying but on the whole not particularly impressive degrees of success—by leaders of post-colonial states, who had won independence, but whose populations were and remain deeply divided along regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines. It is this sort of work that the category ‘nation’ could, in principle, be mobilized to do in contemporary Iraq—to cultivate solidarity and appeal to loyalty in a way that cuts across divisions between Shi’ites and Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, North and South.2¶ In contexts like this, the category ‘nation’ can also be used in another way, not to appeal to a ‘national’ identity transcending ethnolinguistic, ethnoreligious, or ethnoregional distinctions, but rather to assert ‘ownership’ of the polity on behalf of a ‘core’ ethnocultural ‘nation’ distinct from the citizenry of the state as a whole, and thereby to define or redefine the state as the state of and for that core ‘nation’ (Brubaker, 1996, p. 83ff). This is the way ‘nation’ is used, for example, by Hindu nationalists in India, who seek to redefine India as a state founded on Hindutva or Hinduness, a state of and for the Hindu ethnoreligious ‘nation’ (Van der Veer, 1994). Needless to say, this use of ‘nation’ excludes Muslims from membership of the nation, just as similar claims to ‘ownership’ of the state in the name of an ethnocultural core nation exclude other ethnoreligious, ethnolinguistic, or ethnoracial groups in other settings.¶ In the United States and other relatively settled, longstanding nation-states, ‘nation’ can work in this exclusionary way, as in nativist movements in America or in the rhetoric of the contemporary European far right (‘la France oux Franc¸ais’, ‘Deutschland den Deutshchen’). **Yet it can also work in a very different and fundamentally inclusive way**.3 It can work to mobilize mutual solidarity among members of ‘the nation’, inclusively defined to include all citizens—and perhaps all long-term residents—of the state. To invoke nationhood, in this sense, is to attempt to transcend or at least relativize internal differences and distinctions. It is an attempt to get people to think of themselves— to formulate their identities and their interests—as members of that nation, rather than as members of some other collectivity. To appeal to the nation can be a powerful rhetorical resource, though it is not automatically so. Academics in the social sciences and humanities in the United States are generally skeptical of or even hostile to such invocations of nationhood. They are often seen as de´passe´, parochial, naive, regressive, or even dangerous. For many scholars in the social sciences and humanities, ‘nation’ is a suspect category.¶ Few American scholars wave flags, and many of us are suspicious of those who do. And often with good reason, since flag-waving has been associated with intolerance, xenophobia, and militarism, with exaggerated national pride and aggressive foreign policy. **Unspeakable horrors**—and a wide range of lesser evils—**have been perpetrated in the name of the nation**, and not just in the name of ‘ethnic’ nations, but in the name of putatively ‘civic’ nations as well (Mann, 2004). But this is not sufficient to account for the prevailingly negative stance towards the nation. Unspeakable horrors, and an equally wide range of lesser evils, have been committed in the name of many other sorts of imagined communities as well—in the name of the state, the race, the ethnic group, the class, the party, the faith.¶ In addition to the sense that nationalism is dangerous, and closely connected to some of the great evils of our time—the sense that, as John Dunn (1979, p. 55) put it, nationalism is ‘the starkest political shame of the 20th-century’— there is a much broader suspicion of invocations of nationhood. This derives from the widespread diagnosis that we live in a post-national age. It comes from the sense that, however well fitted the category ‘nation’ was to economic, political, and cultural realities in the nineteenth century, it is increasingly ill-fitted to those realities today. On this account, nation is fundamentally an anachronistic category, and invocations of nationhood, even if not dangerous, are out of sync with the basic principles that structure social life today.4¶ The post-nationalist stance combines an empirical claim, a methodological critique, and a normative argument. I will say a few words about each in turn. The empirical claim asserts the declining capacity and diminishing relevance of the nation-state. Buffeted by the unprecedented circulation of people, goods, messages, images, ideas, and cultural products, the nation-state is said to have progressively lost its ability to ‘cage’ (Mann, 1993, p. 61), frame, and govern social, economic, cultural, and political life. It is said to have lost its ability to control its borders, regulate its economy, shape its culture, address a variety of border-spanning problems, and engage the hearts and minds of its citizens. I believe this thesis is greatly overstated, and not just because the September 11 attacks have prompted an aggressively resurgent statism.5 Even the European Union, central to a good deal of writing on post-nationalism, does not represent a linear or unambiguous move ‘beyond the nation-state’. As Milward (1992) has argued, the initially limited moves toward supranational authority in Europe worked—and were intended—to restore and strengthen the authority of the nation-state. And the massive reconfiguration of political space along national lines in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War suggests that far from moving beyond the nation-state, large parts of Europe were moving back to the nation-state.6 The ‘short twentieth century’ concluded much as it had begun, with Central and Eastern Europe entering not a post-national but a post-multinational era through the large-scale nationalization of previously multinational political space. Certainly nationhood remains the universal formula for legitimating statehood. ¶ Can one speak of an ‘unprecedented porosity’ of borders, as one recent book has put it (Sheffer, 2003, p. 22)? In some respects, perhaps; but in other respects—especially with regard to the movement of people—social technologies of border control have continued to develop. One cannot speak of a generalized loss of control by states over their borders; in fact, during the last century, the opposite trend has prevailed, as states have deployed increasingly sophisticated technologies of identification, surveillance, and control, from passports and visas through integrated databases and biometric devices. The world’s poor who seek to better their estate through international migration face a tighter mesh of state regulation than they did a century ago (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, pp. 30–1, 267). Is migration today unprecedented in volume and velocity, as is often asserted? Actually, it is not: on a per capita basis, the overseas flows of a century ago to the United States were considerably larger than those of recent decades, while global migration flows are today ‘on balance slightly less intensive’ than those of the later nineteenth and early twentieth century (Held et al., 1999, p. 326). Do migrants today sustain ties with their countries of origin? Of course they do; but they managed to do so without e-mail and inexpensive telephone connections a century ago, and it is not clear—contrary to what theorists of post-nationalism suggest—that the manner in which they do so today represents a basic transcendence of the nation-state.7 Has a globalizing capitalism reduced the capacity of the state to regulate the economy? Undoubtedly. Yet in other domains—such as the regulation of what had previously been considered private behavior—the regulatory grip of the state has become tighter rather than looser (Mann, 1997, pp. 491–2).¶ The methodological critique is that the social sciences have long suffered from ‘methodological nationalism’ (Centre for the Study of Global Governance, 2002; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002)—the tendency to take the ‘nation-state’ as equivalent to ‘society’, and to focus on internal structures and processes at the expense of global or otherwise border-transcending processes and structures. There is obviously a good deal of truth in this critique, even if it tends to be overstated, and neglects the work that some historians and social scientists have long been doing on border-spanning flows and networks.¶ But what follows from this critique? If it serves to encourage the study of social processes organized on multiple levels in addition to the level of the nation-state, so much the better. But if the methodological critique is coupled— as it often is—with the empirical claim about the diminishing relevance of the nation-state, and if it serves therefore to channel attention away from state-level processes and structures, there is a risk that academic fashion will lead us to neglect what remains, for better or worse, a fundamental level of organization and fundamental locus of power.¶ The normative critique of the nation-state comes from two directions. From above, the cosmopolitan argument is that humanity as a whole, not the nation- state, should define the primary horizon of our moral imagination and political engagement (Nussbaum, 1996). From below, muticulturalism and identity politics celebrate group identities and privilege them over wider, more encompassing affiliations.¶ One can distinguish stronger and weaker versions of the cosmopolitan argument. The strong cosmopolitan argument is that there is no good reason to privilege the nation-state as a focus of solidarity, a domain of mutual responsibility, and a locus of citizenship.8 The nation-state is a morally arbitrary community, since membership in it is determined, for the most part, by the lottery of birth, by morally arbitrary facts of birthplace or parentage. The weaker version of the cosmopolitan argument is that the boundaries of the nation-state should not set limits to our moral responsibility and political commitments. It is hard to disagree with this point. No matter how open and ‘joinable’ a nation is—a point to which I will return below—it is always imagined, as Benedict Anderson (1991) observed, as a limited community. It is intrinsically parochial and irredeemably particular. Even the most adamant critics of universalism will surely agree that those beyond the boundaries of the nation-state have some claim, as fellow human beings, on our moral imagination, our political energy, even perhaps our economic resources.9¶ The second strand of the normative critique of the nation-state—the multiculturalist critique—itself takes various forms. Some criticize the nation-state for a homogenizing logic that inexorably suppresses cultural differences. Others claim that most putative nation-states (including the United States) are not in fact nation-states at all, but multinational states whose citizens may share a common loyalty to the state, but not a common national identity (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 11). But the main challenge to the nation-state from multiculturalism and identity politics comes less from specific arguments than from a general disposition to cultivate and celebrate group identities and loyalties at the expense of state-wide identities and loyalties.¶ In the face of this twofold cosmopolitan and multiculturalist critique, I would like to sketch a qualified defense of nationalism and patriotism in the contemporary American context.10 Observers have long noted the Janus-faced character of nationalism and patriotism, and I am well aware of their dark side. As someone who has studied nationalism in Eastern Europe, I am perhaps especially aware of that dark side, and I am aware that nationalism and patriotism have a dark side not only there but here. Yet the prevailing anti-national, post-national, and trans-national stances in the social sciences and humanities risk obscuring the good reasons—at least in the American context—for cultivating solidarity, mutual responsibility, and citizenship at the level of the nation-state. Some of those who defend patriotism do so by distinguishing it from nationalism.11 I do not want to take this tack, for I think that attempts to distinguish good patriotism from bad nationalism neglect the intrinsic ambivalence and polymorphism of both. Patriotism and nationalism are not things with fixed natures; **they are highly flexible political languages, ways of framing political arguments** by appealing to the patria, the fatherland, the country, the nation. These terms have somewhat different connotations and resonances, and the political languages of patriotism and nationalism are therefore not fully overlapping. But they do overlap a great deal, and an enormous variety of work can be done with both languages. I therefore want to consider them together here.¶ I want to suggest that patriotism and nationalism can be valuable in four respects. They can help develop more robust forms of citizenship, provide support for redistributive social policies, foster the integration of immigrants, and even serve as a check on the development of an aggressively unilateralist foreign policy.¶ First, nationalism and patriotism can motivate and sustain civic engagement. It is sometimes argued that liberal democratic states need committed and active citizens, and therefore need patriotism to generate and motivate such citizens. This argument shares the general weakness of functionalist arguments about what states or societies allegedly ‘need’; in fact, liberal democratic states seem to be able to muddle through with largely passive and uncommitted citizenries. But the argument need not be cast in functionalist form. A committed and engaged citizenry may not be necessary, but that does not make it any less desirable. And patriotism can help nourish civic engagement. It can help generate feelings of solidarity and mutual responsibility across the boundaries of identity groups. As Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 7) put it, the nation is conceived as a ‘deep horizontal comradeship’. Identification with fellow members of this imagined community can nourish the sense that their problems are on some level my problems, for which I have a special responsibility.12¶ Patriotic identification with one’s country—the feeling that this is my country, and my government—can help ground a sense of responsibility for, rather than disengagement from, actions taken by the national government. A feeling of responsibility for such actions does not, of course, imply agreement with them; **it may** even **generate powerful emotions such as shame, outrage, and anger that underlie and motivate opposition to government policies**. Patriotic **commitments** are likely to **intensify** rather than attenuate **such emotions**. As Richard Rorty (1994) observed, ‘you can feel shame over your country’s behavior only to the extent to which you feel it is your country’.13 Patriotic commitments can furnish the energies and passions that **motivate and sustain civic engagement**.

# QUARTERS v TEXAS BK

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### Text: The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology should direct the Department of Energy to include a Quadrennial Energy Review as an addendum to the Quadrennial Technology Review. The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology should direct the Department of Energy to include a recommendation to substantially increase power purchase agreements for energy production in the United States from small modular reactors as part of the Quadrennial Energy Review.

#### Recommending the plan solves - CP creates policy sustainability and private sector coordination – avoid politics

Moniz 12

Ernest Moniz, Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems and Director of the Energy Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Former Clinton Administration Under Secretary of the Department of Energy and as Associate Director for Science in the Office of Science and Technology Policy ; serves on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Spring 2012, Stimulating Energy Technology Innovation, Daedalus, Vol. 141, No. 2, Pages 81-93

It should come as no surprise that I do not have the answers for how the government should intersect the latter stages of the innovation process in a general sense. However, PCAST recommended a pragmatic approach to an integrated federal energy policy that would employ all the tools available to the government in a coherent way. Termed **the** Quadrennial Energy Review (**QER**), the process is necessarily complex, but **history suggests** that **anything short of a full multiagency effort is unlikely to provide a robust plan that accounts for the many threads of an energy policy**. Furthermore, a degree of analysis is required that has not been present in previous efforts.¶ Energy policy is derivative of many policies: environment, technology and competitiveness, diplomacy and security, natural resources, and land and food, among many others. Indeed, multiple agencies that are not labeled “energy” have major equities and long-held perspectives on key elements of energy policy. Often, the preferred policies for different agencies’ agendas conflict. Further, states and local governments play a strong role, for example with building codes, and their approaches can vary dramatically in different parts of the country; certainly, California’s energy policies have influenced the national market. The tools available to support innovation are also diverse, ranging from direct support of RD&D to a variety of economic incentives, regulation, standards, and federal procurement, among other instruments. Congress is equally fragmented: in the House of Representatives and Senate, many committees beyond those tasked with energy policy have equities that mirror those of the different executive agencies. **To overcome this fragmentation** of responsibilities and perspectives, and **especially if the goal is a plan that has staying power in advancing adoption and diffusion, PCAST recommended a QER process** to provide a multiyear roadmap that:¶• lays out an integrated view of short-, intermediate-, and long-term objectives for Federal energy policy in the context of economic, environmental, and security priorities;¶ • outlines **legislative proposals** to Congress;¶ • puts forward anticipated Executive actions (programmatic, regulatory, fiscal, and so on) coordinated across multiple agencies;¶ • **identifies resource requirements** for the RD&D programs **and** for innovation **incentive programs**; and, most important,¶ • provides a strong analytical base.14¶ This is a tall order intellectually and organizationally. Several process elements are essential to fostering a chance for success. First, the Executive Office of the President (eop) must use its convening power to ensure effective cooperation among the myriad relevant agencies. However, the capacity to carry out such an exercise and to sustain it does not (and should not) reside in the eop. The doe is the logical home for a substantial Executive Secretariat supporting the eop interagency process that would present decision recommendations to the president. However, the scope of the analytical capability needed does not currently reside at the doe or any other agency. The doe needs to build this capability, presumably supplemented by contractor support to gather data, develop and run models, and carry out analysis, such as independent energy-system engineering and economic analysis. Market trends and prices would be part of the analysis, including international markets and robust analyses of uncertainty. The Energy Information Administration can help with some data gathering and models, but its independence from the policy function needs to be preserved. The national laboratories also lack this range of functions, and tasking them with providing the analytical support to the policy process would be regarded as a conflict of interest; their focus is best directed at research, invention, and technology transfer. Building this analysis capacity is a large job that will take time.¶ For the QER to succeed, the government must seek substantial input from many quarters in a transparent way; certainly, ongoing dialogue with Congress and the energy industry are essential. The good news is that members of Congress have supported the development of the QER as a way to present a coherent **starting point for congressional action across many committees.** A hope is that **Congress could then use the QER as a basis for** a four or five-year **authorization that would provide the private sector with the increased confidence needed to make sound clean energy investment decisions**.¶ Given the magnitude of the task, PCAST recommended in 2011 that the doe carry out a Quadrennial Technology Review (qtr)–a first step centered in a single department and focused on technology. The qtr resulted in a rebalancing of the R&D portfolio toward the oil dependence challenge through advanced vehicle development, particularly transportation electrification. The key now will be to extend the processes developed for the qtr to the multiagency QER, involving the eop in a leadership role. Taking the next steps in 2012 will maintain momentum and establish the capabilities needed for the QER by early 2015, the time frame recommended by PCAST.¶ While some may view 2015 as a frustratingly long time away, the alternative is to rely on wishes rather than analysis while failing to gain multiple perspectives in a fair and open manner. **Rushing the process will result in a poorly done job that will not accomplish** any of the **key** QER **goals**. Certainly, **it will not bring together succeeding administrations and Congresses around a** reasonably **shared vision** and set of objectives **that can accelerate innovation in service of national competitiveness and environmental and security goals. Continuing with fragmented** and economically inefficient **policies, technologies “du jour,” and frequent shifts will complicate private-sector decisions rather than facilitate innovation**. The government unavoidably plays a strong role in the innovation process, even when this is unacknowledged in policy and political debates. The issue now is to present both a set of principles and fact-based analyses supporting coordinated government-wide actions that earn decent buy-in from major stakeholders.¶

[Note: PCAST = President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology]

### 1NC

#### Deal will happen- compromise

Fiscal Times 11-2

“Two Candidates; Two Approaches,” [http://www.cnbc.com/id/49645450//](http://www.cnbc.com/id/49645450/)

Washington is awash with speculation and anxiety about the looming fiscal cliff of massive tax increases and spending cuts that awaits Congressional action shortly after Tuesday’s election. While there are many scenarios for how negotiations might play out in a sorely divided government, the path to resolution may be simpler than many suspect once the votes are counted.¶ Obama envisions a $4 trillion bipartisan “Grand Bargain” of spending cuts, entitlement and tax reforms and tax increases on the wealthiest Americans to solve the country’s long-term debt problem while averting a jarring year-end panoply of expiring tax cuts and defense and domestic spending reductions totaling $607 billion. Obama’s last bid for a “Grand Bargain” was his failed secret talks with House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, that collapsed in recriminations.¶ “It will probably be messy,” the president told the Des Moines Register last week. “It won’t be pleasant. But I am absolutely confident that we can get what is the equivalent of the grand bargain that I’ve been offering to the Republicans for a very long time.”¶ Romney is dismissive of grand bargains and opposes tax hikes on the wealthy. He says that if elected, he wants Congress and Obama to delay any permanent solutions until after the inauguration in late January, and has suggested he would be open to fixing the problem with a series of separate bills.

#### Plan kills Obama

Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1/9

Obama Plays Safe on Energy Policy, 2012 Lexis

With less than a year to go until he faces re-election, US President Barack Obama is trying to avoid controversial energy policy decisions, postponing the finalization of restrictions on oil refinery and power plant emissions and delaying the approval of a major crude pipeline project. The president’s caution will prolong the status quo on issues where the industry both opposes and supports the administration’s plans, and also illustrates what's at stake for energy policy depending on whether or not Obama is given another four years in office. Most of Obama's original campaign pledges on promoting alternatives to fossil fuels and tackling climate change have not passed muster with Congress, most notably an ambitious plan for national carbon controls, a subsequent toned-down clean energy standard floated after the carbon legislation failed, and repeated efforts to repeal $30 billion-$40 billion worth of oil industry tax deductions over 10 years ( PIW May9'11 ). The one exception has been the passage of $90 billion in clean energy funding as part of an economic stimulus bill passed early in Obama's term, but the White House has been unable to repeat this success in other energy policy areas ( PIW Feb.23'09 ).

#### Collapses the economy

Morici 8/7

 Peter, PhD, is a "recognized expert on economic policy and international economics." He is a Professor of International Business at the R.H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland. "Fix fiscal cliff now or face next Great Depression," 2012, <http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/08/07/fix-fiscal-cliff-now-or-face-next-great-depression/>

President Obama and Republicans are engaging in dangerous brinksmanship. Putting off a political solution to the looming “fiscal cliff” until after the election risks a second Great Depression.¶ Without a compromise by January, $400 billion in mandatory spending cuts and more than $100 billion in tax increases will immediately go into effect. With our economy only growing by only $300 billion annually, such a shock would thrust it into a prolonged contraction.

#### Extinction

Kemp 10

Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

### 1NC

#### No weaponization now – Obama’s NSP has generated cooperation

Huntley, 11

- senior lecturer in the National Security Affairs department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California (Wade, “The 2011 U.S. National Space Security Policy: Engagement as a Work in Progress”, Disarmament Times, Spring,http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=429:the-2011-us-national-space-security-policy-engagement-as-a-work-in-progress&catid=154:disarmament-times-spring-2011&Itemid=2)

As is well understood, the space policies of the Bush administration were decidedly oriented toward military security concerns and independent action. The 2006 National Space Policy unabashedly proclaimed the U.S. intention to maintain a dominant position in space indefinitely. This policy orientation dismissed multilateral cooperation as impinging on U.S. “freedom of action,” throwing weight instead behind a wide range of technology development initiatives founded on the assumption that deployment of weapons in space was, if not already factual, certainly inevitable.2 U.S. commercial and civil engagement was overshadowed by these security concerns, expressed through the tightening of export control restrictions inhibiting a broad range of technology sharing. Once again, U.S. space policy was subsumed by other national priorities, in this case dominated by military security concerns. This background is essential for appreciating how the space policies of the Obama administration are beginning to genuinely break new trails. The U.S. National Space Policy issued in June 2010 has been widely recognized for its cooperative and multilateral tone, including as explicit near-term goals the expansion of international cooperation on all activities and pursuing international as well as national measures to enhance space stability. Particularly notable are the document’s emphasis on orienting U.S. “leadership” toward fostering international cooperation, and its references, in its concluding section, to cooperation with other states and non-state actors in the pursuit of national security space objectives.3 Less broadly noticed was this policy’s clarity and coherence in articulating a vision for U.S. space activities on its own terms.  The document is organized around core principles, subsidiary goals and implementing guidelines that exceed its predecessors in delineating a longer-term direction for U.S. space policy that is integrated with, rather than derivative of, broader U.S. global aims.4 The policy also was generated and issued far earlier in the tenure of the administration than either of its predecessors, indicating an increased prioritization of attention to space policy at higher levels of policy-making. To some degree, a turn toward multilateral cooperation in U.S. space policy was to be expected. China’s 2007 anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test and the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision increased awareness of the challenge of space debris and the need for better global information sharing on space situational awareness (SSA).5  Also, new budget realities and unpromising technological developments have scaled back ambitions in some quarters for solving U.S. space security concerns with new independent capabilities. Finally, the Obama administration has pursued a more cooperative disposition across a wide range of global policy challenges, from Iranian nuclear ambitions to global climate change. But the improved clarity of vision in the 2010 Space Policy suggests that the emphasis on fostering global cooperation on space-related activities is more grounded in deliberate foresight than sailing the prevailing political winds. The 2011 National Security Space Strategy, released February 4, is best interpreted against this background of the Obama administration’s turn toward both greater international space cooperation and greater attention to space policy in general. This first-of-its-kind strategic statement culminates a congressionally mandated space posture review.6 The initial section portraying the strategic environment to which U.S. security policy must be responsive highlights the growing problems of space debris, orbital congestion and coordination among a growing number of space actors — not state-based security threats per se.  The Security Space Strategy features the objective of a “stable space environment in which nations exercise shared responsibility.”7 Specific provisions intended to implement this strategy, relevant to the preceding observations, include:8   • The strategy presents a full section on “Partnering with Responsible Nations, International Organizations, and Commercial Firms.” This category is not wholly multilateral in the traditional sense, displaying a symbiosis of alliance-building and collective cooperation not always carefully distinguished; i.e., “The United States will lead in building coalitions of like-minded space-faring nations and, where appropriate, work with international institutions to do so.” • The strategy intends to “encourage responsible behavior in space and lead by the power of example,” a significant observation given the tendency of U.S. policy-makers (as noted above) not to expect quid pro quo responses to cooperative gestures. Also, the strategy states the U.S. “will support development of data standards, best practices, transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior for responsible space operations.” [italics added] In the context of the section on “Preventing and Deterring Aggression,” the strategy similarly intends to “support diplomatic efforts to promote norms of responsible behavior in space” as well as “pursue international partnerships that encourage potential adversary restraint,” along with other measures.  This emphasis on norm-building and the role of example suggests a near-term endorsement of the development of “codes of conduct” for space activities (such as the recently revised European Union Code of Conduct, discussed below), whether or not such concord leads to more formal arms control arrangements in the longer-term. • The Department of Defense is directed to “foster cooperative SSA relationships,” and to “expand provision of safety of flight services to U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and commercial firms.” Greater SSA information sharing has been a key suggestion for fostering international cooperation; the U.S. possesses globally superior SSA capabilities, but restricts the sharing of this information on the basis of national security concerns.9 Hence, this nominal commitment is significant in its own right. • The strategy commits to reforming export controls. “In particular, as new opportunities arise for international collaboration, a revised export control system will better enable the domestic firms competing for these contracts.” As noted above, the oppressive impact of current U.S. export controls not only impinges on U.S. commercial space actors but also epitomizes the high degree to which U.S. policy has subsumed commercial and civil interests to national security concerns. The strategy appears to acknowledge this connection and commit to remedy it. • The most assertive passages of the statement are moderated with community-building intent. For example, the strategy’s section on “Preventing and Deterring Aggression” concludes that the U.S. “will retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail,” but immediately adds that the U.S. “will use force in a manner that is consistent with longstanding principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of self defense.” • The concluding and most conflict-oriented section of the strategy opens by noting that “some actors may still believe counterspace actions could provide military advantage.” Counterspace capabilities, unarticulated in the document, include ASATs, ground-based directed energy weapons and satellite transmission jamming. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Gregory Schulte explained at the strategy’s rollout that China is a principal concern in this regard, but so is the proliferation of these technologies: “If Ethiopia can jam a commercial satellite, you have to worry what others can do.”10  This section of the strategy does not, however, call for maintaining options to develop complementary space conflict capabilities. Rather, the strategy asserts that the U.S. “must be prepared to ‘fight through’ a degraded environment,” and identifies “resilience” and “space protection” as the key criteria. The preceding survey of elements of the 2011 National Security Space Strategy is deliberately selective, highlighting those elements expressing consistency with the 2010 National Space Policy’s bend toward fostering greater international collaboration. Perhaps as striking as the prevalence of such passages, however, is the absence of expressed intention — even couched in hedging language — to sustain or expand the kind of independent space-based military capabilities that were the centerpiece of the prior administration’s aims (if not its accomplishments). Again, to some extent this turn in tone is overdetermined by extenuating global circumstances. But one must still be struck by the degree to which developments such as the Chinese ASAT test have not ignited the kind of response one might have anticipated only a few short years after Donald Rumsfeld’s notorious warning of a “space Pearl Harbor.”11   The most immediate significance of the National Security Space Strategy is likely the signals it sends concerning U.S. policy toward the recently revised European Union Code of Conduct.12  The strategy did not explicitly endorse this EU initiative, but Mr. Schulte, at the February 4 presentation of the strategy, highlighted the initiative “as a potential way” to promote “transparency and confidence-building measures, which tend to be voluntary as opposed to legally binding.” A week earlier, Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, stated at the Conference on Disarmament that the administration was nearing a decision on whether the U.S. would sign on to the code, and what modifications might be required in order to do so.13 As U.S. interest in the Code of Conduct has increased, debates over its provisions and its relationship to the Outer Space Treaty have intensified.   These policy movements toward multilateral engagement and commitment to behavioral standards (even if non-binding) mark a sharp departure from the stiff resistance to curtailing U.S. “freedom of action” in the previous administration, and have accordingly generated resistance from congressional opponents on just those terms. Prior to the release of the National Security Space Strategy, a group of 37 Republican senators led by Arizona Senator Jon Kyl issued a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton expressing concern over a potential multilateral commitment that might limit development and/or deployment of space-based missile defense interceptors and ASAT-defeating systems.14  Critics also decried the strategy’s emphasis on “the old fallacious assumption that the power of example will prevent adversaries from doing the United States harm,” and endorsed maintaining the goal of U.S. retention of a “dominant position in military and intelligence space capabilities.”15 In fact, the administration’s warming toward normative commitments in general — and the EU Code of Conduct in particular — are in part intended to forestall pressure for more formal and binding measures that would definitively cut off the “hedge” of unilateral U.S. weapons development options.16 The balance of U.S. debate may have shifted toward greater international cooperation, but the terms of the debate remain the same. In sum, the National Security Space Strategy appears to mark not only a swing in U.S. policy toward greater global engagement but also, and more importantly, a step toward greater long-term coherence in thinking concerning the core goals of U.S. space activities. Even supporters of the general directions of the strategy noted its more-than-expected breadth of thought.17 But if this reading is sound, the strategy is still but one step on a long road, and ongoing debates over the role of U.S. space policy vis-à-vis broader national security interests will insure that road is bumpy. Suggesting such limitations, Mr. Schulte acknowledged that the classified version of the strategy is only four pages longer than the released version, indicating that more specific guidelines for military implementation of the strategy remain to be developed.18 Many devils may lurk in these details.

#### SMR development allows the Air Force to deploy a space laser

Maybury, 12

(Chief Scientist-USAF, “Energy Horizons: United States Air Force Energy S&T Vision 2011-2026,” 1/31, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/energy.pdf)

**Space is the ―ultimate high ground, providing access to every part of the globe**, including denied areas. **Space also has the unique characteristic that once space assets reach space, they require comparatively small amounts of energy to perform their mission,** much of which is renewable. This simple characterization belies the complexity of the broader space enterprise. **The bigger space energy picture must encompass the energy required to maintain and operate the launch ranges**, the energy consumed during the launch of space assets, the energy generated and used in space, the energy consumed in satellite control stations, and the energy consumed in data ingest and processing centers. A comprehensive space energy strategy that addresses this full spectrum promises to enhance the resiliency, sustainability, and affordability of future space systems and operations through reduced consumption, increased energy supply, and cultural change. In the near-term, **there should be an emphasis on lowering ground facilities and systems energy consumption**, while continuing S&T investments for long-term assured energy advantage. The focus on ground facilities should include launch ranges, world-wide satellite control facilities, as well as the substantial data centers required to process and disseminate data to warfighters. In the longer term it may be possible to broaden the set of missions to be performed from space in an energy-efficient manner. This would require significant advances in S&T related to space-borne energy generation and storage technologies. In the mid- and long-term, substantial energy savings may be achieved through commonality in ground systems, efficient operations of those ground systems, as well as expanding the use of renewable energy resources. 3.1 Space Domain Strategic Context **On-orbit assets continue to be among the highest demand** and lowest density **assets in the Air Force inventory. They consistently and effectively provide unique capability to the community.** These assets are constrained, not just by the size of the payloads they carry, but also by their capability. Their austere operational environment coupled with current technology constraints means these systems regularly are required to operate long past their projected life. **S&T that increases energy production,** storage, and utilization of on-orbit assets **can both provide longer life systems or increase capability value for the Air Force.** In contrast to the air domain, assets in the space portfolio do not use traditional aviation fuels for mobility (airlift and air refueling). Indeed, once space assets are placed in orbit, with the very small exception of on-board consumables (to include propulsion for satellite maneuverability), only energy for the associated ground facilities and systems is required to maintain and operate them. Although there is an energy cost in getting systems to space, it is relatively small compared to the energy costs of the ground infrastructure. Therefore, in the near-term, investments in S&T that reduce the energy costs of space systems should focus primarily on reducing the energy costs of the associated ground facilities and systems. Nonetheless, there are promising S&T projects, such as the Reusable Booster System (RBS) and revolutionary small launch vehicles, that may substantially reduce the cost to orbit by applying lessons learned from the commercial aircraft industry to the RBS. For example, reuse may dramatically reduce manufacturing costs while simultaneously permitting much faster turnaround times. However, the full implications of reusable launch vehicles on energy consumption are not yet fully understood. The reusable components of RBS must be rocketed or jetted back to the launch base, resulting in greater use of energy for every launch. The energy impact of RBS requires detailed study. Additional potentially large energy cost savings could be achieved by employing other technologies emphasized in Technology Horizons, including fractionated, composable, and networked space systems. Much smaller systems that may perform the same functions as larger systems offer the possibility of substantially lowering launch costs and reducing on-orbit energy use. On the other hand, launching larger constellations of smaller satellites in low earth orbit may require more energy and use less efficient small launch vehicles. The total energy picture associated with the use of small, fractionated satellites requires careful analysis. Technology Horizons also advocated autonomous real-time, cross-domain, assured and trusted Space Situational Awareness (SSA). While autonomy can be used to save energy and cost for virtually any space mission, automating heavily human-directed SSA can potentially save large energy costs by reducing the presence of human interaction and, at the same time, increasing responsiveness. Figure 3.1 visually emphasizes that the overwhelming share of energy use for space domain operations is in terrestrial facilities and systems. Of the energy consumed for Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) missions, 97.2% is used by terrestrial facilities, 1.8% is used for ground vehicle transportation, and an estimated 1% is used for rocket launches. The commercial space sector has taken significantly different approaches on the ground infrastructure. Commercial space systems are operated with smaller facilities, small crews, and even autonomously. AFSPC has considered base closures to save significant costs; another solution, either in concert with base closures or by itself, is to establish an aggressive program to replace local power generation with renewable technologies. This would directly support the Air Force Energy Plan goals in the near-term, while also supporting assured sources of supply and cost reduction goals. Efforts are already underway to create more energy efficient ground assets using information from the cyber and infrastructure elements of Energy Horizons. A key opportunity is energy cost reduction for terrestrial radar and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, but so far little work has been done on this. 3.2 Space Energy Technologies Leading edge technologies for energy performance of on-orbit space systems can transition to terrestrial facilities and systems to lower their energy intensity and consumption. These technologies fall into three categories which are addressed in turn: energy generation, storage, and transmission. 3.2.1 Energy Generation Table 3.1 illustrates the near-, mid- and far-term opportunities in energy generation. Today, there is an emphasis on continuing to evolve Inverted Meta-Morphic (IMM) solar cell arrays that are exceeding 34% efficiency in demonstration programs. In contrast, current terrestrial solar cell arrays for energy generation are far less efficient, below 20%. If packaging and production issues could be overcome, the improved efficiency offered by IMM would dramatically improve the output capabilities of ground facility solar array systems and, in turn, lower the use of non-renewable energy sources. There may also be spinoff to the air and ground domains through programs such as DARPA‘s Vulture program, a long-endurance unmanned vehicle powered by solar cells, which is taking advantage of the same kinds of efficiency improvements in terrestrial systems. The importance of these S&T efforts lies in the fact that every 1% increase in solar cell energy generation efficiency translates to a 3.5% increase in power (or decrease in mass) for the system. The downside is that as the efficiency improves, the relative benefit is not as great, so there is a point of diminishing returns with the evolutionary approach. In addition, amorphous-Silicon (a-Si) for flexible arrays has achieved 10% efficiency. While a-Si has not been fully space qualified, it could be transitioned to terrestrial systems such as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) and powered tents. There are other breakthrough space energy generation component technologies with the potential of achieving up to 70% efficiency. Examples include quantum dots and dilute nitrides in solar cells. But there are also entirely new technologies such as tethers to attempt to harvest energy from the geomagnetic field, and energy harvesting from system heat waste. These ideas, as well as **new developments in** nuclear energy, including **small modular reactors, can potentially fuel local facilities.** Recently, there has been progress in developing large systems for energy generation, including very large deployable panels as developed by the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), DARPA, and industry. For example, we are currently limited to 27 kW arrays for satellite power, whereas more power is required for some future space missions by the AF, National Security Space (NSS), and NASA. **Employing larger and more efficient arrays will enable missions that require very high power, such as** space-based radar or **space-based laser missions**. An example of a system that is almost ready for a flight demonstration is the AFRL-Boeing 30 kW Integrated Blanket Interconnect System (IBIS). Figure 3.2 shows the technology and implementation concept for such a High Power Solar Array (HPSA). In the long term, increased solar cell efficiencies and revolutionary materials foreshadow the potential of 500 kW on-orbit power generation technologies, which would be transformational for performing missions from space-based systems. In addition to improving photovoltaic efficiencies, other potential energy production is possible in the mid- to far-term. In addition to modern designs for autosafing, **small modular nuclear reactors for ground operations** energy, nuclear energy **has been demonstrated on several satellite systems** (e.g., Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG)). **This source provides consistent power regardless of harvestable resources** (i.e. solar) **at a much higher energy and power density than current technologies**. While the implementation of such a technology should be weighed heavily against potential catastrophic outcomes, **many investments into small modular reactors can be leveraged for space based systems. As these nuclear power plants decrease in size, their utility on board space based assets increases.**

#### Extinction

**Mitchell, et al 1**
-Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh

(Dr. Gordon, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, “Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads”, No. 6 July, <http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html>)

A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36 Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

### Solvency

#### SMR incentives fail

Magwood, commissioner – NRC, 7/14/’11

(William, “ECONOMICS AND SAFETY OF MODULAR REACTORS; COMMITTEE: SENATE APPROPRIATIONS; SUBCOMMITTEE: ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT,” CQ Congressional Testimony)

That is not to say that SMRs are a new idea. The conceptual benefits of small reactors have been the subject of discussion and analysis for decades, and all the potential benefits I've mentioned have been considered in the past. The potential advantages of smaller reactors prompted the government to provide considerable financial support for the development of the mid- size, passive-safety reactors in the 1990s and to encourage the pursuit of the pebble-bed modular reactor in the early years of this century.¶ Both efforts proved unable to overcome the economic realities of building and operating nuclear power plants realities that tend to penalize small reactors and reward larger designs. Thus, instead of the AP-600 and 500 megawatt Simplified Boiling Water Reactor of the early 1990s, the market pushed vendors to increase the size of their designs; today, vendors offer Generation III+ technologies based on those smaller systems the 1100 megawatt AP- 1000 and the 1600 megawatt Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor.2¶ Around the turn of the century, both DOE and industry became interested in the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, or PBMR. This was a small, high-temperature gas-cooled reactor with a generating capacity of about 165 megawatts. This technology captured considerable media attention after U.S. companies became involved in an effort to build a commercial pilot in South Africa. However, as the high costs of the project became apparent, commercial participants began to peel away and eventually the South African project was abandoned.¶ All small reactor technologies of the past failed to find a way to overcome the fact that the infrastructure required to safely operate a nuclear power reactor of any size is considerable. Tons of steel and concrete are needed to construct containment buildings. Control rod drives, steam generators, and other key systems are hugely expensive to design and build. A larger plant with greater electric generating capacity simply has an inherently superior opportunity to recover these large up-front costs over a reasonable period.¶ So why is today different from yesterday? The greatest difference is the fact that the technology has evolved significantly over the years. Having learned lessons from the development of Generation III+ technologies and from the failure of previous small reactors, today's SMR vendors clearly believe they have solved the riddle of small reactor economics. They are presenting novel design approaches that could lead to significant improvements in nuclear safety. For example, design concepts that I have seen thus far further advance the use of passive safety systems, applying gravity, natural circulation, and very large inventories of cooling water to reduce reliance on human intervention during an emergency. SMR designs also apply novel technologies such as integral pressure vessels that contain all major system components and use fewer and smaller pipes and pumps, thereby reducing the potential for a serious loss-of- coolant accident.¶ Very importantly, these new SMRs are much smaller than the systems designed in the 1990s; this choice was made to assure that they could be factory-built and shipped largely intact by rail for deployment. The ability to "manufacture" a reactor rather than "constructing" it on-site could prove to be a major advantage in terms of cost, schedule reliability, and even quality control.¶ But will innovations like these allow this new breed of SMRs to be successful? Maybe.¶ Many years of work remain for SMR vendors to refine their designs and allow for the development of realistic and reliable cost estimates. This is much the same state of affairs that existed in the 2002 time frame when DOE launched the Nuclear Power 2010 program to spur the development and certification of Generation III+ designs such as the AP-1000. At that time, the level of design completeness was insufficient to enable vendors to provide utilities with reliable cost and schedule estimates.

#### SMRs not commercialized- natural gas

Scientific America 3/27

(David Biello, “Small Reactors Make a Bid to Revive Nuclear Power¶ Can small, LEGO-like reactors help create better prospects for the nuclear industry?” <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=small-reactors-bid-to-revive-nuclear-power&print=true>, SEH)

Regardless of how cheap such small modular reactors may allow nuclear to be in future, it is unlikely to be as cheap as natural-gas-fired turbines in the present. In fact, low natural gas prices stalled the U.S. nuclear renaissance outside Georgia and South Carolina, long before the reactor meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. "Because of an unanticipated abundance of natural gas in the United States, nuclear energy, in general, is facing tough competition," noted an analysis of the prospects for small modular reactors from the University of Chicago published last November. The analysis also suggested that small reactors would be more expensive than large reactors on a per-megawatt basis until manufacturing in significant quantities has happened. "It [is] unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of government incentive."

### Grid

#### No risk of blackout- grid break up

USA Today 8-1

“Similar Blackout is unlikely in the U.S.,” USA Today page 8-1

A massive, countrywide power failure like the one in India is "extremely unlikely" in the United States, energy experts say.¶ The U.S. electricity system is segmented in three parts with safeguards to prevent an outage in one system from tripping a blackout in another, "making blackouts across the country extremely unlikely," Energy Department spokeswoman Keri Fulton said.¶ "We are much, much less at risk for something like that happening here," said Gregory Reed, a professor of electric power engineering at University of Pittsburgh. "Most of our issues have been from natural disasters." The U.S. generates more than enough electricity to meet demand and always has power in reserve, Reed said.¶ Grid operators across the USA analyze power usage and generation in real time, factoring forces such as weather, and can forecast power supply and demand by the hour, said Arshad Mansoor, senior vice president of the Electric Power Research Institute in Washington.¶ "In any large, complex interactive network, the chance of that interconnection breaking up is always there," he said.

#### Backup capacity solves blackouts

Aimone 9-12 (Dr. Michael, Director of Business Enterprise Integration – Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), “Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies,” 2012, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf)

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also focused heavily on grid security in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk. 1 Standby Power Generation Currently, DoD ensures that it can continue mission critical activities on base largely through its fleet of on-site power generation equipment. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and **automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage**. In addition, each installation has **standby generators** in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the generators are primed and ready to work, and that they are **maintained and fueled during an emergency**. With careful maintenance these generators can bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a **strategic stockpile** of electrical power generators and support equipment that is kept in operational readiness. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery.

#### Grid is resilient and sustainable

Clark 12

Clark, MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/’12¶ (Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

In 2003, a simple physical breakdown occurred – trees shorted a power line and caused a

fault – that had a cascading effect and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis¶ 2010). This singular occurrence has been used as evidence that the electrical grid is fragile and¶ subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack, a disruption that could cost billions of dollars,¶ brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives – if compounded by other catastrophic¶ events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the 2003 blackout, the worst in American¶ history at that time (Minkel 2008), is a worst case scenario and used as an example of the¶ fragility of the U.S. energy grid. This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context¶ of the robustness of the electrical grid.¶ When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012, the¶ intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stated that an attack was¶ unlikely to succeed because of the “huge amounts of resiliency built into the [electrical] system¶ that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult” (Capaccio 2012). This optimistic view¶ is supported by an electrical grid that has proven to be robust in the face of large natural¶ catastrophes. Complex systems like the electrical grid in the U.S. are prone to failures and the¶ U.S. grid fails frequently. Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always¶ present. Power outages that affect more than 50,000 people have occurred steadily over the last¶ 20 years at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively¶ high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur every 25 years (Minkel¶ 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, the effect is mitigated by policies¶ and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a legally binding¶ agreement allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to a catastrophic¶ disaster such as power outages following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev¶ 2009).¶ The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly, it is a large and complex system¶ supporting the largest economy in the world, and yet commerce does not collapse (Lewis 2010).¶ Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes that cause blackouts, the economy is¶ affected but does not collapse and even after massive damage like that caused by Hurricane¶ Katrina, national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded (Lewis¶ 2010).¶ Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern in an increasingly electronic and¶ interconnected world. Cyber-security is a high priority “economic and national security¶ challenge” (National Security Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the¶ top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). In response to the threat Congress is¶ crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security (Brito and Watkins 2012) and the Department of¶ Homeland Security budget for cyber-security has been significantly increased (U.S. Senate¶ Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).

#### Grid is improving

Koerth-Baker 12

Koerth-Baker, science editor – Boing Boing, columnist – NYT Magazine, electric grid expert, 8/3/’12¶ (Maggie, “Blackout: What's wrong with the American grid,” <http://boingboing.net/2012/08/03/blackout-whats-wrong-with-t.html>)

But this is about more than mere bad luck. The real causes of the 2003 blackout were fixable problems, and the good news is that, since then, we’ve made great strides in fixing them. The bad news, say some grid experts, is that we’re still not doing a great job of preparing our electric infrastructure for the future.¶ Let’s get one thing out of the way right up front: The North American electric grid is not one bad day away from the kind of catastrophic failures we saw in India this week. I’ve heard a lot of people speculating on this, but the folks who know the grid say that, while such a huge blackout is theoretically possible, it is also extremely unlikely. As Clark Gellings, a fellow at the Electric Power Research Institute put it, “An engineer will never say never,” but you should definitely not assume anything resembling an imminent threat at that scale. Remember, the blackouts this week cut power to half of all Indian electricity customers. Even the 2003 blackout—the largest blackout in North America ever—only affected about 15% of Americans.¶ We don’t know yet what, exactly, caused the Indian blackouts, but there are several key differences between their grid and our grid. India’s electricity is only weakly tied to the people who use it, Gellings told me. Most of the power plants are in the far north. Most of the population is in the far south. The power lines linking the two are neither robust nor numerous. That’s not a problem we have in North America.¶ Likewise, India has considerably more demand for electricity than it has supply. Even on a good day, there’s not enough electricity for all the people who want it, said Jeff Dagle, an engineer with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Advanced Power and Energy Systems research group. “They’re pushing their system much harder, to its limits,” he said. “If they have a problem, there’s less cushion to absorb it. Our system has rules that prevent us from dipping into our electric reserves on a day-to-day basis. So we have reserve power for emergencies.”

#### Cyber war infeasible

Clark 12

Clark, MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/’12

(Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

The Department of Homeland Security worries that our critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) may be exposed, both directly and indirectly, to multiple threats because of CIKR reliance on the global cyber infrastructure, an infrastructure that is under routine cyberattack by a “spectrum of malicious actors” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). CIKR in the extremely large and complex U.S. economy spans multiple sectors including agricultural, finance and banking, dams and water resources, public health and emergency services, military and defense, transportation and shipping, and energy (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). The disruption and destruction of public and private infrastructure is part of warfare, without this infrastructure conflict cannot be sustained (Geers 2011). Cyber-attacks are desirable because they are considered to be a relatively “low cost and long range” weapon (Lewis 2010), but prior to the creation of Stuxnet, the first cyber-weapon, the ability to disrupt and destroy critical infrastructure through cyber-attack was theoretical. The movement of an offensive cyber-weapon from conceptual to actual has forced the United States to question whether offensive cyber-attacks are a significant threat that are able to disrupt or destroy CIKR to the level that national security is seriously degraded. It is important to understand the risk posed to national security by cyber-attacks to ensure that government responses are appropriate to the threat and balance security with privacy and civil liberty concerns. The risk posed to CIKR from cyber-attack can be evaluated by measuring the threat from cyber-attack against the vulnerability of a CIKR target and the consequences of CIKR disruption. As the only known cyber-weapon, Stuxnet has been thoroughly analyzed and used as a model for predicting future cyber-weapons. The U.S. electrical grid, a key component in the CIKR energy sector, is a target that has been analyzed for vulnerabilities and the consequences of disruption predicted – the electrical grid has been used in multiple attack scenarios including a classified scenario provided to the U.S. Congress in 2012 (Rohde 2012). Stuxnet will serve as the weapon and the U.S. electrical grid will serve as the target in this risk analysis that concludes that there is a low risk of disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure from a an offensive cyber-weapon because of the complexity of the attack path, the limited capability of non-state adversaries to develop cyber-weapons, and the existence of multiple methods of mitigating the cyber-attacks. To evaluate the threat posed by a Stuxnet-like cyber-weapon, the complexity of the weapon, the available attack vectors for the weapon, and the resilience of the weapon must be understood. The complexity – how difficult and expensive it was to create the weapon – identifies the relative cost and availability of the weapon; inexpensive and simple to build will be more prevalent than expensive and difficult to build. Attack vectors are the available methods of attack; the larger the number, the more severe the threat. For example, attack vectors for a cyberweapon may be email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, websites, and infected USB devices or compact discs. Finally, the resilience of the weapon determines its availability and affects its usefulness. A useful weapon is one that is resistant to disruption (resilient) and is therefore available and reliable. These concepts are seen in the AK-47 assault rifle – a simple, inexpensive, reliable and effective weapon – and carry over to information technology structures (Weitz 2012). The evaluation of Stuxnet identified malware that is “unusually complex and large” and required code written in multiple languages (Chen 2010) in order to complete a variety of specific functions contained in a “vast array” of components – it is one of the most complex threats ever analyzed by Symantec (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). To be successful, Stuxnet required a high level of technical knowledge across multiple disciplines, a laboratory with the target equipment configured for testing, and a foreign intelligence capability to collect information on the target network and attack vectors (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The malware also needed careful monitoring and maintenance because it could be easily disrupted; as a result Stuxnet was developed with a high degree of configurability and was upgraded multiple times in less than one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Once introduced into the network, the cyber-weapon then had to utilize four known vulnerabilities and four unknown vulnerabilities, known as zero-day exploits, in order to install itself and propagate across the target network (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Zero-day exploits are incredibly difficult to find and fewer than twelve out of the 12,000,000 pieces of malware discovered each year utilize zero-day exploits and this rarity makes them valuable, zero-days can fetch $50,000 to $500,000 each on the black market (Zetter 2011). The use of four rare exploits in a single piece of malware is “unprecedented” (Chen 2010). Along with the use of four unpublished exploits, Stuxnet also used the “first ever” programmable logic controller rootkit, a Windows rootkit, antivirus evasion techniques, intricate process injection routines, and other complex interfaces (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) all wrapped up in “layers of encryption like Russian nesting dolls” (Zetter 2011) – including custom encryption algorithms (Karnouskos 2011). As the malware spread across the now-infected network it had to utilize additional vulnerabilities in proprietary Siemens industrial control software (ICS) and hardware used to control the equipment it was designed to sabotage. Some of these ICS vulnerabilities were published but some were unknown and required such a high degree of inside knowledge that there was speculation that a Siemens employee had been involved in the malware design (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The unprecedented technical complexity of the Stuxnet cyber-weapon, along with the extensive technical and financial resources and foreign intelligence capabilities required for its development and deployment, indicates that the malware was likely developed by a nation-state (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Stuxnet had very limited attack vectors. When a computer system is connected to the public Internet a host of attack vectors are available to the cyber-attacker (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Web browser and browser plug-in vulnerabilities, cross-site scripting attacks, compromised email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, operating system and other application vulnerabilities are all vectors for the introduction of malware into an Internetconnected computer system. Networks that are not connected to the public internet are “air gapped,” a technical colloquialism to identify a physical separation between networks. Physical separation from the public Internet is a common safeguard for sensitive networks including classified U.S. government networks. If the target network is air gapped, infection can only occur through physical means – an infected disk or USB device that must be physically introduced into a possibly access controlled environment and connected to the air gapped network. The first step of the Stuxnet cyber-attack was to initially infect the target networks, a difficult task given the probable disconnected and well secured nature of the Iranian nuclear facilities. Stuxnet was introduced via a USB device to the target network, a method that suggests that the attackers were familiar with the configuration of the network and knew it was not connected to the public Internet (Chen 2010). This assessment is supported by two rare features in Stuxnet – having all necessary functionality for industrial sabotage fully embedded in the malware executable along with the ability to self-propagate and upgrade through a peer-to-peer method (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Developing an understanding of the target network configuration was a significant and daunting task based on Symantec’s assessment that Stuxnet repeatedly targeted a total of five different organizations over nearly one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) with physical introduction via USB drive being the only available attack vector. The final factor in assessing the threat of a cyber-weapon is the resilience of the weapon. There are two primary factors that make Stuxnet non-resilient: the complexity of the weapon and the complexity of the target. Stuxnet was highly customized for sabotaging specific industrial systems (Karnouskos 2011) and needed a large number of very complex components and routines in order to increase its chance of success (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). The malware required eight vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system to succeed and therefore would have failed if those vulnerabilities had been properly patched; four of the eight vulnerabilities were known to Microsoft and subject to elimination (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Stuxnet also required that two drivers be installed and required two stolen security certificates for installation (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011); driver installation would have failed if the stolen certificates had been revoked and marked as invalid. Finally, the configuration of systems is ever-changing as components are upgraded or replaced. There is no guarantee that the network that was mapped for vulnerabilities had not changed in the months, or years, it took to craft Stuxnet and successfully infect the target network. Had specific components of the target hardware changed – the targeted Siemens software or programmable logic controller – the attack would have failed. Threats are less of a threat when identified; this is why zero-day exploits are so valuable. Stuxnet went to great lengths to hide its existence from the target and utilized multiple rootkits, data manipulation routines, and virus avoidance techniques to stay undetected. The malware’s actions occurred only in memory to avoid leaving traces on disk, it masked its activities by running under legal programs, employed layers of encryption and code obfuscation, and uninstalled itself after a set period of time, all efforts to avoid detection because its authors knew that detection meant failure. As a result of the complexity of the malware, the changeable nature of the target network, and the chance of discovery, Stuxnet is not a resilient system. It is a fragile weapon that required an investment of time and money to constantly monitor, reconfigure, test and deploy over the course of a year. There is concern, with Stuxnet developed and available publicly, that the world is on the brink of a storm of highly sophisticated Stuxnet-derived cyber-weapons which can be used by hackers, organized criminals and terrorists (Chen 2010). As former counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke describes it, there is concern that the technical brilliance of the United States “has created millions of potential monsters all over the world” (Rosenbaum 2012). Hyperbole aside, technical knowledge spreads. The techniques behind cyber-attacks are “constantly evolving and making use of lessons learned over time” (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002) and the publication of the Stuxnet code may make it easier to copy the weapon (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). However, this is something of a zero-sum game because knowledge works both ways and cyber-security techniques are also evolving, and “understanding attack techniques more clearly is the first step toward increasing security” (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Vulnerabilities are discovered and patched, intrusion detection and malware signatures are expanded and updated, and monitoring and analysis processes and methodologies are expanded and honed. Once the element of surprise is lost, weapons and tactics are less useful, this is the core of the argument that “uniquely surprising” stratagems like Stuxnet are single-use, like Pearl Harbor and the Trojan Horse, the “very success [of these attacks] precludes their repetition” (Mueller 2012). This paradigm has already been seen in the “son of Stuxnet” malware – named Duqu by its discoverers – that is based on the same modular code platform that created Stuxnet (Ragan 2011). With the techniques used by Stuxnet now known, other variants such as Duqu are being discovered and countered by security researchers (Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security 2011). It is obvious that the effort required to create, deploy, and maintain Stuxnet and its variants is massive and it is not clear that the rewards are worth the risk and effort. Given the location of initial infection and the number of infected systems in Iran (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) it is believed that Iranian nuclear facilities were the target of the Stuxnet weapon. A significant amount of money and effort was invested in creating Stuxnet but yet the expected result – assuming that this was an attack that expected to damage production – was minimal at best. Iran claimed that Stuxnet caused only minor damage, probably at the Natanz enrichment facility, the Russian contractor Atomstroyeksport reported that no damage had occurred at the Bushehr facility, and an unidentified “senior diplomat” suggested that Iran was forced to shut down its centrifuge facility “for a few days” (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Even the most optimistic estimates believe that Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was only delayed by months, or perhaps years (Rosenbaum 2012). The actual damage done by Stuxnet is not clear (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010) and the primary damage appears to be to a higher number than average replacement of centrifuges at the Iran enrichment facility (Zetter 2011). Different targets may produce different results. The Iranian nuclear facility was a difficult target with limited attack vectors because of its isolation from the public Internet and restricted access to its facilities. What is the probability of a successful attack against the U.S. electrical grid and what are the potential consequences should this critical infrastructure be disrupted or destroyed? An attack against the electrical grid is a reasonable threat scenario since power systems are “a high priority target for military and insurgents” and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and integrating utilities into the public Internet that has “increased vulnerability across the board” (Lewis 2010). Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that has been “honed over many years of practical application” now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary and specialized, applications and components (Leita and Dacier 2012). The security of the electrical grid is also enhanced by increased awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of the Stuxnet malware in 2010; as a result the public and private sector are working together in an “unprecedented effort” to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security measures (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).

#### CGS now

Brown, 2-3-2010

[Peter J Brown, Asia Times Online , " US's strike threat catches China off guard," 2/3/10, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LB04Ad01.html)

The United States plans to unveil later this decade a new conventional "Prompt Global Strike" (C-PGS) system. It will enable the US to instantly carry out a massive conventional attack anywhere in the world in an hour or less. Research and development work by the US Department of Defense (DoD) on C-PGS began almost two decades ago, and this shifted into high gear in 2003. Instead of delivering a nuclear warhead, a new US-based missile and/or some other unmanned delivery vehicle may carry a conventional warhead that is able to destroy a distant target in less than an hour. The DoD issued the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) on February 1 - which is mandated by the US Congress. It specifically mentions C-PGS prototypes as well as other "long-range strike" capabilities. "The US cannot take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in the programs, platforms, and personnel that will ensure that dominance's persistence," wrote US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in a commentary accompanying the 2010 QDR entitled, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon For a New Age".

#### Obviates need for basing and heg

**Scheel, 2003** [LYNN I. SCHEEL, Major in the US Air Force, LONG-RANGE STRIKE – CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF FUTURE AIRPOWER CAPABILITIES, A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, AIR UNIVERSITY, JUNE 2003]

The language of the current NSS is unambiguous. The US will do what it must to ensure its own security. Developing an advanced long-range strike system will provide the President with an additional military option that is not hamstrung by access to foreign bases or unpredictable diplomatic wrangling. Such a strike option will not only help to ensure American security by exercising its capabilities when necessary, but also its very existence will provide a substantial deterrent and coercive element in the diplomatic struggle to arrive at agreeable solutions without the actual use of force. In 1997, while testifying before the House National Security Subcommittee on Military Procurement in support of additional B-2 procurement, Eliot Cohen, a widely respected expert on strategic studies, voiced the following opinion: What deters potential opponents of the United States from acting contrary to our interests and policy? I would say, “the knowledge that the United States has the capability to deliver military blows against which there is no defense, and which it has the will to use, even without the support of any other nation on earth.” . . . In the new age in which we find ourselves, such a characteristic is particularly desirable.19 Although Cohen’s testimony was for additional B-2s, the same argument can be applied even more strenuously for a new long-range strike system with increased capability against anti-access threats. The effect long-range strike may have on an adversary’s strategic calculus cannot be ignored. Herein may lay the true value of the long-range strike system—its real worth lies in the strategic influence of its mere existence even more than its actual value when employed. Although this carries the scent of nuclear deterrence, long-range strike will perhapsexceed the deterrent capability of nuclear weapons due to the increased likelihood of use, hence raising the credibility of the coercive element. To sum up this section, it is evident there are still limitations to what the Air Force can presently do regarding global strike based on the current weapon system inventory and capabilities. Access to foreign bases is a compelling concern and must not be ignored or marginalized and our national security strategy dictates improving our capabilities to preemptively strike an adversary posing a threat to our national security. In the words of a defense industry “think tank” analysis, “…the U.S. will be best served by the creation of an agile, access-insensitive military force that can project sustained, precise, and survivable military power across great distances with little preparation or reliance on external political or military support.”20 With justification for long-range strike evident, this chapter will now examine the system options and capabilities.

#### No China-Taiwan war --- no one wants it

Pei ’06 (Minxin, senior associate and director of the China program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2/8. “Chen’s Gamble to Stay Relevant.” Straits Times, Carnegie Endowment online.)

Not too long ago, the nightmarish scenario of an armed conflict between mainland China and Taiwan captured the attention of East Asia. After winning his re-election to the presidency under controversial circumstances in March 2004, Taiwan's Chen Shui-bian began a high-stakes gamble to test China's bottom line. He not only escalated the rhetoric about making Taiwan a 'normal nation', but also backed up his words with a plan to hold an island-wide referendum on a new Constitution as a legal vehicle to solidify Taiwan's permanent separation from mainland China. Two years later, things could hardly be more different. The spectre of a war across the Taiwan Strait has receded. In the much improved Sino-American relationship, the contentious Taiwan issue no longer dominates the agenda. In fact, Taiwan was largely an afterthought in recent high-level exchanges between Chinese and American leaders. Topping the discussions between Washington and Beijing today are more pressing global and regional security issues: curbing North Korea's nuclear ambition, pressuring Iran to give up its plans for uranium enrichment and, more importantly, searching for a new framework for US-China relations. The reduction of tensions across the Taiwan Strait comes as welcome news to East Asia. In the past year, a combination of developments has turned the tide against the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The political fortunes of the DPP, which rose to power in 2000 by championing a new Taiwanese identity and recklessly challenged the fragile status quo in the Taiwan Strait, has been waning. Its leadership has lost credibility, both with a majority of Taiwan's voters and with Washington. Indeed, two years before he moves out of the presidential palace in Taipei, Mr Chen is struggling to stay relevant. Broadly speaking, three seismic changes since President Chen's re-election victory two years ago have greatly altered the short- to medium-term political landscape both in Taiwan and across the Taiwan Strait. First, alarmed by Mr Chen's thinly disguised ploy to seek de jure independence through the passage of a new Constitution enacted by a plebiscite, Taiwan's voters decided to end the President's gambit by refusing to give the DPP a majority in the island's legislative chamber (a condition which would be necessary to give a new Constitution any realistic chance of passage) in the watershed election of December 2004. The DPP's electoral nemesis, the so-called pan-blue alliance, consisting of two opposition parties - the Kuomintang and the People First Party – that advocate a moderate approach to mainland China, managed to retain its slim legislative majority. This stunning rebuke by Taiwan's democratic process halted the momentum of the pro-independence movement almost overnight. Constrained by an opposition-controlled legislature and rising public discontent with his poor governing record, President Chen lost his ability to set Taiwan's policy agenda and direction. Of course, things went from bad to worse at the end of last year when the DPP suffered a massive defeat in local elections. Second, China's new leadership adjusted its Taiwan policy in two dramatic directions. On the one hand, Beijing's new leaders concluded that they must make their threat of military action credible. Consequently, the mainland accelerated military preparations for a conflict with Taiwan in light of Mr Chen's vow to pass a new Constitution. Chinese leaders also set in motion a legislative process to obtain pre-authorisation for the use of force - which culminated in the passage of an 'anti-secession law' in March last year. On the other hand, China's President Hu Jintao coupled the threat of the use of force with a charm offensive, inviting the leaders of Taiwan's main opposition parties to visit the mainland and offering a package of economic benefits and goodwill gestures (a pair of pandas) to Taiwan. While wooing the Taiwanese opposition and business community, Beijing also intensified the isolation of Mr Chen, refusing to deal with him unless he accepts the 'one China' principle, which stipulates that the mainland and Taiwan both belong to the same China. Caught offguard by Beijing's 'panda offensive', Mr Chen's government was unable to counter the mainland's new policy initiatives and could offer no reassuring message to a Taiwanese public that had grown increasingly weary of the DPP's divisive ethno-nationalist policies and was interested in **returning the cross-strait relationship to a more stable footing**. Third, President George W. Bush, perhaps the most pro-Taiwan American president in history, re-adjusted his policy in late 2004. Although the Bush administration approved the largest arms package for sale to Taiwan in 2001 and substantially upgraded ties with Taiwan in the past five years, Washington was greatly alarmed by Mr Chen's apparent strategy of taking advantage of US support and seeking a dangerous confrontation with mainland China. Obviously, the United States has **no interest** in fighting for Taiwan's de jure independence even though it continues to deter China from seeking reunification through military means. In addition, with its strategic attention focused on Iraq, the war on terrorism, Iran and North Korea, the Bush administration needs China's cooperation on a wide range of issues and **wants to prevent a needless conflict** between the mainland and Taiwan. Washington has also grown increasingly impatient with Mr Chen, who has surprised the Bush administration on numerous occasions with statements that were viewed as irresponsible, fickle and reckless. Consequently, Washington cooled its support for Taipei and became explicit in its opposition to the so-called 'unilateral change of the status quo', a veiled reference to Mr Chen's plans to alter Taiwan's constitutional and political status. The cumulative effects of these developments significantly undermined Mr Chen's effectiveness and increased his frustrations. Struggling to regain the political initiative after the DPP's disastrous performance in last December's local polls, Mr Chen recently reshuffled his government. He appointed two heavyweight loyalists, Mr Su Tseng-chang and Ms Tsai Ing-wen, as Premier and Vice-Premier respectively. Both are viewed as hardliners on China policy. Defying public expectations that, chastened by his party's electoral losses, he would adopt a more conciliatory tone towards the mainland, the Taiwanese President has apparently decided to escalate tensions with Beijing (and Washington) again. In the past month, Mr Chen has vowed to tighten cross-strait trade and investment, scrap the symbolic National Reunification Council, seek admission to the United Nations under the name 'Taiwan' (not the Republic of China) as well as enact a new Constitution through a plebiscite. All these steps, if carried out, would re-ignite tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Mr Chen conceivably could benefit from the tensions because these acts would energise his base and allow him to dominate Taiwan's policy agenda again. It is too early to tell whether Mr Chen's gamble will pay off. So far, Beijing has reacted coolly to his latest provocations, relying instead on Washington to restrain Taipei. The Bush administration, surprised again by Mr Chen's pronouncements, has made its irritation public and criticised Taipei for trying to change the status quo. But in Taiwan, Mr Chen's confrontational stance has failed to rally the public. For the short term, his gambit has got him enough public attention to show his political relevance.

### Leadership

#### Export regs prevent solvency

Platts, 10/1/2012. “Export reform needed to increase US nuclear market share: NEI,” http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6666149.

Export controls on technology related to nuclear power should be reformed to allow US companies to capture a larger share of growing international markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute said Monday. The US Department of Commerce estimates the world market for nuclear power technology, fuel and related services and equipment at "upwards of" $750 billion over the next 10 years, Richard Myers, vice president for policy development, planning and supplier programs at NEI, said at a press conference Monday in Washington to release a report the US nuclear power industry commissioned on the topic. "It is a myth that the US nuclear supply chain has disappeared," Myers said. Most manufacturing of large "heavy metal" components for nuclear power plants, such as reactor vessels, is now done in Asia, but many US firms manufacture "precision components" for the nuclear industry and would stand to benefit from increased ability to compete with other countries, Myers said. US licensing and regulatory reviews of nuclear exports, however, are "unduly burdensome," have confusing "layers of jurisdiction" shared by at least four federal agencies, and typically take at least a year to complete, "months longer" than reviews in other exporter countries, he said. As a result, the US export control regime is "far more complex and more difficult to navigate ... than comparable regimes in other nations," Myers said. The report prepared by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for NEI said that "US agencies should be able to increase the efficiency of their license processing through stronger executive branch procedures. By signaling to potential customers that US exports may be licensed on a schedule comparable to those of foreign export control regimes, such an improvement could significantly 'level the playing field' for US exporters in the near term." Many such reforms can be accomplished "administratively," without the need for legislation, James Glasgow, a partner at Pillsbury who specializes in nuclear export law, said during the press conference. The US Department of Energy is currently amending some of its export regulations, known as the Part 810 rule, and reforming that rule could provide significant opportunities to US exporters, Glasgow said. Unfortunately, some of DOE's proposed revisions to the rule go in the wrong direction, adding regulatory requirements and hurdles, Myers said. Some potential customers for US nuclear exports see DOE's Part 810 review as "the choke point" for an order, and "sometimes that's an evaluation criterion" for deciding whether to buy from a US firm, Glasgow said. In such situations, delay in the review can be "the functional equivalence of denial" of permission for the export because the buyer looks elsewhere, he said.

\*\*\*Burdensome U.S. export regulations are the critical obstacle to nuclear leadership—the U.S. actually still has the supply chain, but massive delays in processing push countries away from the U.S.

#### US won’t cave to South Korea on reprocessing now

Yonhap 12

Yonhap, 3-8-2012, “U.S. unlikely to allow S. Korea to reprocess nuclear fuel,” <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/03/08/23/0301000000AEN20120308007100315F.HTML>

The United States is unlikely to allow South Korea to adopt its indigenous technology aimed at reprocessing highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel in their negotiations to revise a bilateral nuclear accord, a senior Seoul diplomat involved in the talks said Thursday. The refusal by U.S. negotiators stemmed from a "deep-rooted distrust" of South Korea, which had once authorized a clandestine nuclear weapons program in the early 1970s under former president Park Jung-hee but shut it down under pressure from Washington, the diplomat said on the condition of anonymity. Rather than pressing the U.S. to allow South Korea to adopt the proliferation-resistant reprocessing technology, called "pyroprocessing," Seoul is focusing on revising the nuclear accord to make it easier to export nuclear power plants, the diplomat said.

#### Failure to maintain a hardline on domestic reprocessing shatters the norm against ENR and makes credible US diplomatic pressure impossible – ensures South Korean ENR

Sagan 11

Scott Sagan, poly sci prof @ Stanford, co-chair Global Nuclear Future Initiative, 4-18-2011, “The International Security Implications of U.S. Domestic Nuclear Power Decisions,” http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120621005012/http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/sagan\_brc\_paper\_final.pdf

A similar phenomenon occurs when policy makers and scholars underestimate the international effect of the U.S. decision to abandon plutonium reprocessing in the 1970s. Skeptics claim that the fact that France and Japan, especially, went forward with their ambitious plutonium reprocessing efforts somehow demonstrates that U.S. efforts to constrain the global growth were a failure. But a more appropriate standard (but again more difficult to measure) for assessing our influence would estimate the number of states that would have developed plutonium reprocessing capabilities if the U.S. had not actively discouraged such fuel cycle activities after Jimmy Carter’s April 1997 order to cancel construction of commercial breeder reactors that employed a closed fuel cycle with plutonium reprocessing. The primary motivation behind the decision to postpone the development of this technology was a concern for the proliferation implications of the U.S. use of a closed fuel cycle. 17 The Carter administration reasoned that the decision to end reprocessing in the U.S. would have two effects: first, the U.S. could no longer act as an exporter of related technologies, limiting their availability; and second, it would create a normative change that would redefine the behavior of a responsible nuclear power state. Because we are estimating a counterfactual condition, it is not possible to measure definitively the effects of the Carter policy on the actual spread of reprocessing facilities around the world. Of the twenty-one countries that at some point in their history pursued plutonium reprocessing, ten have finished large-scale facilities and use them today: U.S., China, Israel, France, UK, India, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and North Korea. 18 Algeria and the Czech Republic have a pilot-scale reprocessing plants, but have not moved towards further industrial development. 19 Nine countries abandoned their reprocessing programs: South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Iraq, Italy, Argentina, Brazil, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. 20 The causes of these reversal decisions were complex, but in many of the cases U.S. diplomatic pressure was an important factor and that pressure was made more credible and acceptable because the U.S had given up its own civilian plutonium reprocessing programs. This “credibility” factor continues to be important today. South Korea is lobbying to renegotiate its agreements with the U.S. to be able to develop “pyro-processing,” a form of spent fuel reprocessing that supporters claim poses fewer proliferation risks than standard PUREX acqueous reprocessing. While this appears a challenge to the claim that the U.S. policy has had a positive influence, the very fact that the South Koreans are actively arguing that pyro-processing – unlike the PUREX process – does not separate out plutonium shows their awareness of the power of the norm against developing such technologies. While the U.S. government initially cooperated with South Korea on pyroprocessing research, Richard Stratford (Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs in the Bureau of Nonproliferation, U. S. Department of State) recently stated that the technology “moved to the point that the product is dangerous from a proliferation point of view,” and that the DOE now “states frankly and positively that pyro-processing is reprocessing.” The U.S. government position against pyro-processing in South Korea today is made more credible by the fact that the U.S. does not reprocess spend fuel for commercial purposes. 21

#### South Korean ENR causes South Korean prolif and undermines US nonprolif efforts with Iran, North Korea, and Southeast Asia

Keck 12

Zachary Keck 12, Assistant Editor of The Diplomat, “Rough Waters? The State of the ROK-U.S. Alliance,” The Diplomat, 8-22-12, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/08/22/rough-waters-the-state-of-the-rok-u-s-alliance/

Washington’s concerns over South Korean’s nuclear ambitions have only been heightened by Seoul’s latest campaign to acquire indigenous enrichment and reprocessing facilities, which it is proscribed from doing under a nuclear pact it signed with Washington in 1974. In contrast, the U.S. has signed agreements recognizing Japan’s reprocessing and enrichment rights as well as India’s de facto reprocessing capability. Now, with the U.S. and South Korea renegotiating the 1974 nuclear pact that will expire in 2014, South Korea has demanded that Washington acquiesce to Seoul building enrichment and processing facilities. South Korea’s immediate interest in acquiring these capabilities is not nuclear weapons but rather further expanding its nuclear energy industry at home and abroad. Nonetheless, the U.S. has rejected South Korea’s request thus far, with President Obama’s top proliferation adviser, Garry Samore, telling South Korean reporters last month, “There is no danger that Korean industry will not be able to get access to low enriched uranium," Washington has a number of reasons to oppose South Korea’s request, many of which have nothing to do with Seoul. For instance, a key component of President Obama’s nuclear security agenda is the goal of securing all nuclear materials worldwide within four years. Allowing South Korea to begin producing its own fissile materials would run counter to this goal and undercut the administration’s important successes in reducing the number of countries that possess and produce these materials. Allowing South Korea to build these facilities would also undermine the current U.S.-led campaign to persuade Iran to abandon its own enrichment facilities. It would also adversely affect a number of U.S. objectives in the Asia-Pacific, including persuading Pyongyang to surrender its own nuclear program, according Japan a heightened status among U.S. allies, and keeping Southeast Asia’s budding nuclear energy programs on their current peaceful trajectories. Under the surface, however, Washington’s opposition is likely due in part to its uncertainty over South Korea’s long-term nuclear intentions. As noted above, South Korea already has a history of covertly seeking nuclear arms. That this took place before Seoul became a democracy is cold comfort to the U.S given that South Koreans have at times been overwhelming in favor of their country acquiring nuclear weapons. In other words, at a time when the region is undergoing sweeping changes, the U.S. is increasingly less confident that South Korea will continue to rely on Washington for its security indefinitely. Indeed, there are already a number of signs that Seoul is seeking greater autonomy. These come at a time when the U.S. will need South Korea more than ever in order to properly rebalance its forces in the region.

#### Prolif won’t cause war

Tepperman ‘9 (Jonathan Tepperman a journalist based in New York City. “Why Obama should learn to love the bomb” Newsweek Nov 9, 2009 <http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome_files/nukes_Final.pdf>)

**A growing** and compelling **body of research suggests** that **nuclear weapons** may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually **make us safer**. In this era of rogue states and trans-national terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that’s a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama’s idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it’s not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn’t be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke free planet) that’s both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, **there’s never been a** nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, **war between two states that possess them**. Just stop for a second and think about that: it’s hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading “nuclear optimist” and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, “We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that **all states are rational** on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they’re pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: **a country will start a fight only when it’s almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price**. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn’t think they could win. The problem **historically** has been that **leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side**—and millions of innocents pay the price. **Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war** obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button— and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, “Why fight if you can’t win and might lose everything?” Why indeed? **The iron logic of deterrence** and mutually assured destruction **is so compelling**, it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world’s major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight **proxy wars**, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these **never matched the** furious **destruction of** full-on, great**-power war** (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there’s very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, “It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time.” The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. **The best recent example is India and Pakistan**, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. **Getting their hands on weapons** of mass destruction didn’t do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war.

#### Heg not solve war –

#### A. No threats require primacy and other factors ensure security.

Friedman and Preble 10 (Benjamin Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, September 22, 2010 Cato Policy Analysis No. 667 September 23, 2010 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf>

The United States confuses what it wants from its military, which is global primacy or hegemony, with what its needs, which is safety. Our leaders tend to exaggerate the capability of the enemies we have and invent new enemies by defining traditional foreign troubles —geopolitical competition among states and instability within them, for example—as pressing threats to our security. Geography, wealth, and nuclear weapons provide us with safety that our ancestors would envy. Our hyperactive military policies damage it by encouraging rivalry and resentment. Global military primacy is a game not worth the candle.56

#### B. No war – States have an incentive to avoid it.

Zakaria 08 (Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 244)

In certain areas – the South China Sea, for example – U.S. military force is likely to be less relevant than that of China. In international negotiations, America will have to bargain and compromise with the others. Does all this add up to instability and disorder? Not necessarily. Two hundred years of Anglo-American hegemony has in fact created a system that is not as fragile is it might have been in the 1920s and 1930s. (When British power waned, American power was unwilling to stip in, and Europe fell through the cracks). The basic conception of the current system – an open world economy, multilateral negotiations – has wide acceptance. And new forms of cooperation are growing. Ann-Marie Slaughter has written about how legal systems are constructing a set of standards without anyone’s forcing them to do so—creating a bottom-up, networked order. Not every issue will lend itself to such stabilization, but many will. In other words, the search for a superpower solution to every problem may be futile and unnecessary. Small work-arounds might be just as effective.

#### Nuclear will remain uncompetitive for decades—our evidence cites industry leaders.

Hiltzik 11

Michael Hiltzik is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author who has covered business, technology, and public policy for the Los Angeles Times for twenty years, master of science degree in journalism from the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University [March 23, 2011, “A nuclear renaissance in U.S. was unlikely even before Japan disaster,” *LA Times*, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/23/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20110323>]

¶ To all those who may be concerned that the catastrophic events at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant will derail the heralded renaissance of nuclear power in the U.S., you can relax.¶ The reason is simple: There is no renaissance.¶ Not even Exelon Corp., the nation's biggest nuclear generation company, has been holding its breath for a surge in orders or appreciable increase in new generating capacity.¶ The reason has little to do with an unreasoning public's fear of nuclear meltdowns and radiation poisoning, and almost everything to do with pure economics. As John Rowe, Exelon's chairman and chief executive, told an audience at a Washington think tank two weeks ago, you can build a new natural gas plant for 40% less than a new nuclear plant, and the price of its fuel is at rock bottom.¶ "Natural gas is queen," he says. (To be fair, Exelon also makes a lot of money from gas.)¶ In recent years, nuclear energy has been promoted as a "green," or at least greenish, alternative to coal power and other fossil-fueled generation. That's been a potent selling point as concern has mounted over the latter's effect on climate change by the production of greenhouse gases. Nuclear power is burdened by its own environmental issues, including the dangers of radioactive release into the atmosphere, but the production of carbon dioxide isn't among them.¶ Yet the technology's potential as a weapon against global warming has been as oversold, just as its virtues as safe, clean and "too cheap to meter" were during its infancy in the 1950s. To realistically make a dent in climate change, nuclear plant construction would have to take off at such a rate that it would "pose serious concerns" for the availability of construction materials, properly trained builders and operating technicians, and safety and security oversight, as a report by the Council on Foreign Relations observed in 2007.¶ "For at least a couple of decades to come, nuclear will be very uncompetitive," the report's author, Charles D. Ferguson, told me this week. Ferguson is president of the Federation of American Scientists.¶ The ongoing disaster in Japan will exacerbate social concerns about nuclear waste disposal — the on-site storage of spent fuel, which is common at U.S. plants, has complicated the situation at Fukushima — as well as concerns about the safety and security of existing plants. But those concerns have existed for years, so the spectacle of the Japanese grappling with the consequences, graphic as it is, may not in itself affect public attitudes.¶ Talk of nuclear renaissance in the U.S. had been spurred by two developments. One was the dramatic improvement in the operating record of U.S. plants. In recent years the domestic nuclear industry had been operating at close to 90% of capacity, compared with the lousy 65% record it turned in during the 1970s. The change was the product partially of the industry's consolidation into a small number of specialty operators with nuclear expertise, and it tended to reduce the apparent cost of nuclear power to levels competitive with other sources.¶ But that also means that "people who advocate nuclear power have rose-colored glasses about its economics," says John E. Parsons of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the co-author of a 2009 update to a 2003 MIT report on the future of nuclear power.¶ Further encouragement came from the streamlining of U.S. licensing rules. The new procedure consolidates what formerly were separate construction and operating permits into one, removing the uncertainty that a utility might build an entire facility only to be denied permission to run it.¶ But no new plant has yet been approved under the new system, so plenty of uncertainty still exists. "An investor has to ask, 'Am I looking at a technology that works only when all the cards fall my way?'" Parsons says.¶ Despite expressions of support for nuclear power coming from political leaders, including President Obama, who is offering loan guarantees for new reactors, nuclear energy can't develop in a policy vacuum. One of the dismal ironies of the American energy program is that many of the same politicians standing foursquare behind nuclear power are also sworn opponents of policies such as a carbon tax, which would make nukes more competitive by raising the price of fossil-based alternatives.¶ For example, here's Mitt Romney. In "No Apology," the book he published last year presumably as a manifesto for his 2012 presidential campaign, Romney says he doesn't understand why nuclear power is such a "boogeyman," because America's existing plants are "trouble-free." Romney contends that nuclear plants are economically unfeasible in the U.S. only because of our "interminable permitting, regulatory and legal delays."¶ Romney should listen more to fellow businessmen like Exelon's Rowe, who would tell him that the real reason is that gas generation is cheaper, thanks to pricing that ignores such external costs of gas as pollution and climate change. Yet in his book Romney condemns policies such as the carbon tax because it would "fatten government, harm employers and employees, and hurt consumers." You can't have it both ways, Mitt.¶ Romney defends the economics of nuclear power by observing that countries with major nuclear construction programs, such as China, seem to have solved the economic conundrum without much trouble. Yet even pro-nuclear experts here acknowledge that nuclear economics don't easily cross national borders. China, which has 13 operating nuclear plants and 30 under construction, has endowed its state-owned nuclear industry with heavy subsidies.¶ According to a report by the Federation of American Scientists, China's burgeoning demand for electrical power can't effectively be satisfied from its current main source, coal, which will face a depletion crisis around the end of this decade. That makes ramping up nuclear an urgent issue for China. But in the U.S., says Andrew Kadak, the former CEO of Yankee Atomic Power Co., a New England nuclear plant operator, "we don't have that urgency because natural gas is too cheap an alternative."¶ With the construction of plants still hampered by economics, nuclear utilities are devoting more attention to improving efficiencies and increasing the output of their existing plants, a process known as "uprating." But that amounts to treading water until the social and economic difficulties of nuclear power can be addressed. And they'll have to be addressed: "It's going to be very hard to reduce carbon dioxide if nuclear is out of the picture," MIT's Parsons says. But the first step is injecting realism into the discussion. Nuclear power may be necessary to our energy future, but it won't be our savior.

#### DOD pursuit of SMRs sends a global signal of impending U.S. military aggression -causes resentment against U.S. unilateralism

Smith 11

Terrence P. Smith 11, program coordinator and research assistant with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at the CSIS, February 16, 2011, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations,””http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations

The report repeatedly emphasizes the point that “DOD’s “’first mover’ pursuit of small reactors could have a profound influence on the development of the industry,” and cautions that “if DOD does not support the U.S. small reactor industry, the industry could be dominated by foreign companies.” The U.S. nonproliferation agenda, if there is one, stands in opposition to this line of thinking. Pursuing a nuclear technology out of the fear that others will get it (or have it), is what fueled the Cold War and much of the proliferation we have seen and are seeing today. It is a mentality I think we should avoid.¶ I do not mean to say this report ignores the risks. In fact they explicitly say, “We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors.” For example it says,¶ Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors.¶ The report also points out that “from a financial perspective, small reactors represent substantial losses in economies of scale.”¶ These issues, which were briefly mentioned, hardly seem like small potatoes. The reports answer to the issues raised: “making reliable projections about these reactors’ economic and technical performance while they are still on paper is a significant challenge,” and “Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple.”¶ On the other hand, the report argues, “failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD.” “First, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries.”¶ Yes these are important issue for a business stand, but I don’t find them to be the primary concern.¶ The reactors are purely for energy purposes, but in a world that seems to be growing tired of U.S. military intervention, the idea of ensuring our ability to do so through the proliferation of mobile nuclear reactors will hardly quell any hostile sentiment. In addition, it can only add fire to the “nuclear = good” flame. So, while even under best case scenario, the reactors are completely proliferation proof and pose no direct threat to the nonproliferation cause (ignoring the spreading of nuclear tech and knowledge in general), I have a tough time seeing how it helps.¶ The report concludes that the DoD “should seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors.” Since the 1970s, the report says, “in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well.” For now, the plans for small nuclear reactors are “unfortunately,” for the most part, “caught between the drawing board and production.”¶ My point is, maybe that is where they should stay.

#### Lack of effective inspections turns the whole case---makes SMRs worse for prolif, safety and security than large reactors

Dr. Edwin Lyman 11, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, July 14, 2011, Testimony Before the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, “An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors,” http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear\_power/lyman-appropriations-subcom-7-14-11.pdf

Proponents of small modular reactors (SMRs) claim that their designs have inherent safety features compared to large reactors, and some even argue that their reactors would have been able to withstand an event as severe as Fukushima. We find these claims to be unpersuasive. For any plant, large or small, the key factor is the most severe event that the plant is designed to withstand—the so-called maximum “design-basis” event. Unless nuclear safety requirements for new reactors are significantly strengthened, one cannot expect that either small or large reactors will be able to survive a beyond-design-basis event like Fukushima. Although some light-water SMR concepts may have desirable safety characteristics, unless they are carefully designed, licensed, deployed and inspected, SMRs could pose comparable or even greater safety, security and proliferation risks than large reactors.

#### Competitivness decline inevitable

Bergstrand 12

(Jeffrey Bergstrand, professor of finance at the University of Notre Dame, is an expert on international trade., 2/17/2012, "Nostalgia for factory jobs that will never come back", [www.cnn.com/2012/02/17/opinion/bergstrand-factory-nostalgia/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/17/opinion/bergstrand-factory-nostalgia/index.html))

The heyday of manufacturing, the block-long plants that produce not just tangible goods, but big, heavy ones like cars, gave us economic stability once; it can do it again. On Wednesday, President Obama spoke at the Master Lock factory in Milwaukee and said, "What's happening in Detroit can happen in other industries. What happens in Cleveland and Pittsburgh and Raleigh and Milwaukee, that's what we've got to be shooting for, is to create opportunities for hardworking Americans to get in there and start making stuff again and sending it all over the world -- products stamped with three proud words: Made in America." But as with most nostalgic visions, this one doesn't reflect economic realities. First, it's understandable why we have a romantic association with manufacturing. "Factory nostalgia" is economically legitimate, because it harkens back to the period of the greatest growth in the U.S. economy in history, basically 1950 to 1973. During that period, there was growth not just in production, but in real household incomes, which is something we have seen little of for the last 40 years. This gave rise to a burgeoning, powerful middle class, and more than that, a sense that all of America shared in the economic boom, with the assembly line tethering us like an anchor to shared prosperity. Compare this image to the more recent service-based economy. The source of the common bond -- the assembly line -- is gone. Instead, people are tied to their own education, their own human capital. Because of that, they're more stand-alone. And so since 1973, we face this widening inequality, partly because our incomes are more tied to individuals, and individuals are different. There's a huge variance across their abilities and educations, and incomes are tied directly to those things. And this situation creates the political tension we face in America; consequently, we long for manufacturing because we associate that with the strength of the middle class. But can we go back to the assembly line? To answer that, there is another important factor to keep in mind. The enormous growth from 1950-73 wasn't entirely of our own making. It was partly due to our own initiative and education, but we also must remember that in 1950, Japan, Germany, Britain and France were all leveled because of World War II. We had no competition. Today, not only are all those countries competing against us, but so are China, India and other countries in South America and Africa -- countries with very large and growing populations. It's not the same game, and in that sense, we're naïve to think we can repeat the '50s and '60s if we just pull our bootstraps up. The world was much different then. Further, there's a very important caveat to people who respond that we should just close our borders and make everything here. As an economic policy, that belief will only serve to hurt standards of living here and globally. There is a large body of evidence that shows that economic growth comes from three things: good geography, sound institutions and strong trade partnerships with the rest of the world. So, going back to closing the borders will only hurt us in the long run. Despite the recent, well-publicized successes in U.S. auto manufacturing, what is happening in the American economy is not the reversal of a trend toward declining manufacturing. Rather, it's a slowing down of the rate of loss of manufacturing, or almost a stabilization of the decline of manufacturing in this country. For the last 25 - 30 years, companies moved manufacturing to China where labor costs were considerably less and there existed an enormous consumer market. But the subsequent rapid per capita income growth in China has meant a rise in the relative price of their labor, so the cost differential is being alleviated. This cost differential is being further narrowed by China once again allowing its currency to gain in value compared to the U.S. dollar. Once that differential diminishes, the rate of manufacturing decline has to slow. However, this does not signal that "in-sourcing" or "re-shoring" is on the rise in America. Low-technology manufacturing is not anything we will ever get back to permanently. It's just too costly to produce here, and even if China becomes less attractive, there's still Latin America, and much of Asia and Africa. Going forward for decades, we simply don't have a comparative advantage in producing low-technology manufactured goods.

## 2NC

### Chem industry

#### Chemical industry dying now

NASDAQ, 2012

9-6. Subset of Ameritrade, stock market exchange. “Chemical Industry Stock Outlook - Sept. 2012 - Zacks Analyst Interviews,” http://community.nasdaq.com/News/2012-09/chemical-industry-stock-outlook-sept-2012-zacks-analyst-interviews.aspx?storyid=170806#ixzz28UcPva8c

The sluggish economy took a toll on growth in the U.S. as the nation's chemical production grew a nominal 2.1% in 2011. South America and Asia (excluding Japan) witnessed growth of 4.7% and 11.1%, respectively. Growth in Asia was led by strong contributions from China. ¶ End-Market Scenario ¶ U.S. chemical production continues its monthly declining streak as reflected in the recently released data by the American Chemistry Council ("ACC"). The Washington-based chemical industry trade group said that the Chemical Production Regional Index (CPRI) fell 0.1% in June, following a downwardly revised 0.5% decline in May. ¶ The U.S. CPRI, which was created by Moore Economics to track chemical production in seven regions across the nation, is comparable to Federal Reserve's industrial production index for chemicals. The ACC reported that chemical production dipped in the Gulf Coast, Midwest, Southeast and West Coast regions and was flat in the Ohio Valley, Mid-Atlantic and Northeast regions. ¶ On a region-by-region basis, production declined across all regions except the Gulf Coast and Ohio Valley areas. On a year-to-date basis (production for the first six months of 2012 compared with the year-ago data), production nudged up 0.2%. ¶ On a monthly comparison basis, chemical production in the Gulf Coast region, where key building block materials are produced, was down 0.4% in June. The Midwest region saw a decline of 0.2%. Productions in the Ohio Valley and Mid-Atlantic regions were flat in June. Production slipped in the Southeast (down 0.2%) and West Coast (0.1%) regions during the month while remained unchanged in the Northeast. ¶ Output from the U.S. manufacturing sector, the largest consumer of chemical products, crept up 0.2% in June, following a 0.1% fall a month ago. Within this sector, output rose in several key chemistry end-user markets including appliances, motor vehicles, computers, apparel, structural panels, rubber products, paper and printing. ¶ Demand for U.S. manufacturing has been weak in recent months given the ongoing European predicament and slowdown in Chinese manufacturing sector. The ACC noted that output clipped in a number of key segments including plastic resins, fertilizers, adhesives, organic chemicals and pharmaceuticals. However, production rose across many segments such as inorganic chemicals, industrial gases, consumer products, pesticides, coatings and synthetic rubber. ¶ The decline in chemical output was also witnessed in Europe . According to the European Chemical Industry Council ("ECIC"), chemicals production in the European Union fell 2.1% year over year in the first five months of 2012. Production edged down 0.7% year over year in May 2012. Chemicals prices rose 2.7% year over year in May, led by a 4% increase in the price for basic inorganics.

#### They can’t solve the problems with the chemical industry – lack of regulation

Schwarzman and Wilson 08

(Megan and Michael, Program in Green Chemistry & Chemicals Policy, Center for Occupational & Environmental Health, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley “Reshaping Chemicals Policy on Two Sides of the Atlantic,” http://www.transatlantic.be/publications/schwarzman\_wilson\_draft.pdf)

With few exceptions, TSCA does not require producers to either investigate or disclose information about the hazardous properties of the chemicals and products they make. As a result, there is a significant lack of information on the health or environmental effects of most of the 82,000 industrial chemicals used in the United States. 22 These include 62,000 chemicals that were already in commercial use when TSCA was implemented in 1979, which were “grandfathered” into use without further review. Ninety two percent (by volume) of the highest production volume chemicals in commercial use today consist of these substances. 23 In addition to the lack of data on pre-1979 chemicals, the U.S. EPA has reported that 85% of new chemical notices submitted by companies since 1979 lack information on their potential health effects, and 67% lack health or environmental data of any kind. 24 All other federal statutes combined regulate just over 1,000 chemicals and pollutants. 25 U.S. EPA has made limited progress in closing the data gap under the voluntary High Production Volume (HPV) Chemical Challenge, which encourages producers to submit only “screening-level” information for about 3,000 chemicals produced or imported at more than one million pounds per year. 262728 Screening level information, even when present, is not sufficient to inform either business or consumer decision-making in purchasing chemicals or products. 29 Other information on the identity of chemicals used in California is also lacking: there is no state-wide information database on the volume or location of chemicals or products produced or imported, no catalogue of their commercial or consumer uses, and virtually no record of their ultimate route of disposal or environmental fate. 30 The Safety Gap In addition to insufficient data requirements, TSCA failed to grant the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adequate authority to investigate or regulate chemicals of concern to public or environmental health. As a result, the EPA has been greatly constrained in controlling even known hazards; since the passage of TSCA, EPA has issued formal rules to regulate only five of the 82,000 chemicals in the TSCA inventory. 31 As a result, EPA has resorted to primarily voluntary measures to encourage industry submission of data, measures that have been largely ineffectual. 32 The EPA is unable to act expediently because the statute requires the government to prove that a chemical or product causes unreasonable harm to human health or the environment before that agency can either request additional health or environmental data from industry or take protective measures. 33 In satisfying this burden of proof, agencies must meet a standard of evidence that: 34 ƒ Requires health and exposure information that cannot be obtained from producers ƒ Often exceeds the limits of scientific knowledge ƒ Relies on estimates and assumptions that are easily contested ƒ Is limited to chemical-by-chemical assessments that can take years to complete, and yet poorly reflect actual exposures, and ƒ Frequently lead to substitution with another hazardous substance TSCA effectively places public agencies, including the EPA, in a “logical paralysis:” in order to establish proof of a public health risk, agencies need health and exposure information that the producers of chemicals and products are under no legal obligation to provide; to require this information, TSCA requires public agencies to first establish proof of a public health risk. In the absence of sufficient health and environmental information, and without an effective legal framework for reducing the use of hazardous chemicals and products, hazardous chemicals and products are allowed to enter or remain on the market, and remain competitive relative to potentially safer substances. The Technology Gap Transitioning from concept to commercial application of cleaner technologies, such as green chemistry, often requires that a company (1) conduct extensive research and development, (2) make potentially large capital investments, and (3) assume the risks of being a leader in an emerging field. The market and regulatory weaknesses caused by the data and safety gaps, together with organizational and institutional inertia within industry and a lack of public and private investment in green chemistry research and education, all make companies reluctant to take on these risks. This is producing a green chemistry technology gap that could place California producers at a disadvantage in this emerging global sector, while at the same time perpetuating the existing health and environmental problems resulting from the manufacture, use, and disposal of hazardous chemicals and products. Consequences of U.S. Policy Weaknesses The Data, Safety and Technology Gaps engendered by TSCA have produced conditions in the U.S. chemicals market in which: • Downstream businesses do not have adequate information to identify hazardous chemicals in their supply chains or choose the safest chemicals for their needs; • Government agencies do not have adequate information to systematically identify and prioritize chemical risks, nor the legal tools to efficiently mitigate known risks; • Consumers, workers, and small-business owners do not have the right kinds of information to identify and use safer chemical products; • The public bears the human and economic burden of health and environmental damage caused by chemical exposures and pollution.

### Space da

### 2NC Overview

#### Weaponization cause extinction – causes an arms race and accidental war --- that’s Hitchens and Mitchell --- it quickly escalates - forces other countries to build up their own weapons systems in self-defense

#### Err on the side of caution - any slight offensive move in space escalates to extinction in a world of weaponization - computer models prove

Johnson 7

PhD and director of The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (Rebecca, the Acronym Institute [an Independent, not-for-profit research and advocacy organization working on disarmament, arms control, and security issues], “Space without Weapons.” October, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/congo.htm>)

A number of adverse security consequences are foreseeable if space were to be weaponised. It could exacerbate the threats from space debris and electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) and provoke other space-faring nations to deploy weapons for use in, to or from space. In computer wargame trials conducted by the Pentagon a few years ago, the use of weapons in space (including anti-satellite weapons) led inexorably to the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear war on the ground. Losing one’s space-based ‘eyes and ears’ appeared to cause miscalculations and led to rushed, panicky ‘use them or lose them’ decisions being made, with devastating consequences. Even if weaponising space did not lead directly to nuclear war - with the inevitable catastrophic consequences for humankind - it would create a situation of widespread distrust. It could also impede international cooperation in areas related to space technology and developments, including commercial enterprises and space exploration.

#### We control timeframe - enemies will preemptively strike us BEFORE the weapons are successfully deployed

Coffelt 5

(Christopher, Colonel, " The Best Defense: Charting the Future of US Space Strategy and Policy," Maxwell AFB, June, http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/2337/

The United States cannot expect that the entire world will sit idly by as it deploys weapons in space which, effectively, border every state on the planet. If the united states had unlimited armies, navies, and air forces, would it surround every border and coastline with them, ready to put down potential aggression or implement united states policy objectives at a moments notice? Adversaries and allies alike would certainly find such action offensive, possibly spurring them to respond. Putting weapons in space will elicit a similar reaction and/or countermeasures which decrease or negate the intended security benefits. Even without the intense bipolar competitive environment of the cold war, weapons in space could spark an arms race where others (alone or cooperatively) attempt to match the new capability to ensure their interests are similarly secured in space. While the likelihood of spurring a preemptive attack appears low, it remains a possibility that a strategist must consider. Putting weapons in space may elicit a preemptive attack from a threatened state or states. Striking in the early phases of a space weapon deployment is advantageous because the new weapon system may not have its full capability. Additionally, striking before the United States could potentially prepare and mass for a first-strike gives the threatened state its best chance for success. Aside from the militarily negative consequences of deploying weapons into space, there are also distinct non-military disadvantages.

#### Turns the colonization and asteroids add on

Su ’10

Jinyuan Su, The Silk Road Institute of International and Comparative Law, School of Law, Xi'an Jiaotong University. “Towards an effective and adequately verifiable PPWT”. Space Policy Volume 26, Issue 3, August 2010. ScienceDirect.

With regard to space weaponization, many more debates have taken place over inter-state strategic trade-offs than over the cooperative interest of avoiding a disaster arising from orbital debris. Today around 21,000 orbiting debris larger than 10 cm in diameter are tracked; and it is estimated there are over 100,000 pieces larger than a marble. Debris in orbits higher than about 800 km above the Earth’s surface will be up there for decades, above 1000 km for centuries, and above 1500 km effectively forever.32 Therefore, the amount of orbital debris is unlikely to decrease by natural degradation unless technology development enables us to dispose of it. Space debris moves at an extremely high speed of 27,000 km per hour; even tiny pieces can cause destruction to a satellite.33 This danger will be exacerbated as the Earth orbits become increasingly crowded. In addition, there is also a high risk of a chain reaction of destruction, the so-called “Kessler Syndrome”,34 in which, if a collision does occur, the resulting fragments become an additional collision risk. The deployment of space-based weapons would generate great quantities of space debris just during the initial deployment and far more if they are used.35 Testing of ASATs would further increase the amount. In the event of a real “space war”, the Earth orbits could be veiled by debris clouds, making them no-go areas and jeopardizing the possibility of space exploitation. A conservative estimate shows that a modest space war involving destruction of 30 satellites would increase the level of space debris by almost a factor of four, while a larger one involving destruction of 100 satellites would increase it by 1250%, excluding Kessler Syndrome effects.36 The space industry was projected to exceed $150 billion per year in revenues by 2010,37 yet even this figure may not fully display humanity’s heavy reliance on space technologies for daily life. If the Earth orbits were to become too inhospitable for satellites, the global economy would collapse and human society would step back in time several decades. Meanwhile, although it is possible to distinguish enemy satellites from neutral ones, collateral damage may be caused to the in-orbit or on-Earth properties of neutral states. The belligerent states would be liable, jointly or severally, to the third state.38

### 2NC Heg Impact

#### Plan destroys heg

#### A) Power projection

Hitchens 10

[Hitchens, Theresa. Director, Center for Defense Information, Leader of Space Security Project in cooperation with the Secure World Foundation. The author of “Future Security In Space: Charting a Cooperative Course,” Cited by Center for Nonproliferation Studies Mountbatten Centre for “International Studies Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs Occasional”]

Dr. Karl Mueller, a former Air Force analyst now at RAND, writes:. The United States would not be able to maintain unchallenged hegemony in the weaponization of space, and while a space-weapons race would threaten international stability, it would be even more dangerous to U.S. security and relative power projection capability, due to other states’ significant ability and probably inclination to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against ascendant U.S. power.2 On the other hand, a space race cannot be ruled out as a likely outcome—especially given that many countries with much fewer economic and technical resources than the United States are already going to space. A strategic-level space race could have negative consequences for U.S. security in the long run that could outweigh any short-term advantage of being the first with space-based weapons. In particular, it would be costly in dollar terms to sustain orbital weapon systems and stay ahead of opponents intent on matching U.S. space-weapon capabilities. The price tag of space-weapon systems and protective measures would not be trivial for anyone choosing to pursue them— with maintenance costs a key issue.

#### B) First Strike Pressure

Hitchens 10

 [Hitchens, Theresa. Director, Center for Defense Information, Leader of Space Security Project in cooperation with the Secure World Foundation. The author of “Future Security In Space: Charting a Cooperative Course,” Cited by Center for Nonproliferation Studies Mountbatten Centre for “International Studies Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs Occasional”]

The other related negative side effect of the inherent vulnerability of orbiting weapons is the pressure to use them first. The strategic dynamic of space-based weapons could perhaps be compared to that of nuclear intercontinental 30 ballistic missiles— offense-dominant weapons with inherent vulnerabilities (fixed sites). This is a recipe for instability, as the United States and Soviet Union soon found in their nuclear competition. Spurring other nations to acquire spacebased weapons, either ASATs or weapons aimed at terrestrial targets, would undercut the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely on the ground on a global basis and thus negate what today is a unique advantage of being the world’s only military superpower.3 Along with military assets in space, U.S. commercial satellites would also become targets (especially because the U.S. military is heavily reliant on commercial providers, particularly in communications). In other words, the United States could be in the position of creating strategic and military problems for itself, rather than solving them.

#### Space weaponization causes proliferation

Krepon and Katz-Hyman 5

Michael Krepon, president and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Michael Katz-Hyman, research assistant at Stimson, July 2005, “Space Weapons and Proliferation,” Stimson Institute, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Space\_Weapons\_and\_Proliferation.pdf

Successful efforts to stop and reverse proliferation face long odds when the dominant state demands to play by its own rules. These odds become even longer when the dominant state cannot enlist the active support of Moscow and Beijing on hard proliferation cases that bother Washington more than them. Nor do Russian or Chinese leaders appear unduly distressed over the difficulties US forces presently face in Iraq. Burden sharing with respect to proliferation is not high on their list of priorities, and is likely to drop lower if US space warfare initiatives are pursued. Official Chinese and Russian threat perceptions of the United States are not articulated in public, but they may reasonably be inferred. Both capitals might well question why Washington seeks to extend its military dominance into space by pursuing capabilities that would not be particularly helpful in scenarios involving Iran, North Korea, or other developing countries. Instead, the pursuit of US dominance into space may well be viewed by Moscow and Beijing as part of a broader effort to negate their nuclear deterrents. If so, prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament would further decline. When dominance poses a threat to major powers whose cooperation is most needed to halt and reverse proliferation, dominance becomes part of the problem, rather than part of the solution.

### Water

#### Status quo solves and nuclear desalination is ineffective

Gar Smith 11, Editor Emeritus of Earth Island Journal, a former editor of Common Ground magazine, a Project Censored Award-winning journalist, and co-founder of Environmentalists Against War, "NUCLEAR ROULETTE: THE CASE AGAINST A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE," June, International Forum on Globalization series focused on False Solutions, http://ifg.org/pdf/Nuclear\_Roulette\_book.pdf

By 2025, 3.5 billion people will face severe fresh-water shortages. Nuclear proponents groping for justifications to expand nuclear power have argued that the waste heat from power plants can provide a “cheap and clean” solution to the inherently costly process of removing salt from seawater. Desalination plants (there are 13,080 worldwide, mostly oil- and gas-fired and mostly in wealthy desert nations) already produce more than 12 billion gallons of drinkable water a day. 153 The first nuclear desalinator was installed in Japan in the late 1970s and scores of reactor-heated desalination plants are operating around the world today.¶ But nuclear desalination is another False Solution. The problem with atomic water-purifiers is that using heat to treat seawater is an obsolete 20 th -century technology. Thermal desalination has given way to new reverse osmosis systems that are less energy intensive and 33 times cheaper to operate. 154 Nuclear desalination advocates claim that wind, solar, and wave power aren’t up to the task while new low-temperature evaporation technology may be able to produce high purity water at temperatures as low as 122° Fahrenheit. 155 Promoting reactors as a solution to the world’s water shortage is especially ludicrous since nuclear power plants consume more water than any other energy source. 156¶ Even proponents admit there is a potential risk that running seawater through a radioactive environment might contaminate the drinking water produced. 157 Undeterred, scientists in Russia and India have proposed anchoring small atom-powered water-plants offshore near densely populated coastal cities. But this would provide no relief for the billions of people living inland in water-starved regions of North Africa and Asia.¶ Desalination is merely a way of giving a marginal new purpose to existing reactors whose balance sheets would be improved if they were retrofitted with desalination chambers. As with power generation, so with desalination: efficiency in water use (better irrigation technology, crop selection, eliminating transit losses, etc.) beats new production.¶ A real solution to the growing global water shortage needs to address the increasing amount of water diverted to wasteful agricultural and industrial practices and concentrate on preventing the water from being contaminated in the first place—by, among other things, capping the size of local populations to match locally available water supplies.

#### Indus Waters Treaty solves

Jaroslav Tir and Douglas M. Stinnett 12, Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia AND assistant professor of international affairs in UGA's School of Public &. International Affairs, "Weathering climate change: Can institutions mitigate international water conflict?" January, Vol. 49, Issue 1, Sage Journals

Conflict management¶ To cope with disagreements among signatories, some river treaties specify a variety of formal procedures for dispute management. The Permanent Indus Commission, for example, is responsible for resolving disputes between India and Pakistan over the implementation of the Indus Waters Treaty. Disputes are managed primarily through regular meetings of the officials that make up the two national sections of the Commission (Zawahri, 2009b). At the opposite end of the spectrum lie mandates for binding arbitration or adjudication by an existing international institution. For example, Hungary and Slovakia have resorted to the ICJ to resolve a dispute involving a 1977 treaty governing water infrastructure projects on the Danube (McCaffrey, 2003).¶ Dispute resolution provisions can address different sources of noncompliance, including those related to anticipated consequences of climate change. A formal process of resolving disputes can address overt cheating by raising the visibility of noncompliance (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). By increasing the costs of violations – some of which may appear particularly tempting due to the effects of climate change (e.g. unilaterally increase withdrawal rates to compensate for lack of water due to a number of dry years) – dispute settlement mechanisms can improve compliance.¶ Conflict management institutions can also address disputes over an agreement’s exact obligations. If climate change causes changes to a river system that were not envisioned at the time of the treaty signing, such as lower flow or greater seasonal variation, then these conditions will make the treaty less effective and increase the risk of conflict. In these circumstances, provisions in a treaty for dealing with unforeseen conditions will become important for preventing conflict. The rulings of a third-party arbitration panel, court, or even informal mediation through a secretariat or intergovernmental body can clarify the terms of a treaty (Chayes & Chayes, 1995). This enhances compliance by limiting the occurrence of unintended violations that result from treaty ambiguities or changed circumstances.

### asteroids

#### Statistics prove – you’re an idiot if you think asteroids will kill us.

Everitt ‘8[James Everitt, energy and environment organizer for Pickens Plan; “If an asteroid hit the earth?” published 12/20/2008; [http://push.pickensplan.com/video/2187034:Video:1691581](http://push.pickensplan.com/video/2187034%3AVideo%3A1691581); Jay]

[A computer video](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/27/watch-if-an-asteroid-hit_n_153724.html) circulating the internet has rekindled fears that an asteroid will hit Earth and send mankind the way of the brontosaurus. Based on NASA projections, there is indeed a chance that such an asteroid will impact Earth in the next year. **It is 1 in 2,518,072** This number is derived from [NASA calculations](http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/risk) of the likelihood of a strike by any one of the six substantial Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) whose current course could intersect our planet's in 2009. The most likely of the bunch, an NEO named 2008 AO112, alone has a 1 in 4,000,000 chance of impacting Earth. In other words, there's a 99.999975% chance the thing will miss us. By comparison, in the new year, based on [recent National Safety Council data](http://www.nsc.org/research/odds.aspx), chances are less that you will be killed by an asteroid than by the following: Motor vehicle accident: 1 in 6,539 Exposure to noxious substances: 1 in 12,554 Assault by firearm: 1 in 24,005 Accidental drowning: 1 in 82,777 Exposure to smoke, fire or flames: 1 in 92,745 Exposure to forces of nature (lightning, flood, storms, etc.): 1 in 136,075 **Falling out of bed** or off other furniture: 1 in 329,819 Choking on food: 1 in 343,179 Air and space transport accidents: 1 in 502,554 Exposure to electric current, radiation, temperature, and pressure: 1 in 705,969 Being bitten, stung or crushed by another person or animal: 1 in 1,841,659 Chances You'll Be Killed by an Asteroid in 2009! Conclusion: It would be statistically unwise to sell your home (your chances of selling it aside) and use the proceeds for a pre-asteroid splurge in the tropics. Alternatively, if you are considering fleeing Earth, you are more likely to die by spacecraft accident than by asteroid. And if you do so anyway, given the chance of being bitten, stung or crushed by another person or animal, your chances are even worse if you bring company.

### Solvency

### Incentives

#### This card ends the debate---incentives cannot solve---neg on presumption

Lovins 10 AMORY B. LOVINS is Chair and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute "Nuclear Socialism" Weekly Standard, VOL. 16, NO. 06 Oct 25 www.weeklystandard.com/articles/nuclear-socialism\_508830.html?page=1

With such juicy incentives, why won’t private investors finance reactors? In 2005-08, with the strongest subsidies, capital markets, and nuclear politics in history, why couldn’t 34 proposed reactors raise any private capital? Because there’s no business case. As a recent study by Citibank U.K. is titled “New Nuclear—the Economics Say No.” That’s why central planners bought all 61 reactors now under construction worldwide. None were free-market transactions. Subsidies can’t reverse bleak fundamentals. A defibrillated corpse will jump but won’t revive.

American taxpayers already reimburse nuclear power developers for legal and regulatory delays. A unique law caps liability for accidents at a present value only one-third that of BP’s $20 billion trust fund for oil-spill costs; any bigger damages fall on citizens. Yet the competitive risks facing new reactors are uninsured, high, and escalating.

Since 2000, as nuclear power’s cost projections have more than tripled, its share of global electricity generation has fallen from 17 percent to 13 percent. That of cogeneration (making electricity together with useful heat in factories or buildings) and renewables (excluding big hydropower projects) rose from 13 percent to 18 percent.

These bite-sized, modular, quickly built projects—with financial risks, costs, and subsidies generally below nuclear’s and declining​—now dominate global power investments. Last year, renewables (wind, water, solar, geothermal), excluding large hydroelectric dams, attracted $131 billion of private capital and added 52 billion watts. Global nuclear output fell for the past three years, capacity for two.

#### Empirics go neg---billions have been sunk into projects that failed abysmally

Morris et al 12 Adele C. Morris, Fellow and Deputy Director of the. Climate and Energy Economics project at Brookings, Pietro S. Nivola, Charles Schultze, Brookings Scholars, "CLEAN ENERGY:REVISITING THE CHALLENGES OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY" June 4 www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/04%20clean%20energy%20morris%20nivola%20schultze/04\_clean\_energy\_morris\_nivola\_schultze.pdf

U.S. Energy Technology Policy

The energy sector has long been an object of industrial boosterism. While policymakers have had some successes, the history of the Department of Energy's (DOE) RD&D projects has been checkered since the early 1970s. For example, after the first Mideast oil shock in 1973, various alternative fuel programs were proposed. They proved problematic. President Carter and Congress, for example, created the Synthetic Fuels Corporation that was envisaged to spend up to $88 billion ($200 billion in 2007 prices) and to produce an ambitious two million barrels a day by 1992.9 Some plants were completed at a cost of $9 billion (2007 dollars) but they never operated commercially.10 The Clinch River breeder reactor project cost taxpayers $1.7 billion. It was abandoned in 1983; none of the subsidized reprocessing plants became commercial operations. Some more recent federal efforts to fund energy technology have seen similar failures and false starts. For example, from 2004 to 2008 the federal government sank $ 1.2 billion into hydrogen vehicle programs that so far have resulted in no commercial deliverables.12

### Nat Gas

#### Solvency takes decades---SMRs require re-orienting the entire manufacturing industry

Dylan Ryan 11, Masters in Mechanical Engineering, expertise in energy, sustainability, Computer Aided Engineering, renewables technology; Ph.D. in solar energy systems, 2011, “Part 10 – Small modular reactors and mass production options,” <http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/part-10-smallreactors-mass-prod/>

So there are a host of practical factors in favour smaller reactors. But what’s the down side? Firstly, economies of scale. With a small reactor, we have all the excess baggage that comes with each power station, all the fixed costs and a much smaller pay-off. As I noted earlier, even thought many smaller reactors are a lot safer than large LWR’s (even a small LWR is somewhat safer!) you would still need to put them under a containment dome. It’s this process of concrete pouring that is often a bottle neck in nuclear reactor construction. We could get around the problem by clustering reactors together, i.e putting 2 or 4 reactors not only on the same site but under the same containment dome. The one downside here is that if one reactor has a problem, it will likely spread to its neighbours. How much of a showstopper this fact is depends on which type of reactors we are discussing.¶ Also, in the shorter term small reactors would be slower to build, especially many of those we’ve been discussing, given that they are often made out of non-standard materials. Only a few facilities in the world could build them as the entire nuclear manufacturing industry is currently geared towards large LWR’s. Turning that juggernaut around would take decades. So by opting for small reactors while we’d get safer more flexible reactors, we be paying for it, as these reactors would be slower to build (initially anyway) and probably more expensive too.

### Grid

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### **AT Colonization**

#### Tons of tech to get off rock

David 2-22

Leonard is a Space Insider Columnist, “Air Force Eyes Nuclear Reactors, Beamed Power for Space,” <http://www.space.com/14643-air-force-space-nuclear-reactors-power-beaming.html>

In the sweeping report a number of desirable high-tech advances are mentioned.¶ For example, the Air Force is currently limited to 27 kilowatt (kW) arrays for satellite power. But more power is required for some future space missions, the report states, such as flights currently being eyed by the Air Force, national security organizations and NASA. "Employing larger and more efficient arrays will enable missions that require very high power, such as space-based radar or space-based laser missions," the report states.¶ In the long term, the report says, increased solar cell efficiencies and revolutionary materials foreshadow the potential of 500 kW on-orbit power generation technologies, "which would be transformational for performing missions from space-based systems."¶ Furthermore, there are other breakthrough space energy technologies that have the potential of achieving up to 70 percent efficiency, the report adds. Examples include quantum dots and dilute nitrides in solar cells. But there are also totally new technologies such as space tethers that could harvest energy from the Earth's geomagnetic field. [Top 10 Alternative Energy Technologies]

#### Colonization's impossible and you should privilege short-term existential risks

Stross 7

(Charlie, "The High Frontier, Redux," http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2007/06/the\_high\_frontier\_redux.html)

I'm going to take it as read that the idea of space colonization isn't unfamiliar; domed cities on Mars, orbiting cylindrical space habitats a la J. D. Bernal or Gerard K. O'Neill, that sort of thing. Generation ships that take hundreds of years to ferry colonists out to other star systems where — as we are now discovering — there are profusions of planets to explore. And I don't want to spend much time talking about the unspoken ideological underpinnings of the urge to space colonization, other than to point out that they're there, that the case for space colonization isn't usually presented as an economic enterprise so much as a quasi-religious one. "We can't afford to keep all our eggs in one basket" isn't so much a justification as an appeal to sentimentality, for in the hypothetical case of a planet-trashing catastrophe, we (who currently inhabit the surface of the Earth) are dead anyway. The future extinction of the human species cannot affect you if you are already dead: strictly speaking, it should be of no personal concern. Historically, crossing oceans and setting up farmsteads on new lands conveniently stripped of indigenous inhabitants by disease has been a cost-effective proposition. But the scale factor involved in space travel is strongly counter-intuitive. Here's a handy metaphor: let's approximate one astronomical unit — the distance between the Earth and the sun, roughly 150 million kilometres, or 600 times the distance from the Earth to the Moon — to one centimetre. Got that? 1AU = 1cm. (You may want to get hold of a ruler to follow through with this one.) The solar system is conveniently small. Neptune, the outermost planet in our solar system, orbits the sun at a distance of almost exactly 30AU, or 30 centimetres — one foot (in imperial units). Giant Jupiter is 5.46 AU out from the sun, almost exactly two inches (in old money). We've sent space probes to Jupiter; they take two and a half years to get there if we send them on a straight Hohmann transfer orbit, but we can get there a bit faster using some fancy orbital mechanics. Neptune is still a stretch — only one spacecraft, Voyager 2, has made it out there so far. Its journey time was 12 years, and it wasn't stopping. (It's now on its way out into interstellar space, having passed the heliopause some years ago.) The Kuiper belt, domain of icy wandering dwarf planets like Pluto and Eris, extends perhaps another 30AU, before merging into the much more tenuous Hills cloud and Oort cloud, domain of loosely coupled long-period comets. Now for the first scale shock: using our handy metaphor the Kuiper belt is perhaps a metre in diameter. The Oort cloud, in contrast, is as much as 50,000 AU in radius — its outer edge lies half a kilometre away. Got that? Our planetary solar system is 30 centimetres, roughly a foot, in radius. But to get to the edge of the Oort cloud, you have to go half a kilometre, roughly a third of a mile. Next on our tour is Proxima Centauri, our nearest star. (There might be a brown dwarf or two lurking unseen in the icy depths beyond the Oort cloud, but if we've spotted one, I'm unaware of it.) Proxima Centauri is 4.22 light years away.A light year is 63.2 x 103 AU, or 9.46 x 1012 Km. So Proxima Centauri, at 267,000 AU, is just under two and a third kilometres, or two miles (in old money) away from us. But Proxima Centauri is a poor choice, if we're looking for habitable real estate. While exoplanets are apparently common as muck, terrestrial planets are harder to find; Gliese 581c, the first such to be detected (and it looks like a pretty weird one, at that), is roughly 20.4 light years away, or using our metaphor, about ten miles. Try to get a handle on this: it takes us 2-5 years to travel two inches. But the proponents of interstellar travel are talking about journeys of ten miles. That's the first point I want to get across: that if the distances involved in interplanetary travel are enormous, and the travel times fit to rival the first Australian settlers, then the distances and times involved in interstellar travel are mind-numbing. This is not to say that interstellar travel is impossible; quite the contrary. But to do so effectively you need either (a) outrageous amounts of cheap energy, or (b) highly efficient robot probes, or (c) a magic wand. And in the absence of (c) you're not going to get any news back from the other end in less than decades. Even if (a) is achievable, or by means of (b) we can send self-replicating factories and have them turn distant solar systems into hives of industry, and more speculatively find some way to transmit human beings there, they are going to have zero net economic impact on our circumstances (except insofar as sending them out costs us money). What do I mean by outrageous amounts of cheap energy? Let's postulate that in the future, it will be possible to wave a magic wand and construct a camping kit that encapsulates all the necessary technologies and information to rebuild a human civilization capable of eventually sending out interstellar colonization missions — a bunch of self-replicating, self-repairing robotic hardware, and a downloadable copy of the sum total of human knowledge to date. Let's also be generous and throw in a closed-circuit life support system capable of keeping a human occupant alive indefinitely, for many years at a stretch, with zero failures and losses, and capable where necessary of providing medical intervention. Let's throw in a willing astronaut (the fool!) and stick them inside this assembly. It's going to be pretty boring in there, but I think we can conceive of our minimal manned interstellar mission as being about the size and mass of a Mercury capsule. And I'm going to nail a target to the barn door and call it 2000kg in total. (Of course we can cut corners, but I've already invoked self-replicating robotic factories and closed-cycle life support systems, and those are close enough to magic wands as it is. I'm going to deliberately ignore more speculative technologies such as starwisps, mind transfer, or AIs sufficiently powerful to operate autonomously — although I used them shamelessly in my novel Accelerando. What I'm trying to do here is come up with a useful metaphor for the energy budget realistically required for interstellar flight.) Incidentally, a probe massing 1-2 tons with an astronaut on top is a bit implausible, but a 1-2 ton probe could conceivably carry enough robotic instrumentation to do useful research, plus a laser powerful enough to punch a signal home, and maybe even that shrink-wrapped military/industrial complex in a tin can that would allow it to build something useful at the other end. Anything much smaller, though, isn't going to be able to transmit its findings to us — at least, not without some breakthroughs in communication technology that haven't shown up so far. Now, let's say we want to deliver our canned monkey to Proxima Centauri within its own lifetime. We're sending them on a one-way trip, so a 42 year flight time isn't unreasonable. (Their job is to supervise the machinery as it unpacks itself and begins to brew up a bunch of new colonists using an artificial uterus. Okay?) This means they need to achieve a mean cruise speed of 10% of the speed of light. They then need to decelerate at the other end. At 10% of c relativistic effects are minor — there's going to be time dilation, but it'll be on the order of hours or days over the duration of the 42-year voyage. So we need to accelerate our astronaut to 30,000,000 metres per second, and decelerate them at the other end. Cheating and using Newton's laws of motion, the kinetic energy acquired by acceleration is 9 x 1017 Joules, so we can call it 2 x 1018 Joules in round numbers for the entire trip. NB: This assumes that the propulsion system in use is 100% efficient at converting energy into momentum, that there are no losses from friction with the interstellar medium, and that the propulsion source is external — that is, there's no need to take reaction mass along en route. So this is a lower bound on the energy cost of transporting our Mercury-capsule sized expedition to Proxima Centauri in less than a lifetime. To put this figure in perspective, the total conversion of one kilogram of mass into energy yields 9 x 1016 Joules. (Which one of my sources informs me, is about equivalent to 21.6 megatons in thermonuclear explosive yield). So we require the equivalent energy output to 400 megatons of nuclear armageddon in order to move a capsule of about the gross weight of a fully loaded Volvo V70 automobile to Proxima Centauri in less than a human lifetime. That's the same as the yield of the entire US Minuteman III ICBM force. For a less explosive reference point, our entire planetary economy runs on roughly 4 terawatts of electricity (4 x 1012 watts). So it would take our total planetary electricity production for a period of half a million seconds — roughly 5 days — to supply the necessary va-va-voom. But to bring this back to earth with a bump, let me just remind you that this probe is so implausibly efficient that it's veering back into "magic wand" territory. I've tap-danced past a 100% efficient power transmission system capable of operating across interstellar distances with pinpoint precision and no conversion losses, and that allows the spacecraft on the receiving end to convert power directly into momentum. This is not exactly like any power transmission system that anyone's built to this date, and I'm not sure I can see where it's coming from. Our one astronaut, 10% of c mission approximates well to an unmanned flight, but what about longer-term expeditions? Generation ships are a staple of SF; they're slow (probably under 1% of c) and they carry a self-sufficient city-state. The crew who set off won't live to see their destination (the flight time to Proxima Centauri at 1% of c is about 420 years), but the vague hope is that someone will. Leaving aside our lack of a proven track record at building social institutions that are stable across time periods greatly in excess of a human lifespan, using a generation ship probably doesn't do much for our energy budget problem either. A society of human beings are likely to need more space and raw material to do stuff with while in flight; sticking a solitary explorer in a tin can for forty-something years is merely cruel and unusual, but doing it to an entire city for several centuries probably qualifies as a crime against humanity. We therefore need to relax the mass constraint. Assuming the same super-efficient life support as our solitary explorer, we might postulate that each colonist requires ten tons of structural mass to move around in. (About the same as a large trailer home. For life.) We've cut the peak velocity by an order of magnitude, but we've increased the payload requirement by an order of magnitude per passenger — and we need enough passengers to make a stable society fly. I'd guess a sensible lower number would be on the order of 200 people, the size of a prehistoric primate troupe. (Genetic diversity? I'm going to assume we can hand-wave around that by packing some deep-frozen sperm and ova, or frozen embryos, for later reuse.) By the time we work up to a minimal generation ship (and how minimal can we get, confining 200 human beings in an object weighing aout 2000 tons, for roughly the same period of time that has elapsed since the Plymouth colony landed in what was later to become Massachusetts?) we're actually requiring much more energy than our solitary high-speed explorer. And remember, this is only what it takes to go to Proxima Centauri our nearest neighbour. Gliese 581c is five times as far away. Planets that are already habitable insofar as they orbit inside the habitable zone of their star, possess free oxygen in their atmosphere, and have a mass, surface gravity and escape velocity that are not too forbidding, are likely to be somewhat rarer. (And if there is free oxygen in the atmosphere on a planet, that implies something else — the presence of pre-existing photosynthetic life, a carbon cycle, and a bunch of other stuff that could well unleash a big can of whoop-ass on an unprimed human immune system. The question of how we might interact with alien biologies is an order of magnitude bigger and more complex than the question of how we might get there — and the preliminary outlook is rather forbidding.) The long and the short of what I'm trying to get across is quite simply that, in the absence of technology indistinguishable from magic — magic tech that, furthermore, does things that from today's perspective appear to play fast and loose with the laws of physics — interstellar travel for human beings is near-as-dammit a non-starter. And while I won't rule out the possibility of such seemingly-magical technology appearing at some time in the future, the conclusion I draw as a science fiction writer is that if interstellar colonization ever happens, it will not follow the pattern of historical colonization drives that are followed by mass emigration and trade between the colonies and the old home soil. What about our own solar system? After contemplating the vastness of interstellar space, our own solar system looks almost comfortingly accessible at first. Exploring our own solar system is a no-brainer: we can do it, we are doing it, and interplanetary exploration is probably going to be seen as one of the great scientific undertakings of the late 20th and early 21st century, when the history books get written. But when we start examining the prospects for interplanetary colonization things turn gloomy again. Bluntly, we're not going to get there by rocket ship. Optimistic projects suggest that it should be possible, with the low cost rockets currently under development, to maintain a Lunar presence for a transportation cost of roughly $15,000 per kilogram. Some extreme projections suggest that if the cost can be cut to roughly triple the cost of fuel and oxidizer (meaning, the spacecraft concerned will be both largely reusable and very cheap) then we might even get as low as $165/kilogram to the lunar surface. At that price, sending a 100Kg astronaut to Moon Base One looks as if it ought to cost not much more than a first-class return air fare from the UK to New Zealand ... except that such a price estimate is hogwash. We primates have certain failure modes, and one of them that must not be underestimated is our tendency to irreversibly malfunction when exposed to climactic extremes of temperature, pressure, and partial pressure of oxygen. While the amount of oxygen, water, and food a human consumes per day doesn't sound all that serious — it probably totals roughly ten kilograms, if you economize and recycle the washing-up water — the amount of parasitic weight you need to keep the monkey from blowing out is measured in tons. A Russian Orlan-M space suit (which, some would say, is better than anything NASA has come up with over the years — take heed of the pre-breathe time requirements!) weighs 112 kilograms, which pretty much puts a floor on our infrastructure requirements. An actual habitat would need to mass a whole lot more. Even at $165/kilogram, that's going to add up to a very hefty excess baggage charge on that notional first class air fare to New Zealand — and I think the $165/kg figure is in any case highly unrealistic; even the authors of the article I cited thought $2000/kg was a bit more reasonable. Whichever way you cut it, sending a single tourist to the moon is going to cost not less than $50,000 — and a more realistic figure, for a mature reusable, cheap, rocket-based lunar transport cycle is more like $1M. And that's before you factor in the price of bringing them back ... The moon is about 1.3 light seconds away. If we want to go panning the (metaphorical) rivers for gold, we'd do better to send teleoperator-controlled robots; it's close enough that we can control them directly, and far enough away that the cost of transporting food and creature comforts for human explorers is astronomical. There probably are niches for human workers on a moon base, but only until our robot technologies are somewhat more mature than they are today; Mission Control would be a lot happier with a pair of hands and a high-def camera that doesn't talk back and doesn't need to go to the toilet or take naps. When we look at the rest of the solar system, the picture is even bleaker. Mars is ... well, the phrase "tourist resort" springs to mind, and is promptly filed in the same corner as "Gobi desert". As Bruce Sterling has puts it: "I'll believe in people settling Mars at about the same time I see people settling the Gobi Desert. The Gobi Desert is about a thousand times as hospitable as Mars and five hundred times cheaper and easier to reach. Nobody ever writes "Gobi Desert Opera" because, well, it's just kind of plonkingly obvious that there's no good reason to go there and live. It's ugly, it's inhospitable and there's no way to make it pay. Mars is just the same, really. We just romanticize it because it's so hard to reach." In other words, going there to explore is fine and dandy — our robots are all over it already. But as a desirable residential neighbourhood it has some shortcomings, starting with the slight lack of breathable air and the sub-Antarctic nighttime temperatures and the Mach 0.5 dust storms, and working down from there. Actually, there probably is a good reason for sending human explorers to Mars. And that's the distance: at up to 30 minutes, the speed of light delay means that remote control of robots on the Martian surface is extremely tedious. Either we need autonomous roots that can be assigned tasks and carry them out without direct human supervision, or we need astronauts in orbit or on the ground to boss the robot work gangs around. On the other hand, Mars is a good way further away than the moon, and has a deeper gravity well. All of which drive up the cost per kilogram delivered to the Martian surface. Maybe FedEx could cut it as low as $20,000 per kilogram, but I'm not holding my breath. Let me repeat myself: we are not going there with rockets. At least, not the conventional kind — and while there may be a role for nuclear propulsion in deep space, in general there's a trade-off between instantaneous thrust and efficiency; the more efficient your motor, the lower the actual thrust it provides. Some technologies such as the variable specific impulse magnetoplasma rocket show a good degree of flexibility, but in general they're not suitable for getting us from Earth's surface into orbit — they're only useful for trucking things around from low earth orbit on out. Again, as with interstellar colonization, there are other options. Space elevators, if we build them, will invalidate a lot of what I just said. Some analyses of the energy costs of space elevators suggest that a marginal cost of $350/kilogram to geosynchronous orbit should be achievable without waving any magic wands (other than the enormous practical materials and structural engineering problems of building the thing in the first place). So we probably can look forward to zero-gee vacations in orbit, at a price. And space elevators are attractive because they're a scalable technology; you can use one to haul into space the material to build more. So, long term, space elevators may give us not-unreasonably priced access to space, including jaunts to the lunar surface for a price equivalent to less than $100,000 in today's money. At which point, settlement would begin to look economically feasible, except ... We're human beings. We evolved to flourish in a very specific environment that covers perhaps 10% of our home planet's surface area. (Earth is 70% ocean, and while we can survive, with assistance, in extremely inhospitable terrain, be it arctic or desert or mountain, we aren't well-adapted to thriving there.) Space itself is a very poor environment for humans to live in. A simple pressure failure can kill a spaceship crew in minutes. And that's not the only threat. Cosmic radiation poses a serious risk to long duration interplanetary missions, and unlike solar radiation and radiation from coronal mass ejections the energies of the particles responsible make shielding astronauts extremely difficult. And finally, there's the travel time. Two and a half years to Jupiter system; six months to Mars. Now, these problems are subject to a variety of approaches — including medical ones: does it matter if cosmic radiation causes long-term cumulative radiation exposure leading to cancers if we have advanced side-effect-free cancer treatments? Better still, if hydrogen sulphide-induced hibernation turns out to be a practical technique in human beings, we may be able to sleep through the trip. But even so, when you get down to it, there's not really any economically viable activity on the horizon for people to engage in that would require them to settle on a planet or asteroid and live there for the rest of their lives. In general, when we need to extract resources from a hostile environment we tend to build infrastructure to exploit them (such as oil platforms) but we don't exactly scurry to move our families there. Rather, crews go out to work a long shift, then return home to take their leave. After all, there's no there there — just a howling wilderness of north Atlantic gales and frigid water that will kill you within five minutes of exposure. And that, I submit, is the closest metaphor we'll find for interplanetary colonization. Most of the heavy lifting more than a million kilometres from Earth will be done by robots, overseen by human supervisors who will be itching to get home and spend their hardship pay. And closer to home, the commercialization of space will be incremental and slow, driven by our increasing dependence on near-earth space for communications, positioning, weather forecasting, and (still in its embryonic stages) tourism. But the domed city on Mars is going to have to wait for a magic wand or two to do something about the climate, or reinvent a kind of human being who can thrive in an airless, inhospitable environment.

#### Multiple diseases destroy sustainability of life in space

Matin and Lynch 5

(2005, A. C. Matin, PhD in Microbiology, Professor of Microbiology and Immunology at Stanford University in Stanford, California, and Susan V. Lynch, PhD, Molcular Microbiology, Assistant Professor In Residence, Division of Gastroenterology, UC San Francisco, “Investigating the Threat of Bacteria Grown in Space,” Volume 71, Number 5, 2005/ASM News, <http://www.asm.org/asm/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000001523/znw00505000235.pdf> )

Although tantalizing, space is an inhospitable and dangerous frontier for those sent to explore it. Hence, progress towards more safely navigating and perhaps colonizing space are tasks that demand that we develop knowledge on several fronts, from designing radically new means of space transport to determining how space conditions inﬂuence biological processes. Several harmful effects of space on humans are documented. During extended missions in space, for example, bones lose mass, predisposing space travelers not only to fracture their bones but also to develop renal stones from resorbed bone material. Moreover, muscles atrophy, decreased blood production and volume damage the cardiovascular system, latent viruses (such as Varicella zoster, which causes shingles) tend to reactivate, the incidence of diseases such as bacterial cystitis increases, wound healing slows, pharmacologic agents act differently, and pyschological conditions such as claustrophobia and anxiety tend to be accentuated, in part because of disrupted sleep and dietary patterns. Amid these physical and psychological conditions, there is the added problem that astronauts in space are exposed to intense radiation, involving high-energy protons and nuclei of heavy elements with greater penetrating power and increased capacity to cause malignancies and other problems, than they would be on earth. Additionally, the diminished gravity of space and planets, referred to as microgravity, also poses a direct threat to human health.

### Leadership

### link

#### SMRs reprocess fuel

Szondy ‘12

(David Szondy is a freelance writer based in Monroe, Washington. An award-winning playwright, he has contributed to Charged and iQ magazine and is the author of the website Tales of Future Past. “Feature: Small modular nuclear reactors - the future of energy?” February 16, 2012 accessed online August 22, 2012 at http://www.gizmag.com/small-modular-nuclear-reactors/20860/)

SMRs can help with proliferation, nuclear waste and fuel supply issues because, while some modular reactors are based on conventional pressurized water reactors and burn enhanced uranium, others use less conventional fuels. Some, for example, can generate power from what is now regarded as "waste", burning depleted uranium and plutonium left over from conventional reactors. Depleted uranium is basically U-238 from which the fissible U-235 has been consumed. It's also much more abundant in nature than U-235, which has the potential of providing the world with energy for thousands of years. Other reactor designs don't even use uranium. Instead, they use thorium. This fuel is also incredibly abundant, is easy to process for use as fuel and has the added bonus of being utterly useless for making weapons, so it can provide power even to areas where security concerns have been raised.

### AT nuke now

#### Nuclear will remain uncompetitive for decades—our evidence cites industry leaders.

Hiltzik 11

Michael Hiltzik is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author who has covered business, technology, and public policy for the Los Angeles Times for twenty years, master of science degree in journalism from the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University [March 23, 2011, “A nuclear renaissance in U.S. was unlikely even before Japan disaster,” *LA Times*, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/23/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20110323]

To all those who may be concerned that the catastrophic events at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant will derail the heralded renaissance of nuclear power in the U.S., you can relax.¶ The reason is simple: There is no renaissance.¶ Not even Exelon Corp., the nation's biggest nuclear generation company, has been holding its breath for a surge in orders or appreciable increase in new generating capacity.¶ The reason has little to do with an unreasoning public's fear of nuclear meltdowns and radiation poisoning, and almost everything to do with pure economics. As John Rowe, Exelon's chairman and chief executive, told an audience at a Washington think tank two weeks ago, you can build a new natural gas plant for 40% less than a new nuclear plant, and the price of its fuel is at rock bottom.¶ "Natural gas is queen," he says. (To be fair, Exelon also makes a lot of money from gas.)¶ In recent years, nuclear energy has been promoted as a "green," or at least greenish, alternative to coal power and other fossil-fueled generation. That's been a potent selling point as concern has mounted over the latter's effect on climate change by the production of greenhouse gases. Nuclear power is burdened by its own environmental issues, including the dangers of radioactive release into the atmosphere, but the production of carbon dioxide isn't among them.¶ Yet the technology's potential as a weapon against global warming has been as oversold, just as its virtues as safe, clean and "too cheap to meter" were during its infancy in the 1950s. To realistically make a dent in climate change, nuclear plant construction would have to take off at such a rate that it would "pose serious concerns" for the availability of construction materials, properly trained builders and operating technicians, and safety and security oversight, as a report by the Council on Foreign Relations observed in 2007.¶ "For at least a couple of decades to come, nuclear will be very uncompetitive," the report's author, Charles D. Ferguson, told me this week. Ferguson is president of the Federation of American Scientists.¶ The ongoing disaster in Japan will exacerbate social concerns about nuclear waste disposal — the on-site storage of spent fuel, which is common at U.S. plants, has complicated the situation at Fukushima — as well as concerns about the safety and security of existing plants. But those concerns have existed for years, so the spectacle of the Japanese grappling with the consequences, graphic as it is, may not in itself affect public attitudes.¶ Talk of nuclear renaissance in the U.S. had been spurred by two developments. One was the dramatic improvement in the operating record of U.S. plants. In recent years the domestic nuclear industry had been operating at close to 90% of capacity, compared with the lousy 65% record it turned in during the 1970s. The change was the product partially of the industry's consolidation into a small number of specialty operators with nuclear expertise, and it tended to reduce the apparent cost of nuclear power to levels competitive with other sources.¶ But that also means that "people who advocate nuclear power have rose-colored glasses about its economics," says John E. Parsons of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the co-author of a 2009 update to a 2003 MIT report on the future of nuclear power.¶ Further encouragement came from the streamlining of U.S. licensing rules. The new procedure consolidates what formerly were separate construction and operating permits into one, removing the uncertainty that a utility might build an entire facility only to be denied permission to run it.¶ But no new plant has yet been approved under the new system, so plenty of uncertainty still exists. "An investor has to ask, 'Am I looking at a technology that works only when all the cards fall my way?'" Parsons says.¶ Despite expressions of support for nuclear power coming from political leaders, including President Obama, who is offering loan guarantees for new reactors, nuclear energy can't develop in a policy vacuum. One of the dismal ironies of the American energy program is that many of the same politicians standing foursquare behind nuclear power are also sworn opponents of policies such as a carbon tax, which would make nukes more competitive by raising the price of fossil-based alternatives.¶ For example, here's Mitt Romney. In "No Apology," the book he published last year presumably as a manifesto for his 2012 presidential campaign, Romney says he doesn't understand why nuclear power is such a "boogeyman," because America's existing plants are "trouble-free." Romney contends that nuclear plants are economically unfeasible in the U.S. only because of our "interminable permitting, regulatory and legal delays."¶ Romney should listen more to fellow businessmen like Exelon's Rowe, who would tell him that the real reason is that gas generation is cheaper, thanks to pricing that ignores such external costs of gas as pollution and climate change. Yet in his book Romney condemns policies such as the carbon tax because it would "fatten government, harm employers and employees, and hurt consumers." You can't have it both ways, Mitt.¶ Romney defends the economics of nuclear power by observing that countries with major nuclear construction programs, such as China, seem to have solved the economic conundrum without much trouble. Yet even pro-nuclear experts here acknowledge that nuclear economics don't easily cross national borders. China, which has 13 operating nuclear plants and 30 under construction, has endowed its state-owned nuclear industry with heavy subsidies.¶ According to a report by the Federation of American Scientists, China's burgeoning demand for electrical power can't effectively be satisfied from its current main source, coal, which will face a depletion crisis around the end of this decade. That makes ramping up nuclear an urgent issue for China. But in the U.S., says Andrew Kadak, the former CEO of Yankee Atomic Power Co., a New England nuclear plant operator, "we don't have that urgency because natural gas is too cheap an alternative."¶ With the construction of plants still hampered by economics, nuclear utilities are devoting more attention to improving efficiencies and increasing the output of their existing plants, a process known as "uprating." But that amounts to treading water until the social and economic difficulties of nuclear power can be addressed. And they'll have to be addressed: "It's going to be very hard to reduce carbon dioxide if nuclear is out of the picture," MIT's Parsons says. But the first step is injecting realism into the discussion. Nuclear power may be necessary to our energy future, but it won't be our savior.

#### No nuclear renaissance – public perception

Ramana ‘11

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In 1976, Alvin Weinberg, former director¶ of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory,¶ observed: ÒThe public perception and¶ acceptance of nuclear energy . . . has¶ emerged as the most critical question¶ concerning the future of nuclear energyÓ¶ (Weinberg, 1976: 19). This question continues¶ to dog nuclear power, making¶ the technology a problematic choice¶ for electricity generation. The¶ Fukushima accidents reinforce the publicÕs¶ concern about the potential for¶ severe accidents and long-lasting harm¶ to health and the environment. The¶ ongoing revelations about unreported¶ safety problems in Japan, the United¶ States, and other countries offer proof¶ that the nuclear industry and the regulatory¶ authorities cannot be trusted when¶ it comes to assertions of safety. As a¶ result, public opposition to nuclear¶ power is unlikely to disappear anytime¶ soon. If democracy is to be respected, it¶ would take a miracle to effect a Ònuclear¶ renaissance.Ó